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ABSTRACT
The ubiquity of ugly female characters in the work of southern women calls into
question what W. J. Cash termed “gyneolatry,” the worship of the beautiful white woman
upon which so much of southern ideology has been based. If the South functions as an
internal other for the nation, then examining this fiction’s multiplicity of ugly women
illuminates the ways in which women defy not only the norms of southern gender but
also those of the larger American culture, in which the southern woman often acts as a
representation of the South in general. By considering ugliness as a category separate
from others with which it has heretofore been conflated, my project illuminates the ways
in which characters who fail to live up to the rigid expectations of their gender reveal the
productive potential of such failure. Though Flannery O’Connor wrote that southern
literature is rife with freaks because only southerners were able to recognize the freakish,
I maintain that writers such as O’Connor created so many ugly women as their own way
of “being ugly.” These authors utilize the “ugly plot” instead of the expected courtship or
marriage plots to imagine alternative futures for southern women who fall out of the
marriage market. As American culture often relies upon regionalism in order to bolster
national identity, viewing the southern novel through the lens of the ugly plot reveals that
texts written by southern women not only speak back to southern ideologies, but call into
question national paradigms of femininity.
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INTRODUCTION
We often forget that the first line of Margaret Mitchell’s 1936 novel Gone with
the Wind is, “Scarlett O’Hara was not beautiful” (1). While the iconic beauty of actress
Vivien Leigh is at odds with this description, the characterization of the less-thanbeautiful southern woman is surprisingly common in the work of twentieth and twentyfirst century women writers. In fact, in contrast to popular ideas of beautiful southern belles,
the fiction of these southern women writers contains a preponderance of women described
specifically as ugly: differing from the norm enough in a negative way to catch the attention
while simultaneously repulsing the viewer. In Lopsided, Scarred, and Squint-Eyed: Ugly
Women in the Work of Southern Women Writers, I argue that the ubiquity of ugly female

characters in this fiction calls into question what southern scholar W. J. Cash termed
“gyneolatry,” the worship of the beautiful white woman upon which so much of southern
ideology has been based (86). The purity and protection of middle and upper class white
women have been evoked when defending not only retrogressive gender roles in the
region, but also its history of Jim Crow laws, lynching, and other race-based violence and
practices of exclusion. I demonstrate how southern women—particularly those writing
after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment—have consistently used the figure of the
ugly woman as an act of rebellion against this ideology which insisted upon limited roles
for women. If the South, as many scholars observe, functions as an internal other for the
nation, then examining the multiplicity of ugly women in this fiction illuminates the ways
in which women defy not only the expectations of Southern gyneolatry but also those of
the larger American culture, in which the southern woman often acts as a representation
of the South in general.
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Ugliness as a category is important because, unlike more extreme categories such
as the grotesque, ugliness is quite everyday; it differs just enough from normal to catch
the eye. We stare at ugliness because it represents some sort of disorder or violation of
expectation. We try to make sense of what we are seeing: what is that? What makes that
different? Scholarship which has addressed the figure of the ugly woman has conflated
ugliness with other categories, such as the grotesque and the freakish. However, by
differentiating the more quotidian characterization of “ugly” from more extreme
descriptors, my project argues that ugliness has a specific function in the work of
southern women writers: ugliness marks those who for various reasons are not suitable
for the expected roles of marriage and motherhood. In addition to the acknowledged
narrative structures of the courtship and marriage plots, I propose that, in the work of
these authors, there also exists a third element, which I call the ugly plot. By taking them
outside of the marriage market, the ugly plot offers women ways of living that are
alternative to marriage, acknowledging women who “don’t count,” whose class status,
race, ethnicity, or rebellion against the status quo threaten the stability of the dominant,
white southern culture. I argue that the ugly plot not only reveals the limits of the
structures underlying the seemingly requisite roles of wife and mother, but also provides
a space for imagining alternative household configurations and ways of living.
Not only does the ugly plot demonstrate that there are a variety of ways of living
alternative to the dominant marriage market, but it also highlights the fact that there are a
variety of marriage markets. While a traditional courtship plot such as John Pendleton
Kennedy’s Swallow Barn primarily acknowledges the dominant, white, upper class
marriage market, works as disparate as Katherine Anne Porter’s The Old Order and Alice
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Walker’s The Color Purple which deploy the ugly plot acknowledge that there are
multiple marriage markets, interlocking and yet distinct from each other. Depending upon
factors such as race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, these markets rely upon each
other in order to mutually reinforce these boundaries. For example, as I discuss in
Chapter Three, in The Old Order the juxtaposition of the wedding of the young, white,
upper class belle with that of her young, black slave illuminates the ways in which these
marriage economies are simultaneously exclusive and interdependent.
Generally speaking, the beauty standards in the twentieth-century South which
permeate these texts are based on whiteness. Blaine Roberts claims that, “What it meant
to be beautiful in the Jim Crow and civil rights South was determined largely by the
presence of a racial other” (7), and it is such standards of white beauty which are
generally upheld by these texts. As I discuss in Chapter Three, in texts such as The Color
Purple or Their Eyes Were Watching God, markers of blackness (kinky hair or darker
skin, for example) are often invoked as characteristic of ugliness. However, whiteness
does not assure that a woman is evaluated as a beauty; many other factors mediate such a
judgment. And in fact, an ugly plot containing a female character described as ugly—
especially one who has consciously chosen to by ugly—often highlights the role that
privilege plays in the ugly plot. As I discuss in Chapter Four, a woman must have access
to material resources outside of marriage in order to choose to opt out of any of the
marriage markets.
My first chapter, “Theorizing Ugliness,” constructs a theoretical framework for
my analysis of the use of ugliness in these works by southern women writers. First, I
consider the specifically southern dimension of ugliness. As “being ugly” is a phrase with
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a regionally specific definition (meaning misbehaving or being rude), I argue that the
ubiquity of ugly women in these works functions as a refusal of the pedestal. Beginning
with a primarily Foucauldian understanding of the body as a product of its specific
history, I explain the ways in which ugliness not only allows female characters to defy
specifically southern norms of femininity, but allows them a spectrum of relationships to
the marriage economy, including invisibility, shock, and productive modes of failure.
Finally, I consider how ugliness differs from the visual categories with which it is often
conflated. Unlike ugliness, descriptors such as the grotesque, abject, or freakish imply
forms of monstrousness and deviance which place them well outside the bounds of the
normal. I discuss the ways in which these categories inform my understanding of ugliness
as well as the importance of ugliness separately from these categories as well as less
extreme ones, such as the homely or the plain.
Chapter Two, “The Medusa Stares Back,” examines the deployment of ugliness in
the short fiction of Eudora Welty. Utilizing archival research from the Welty collection at
the Mississippi Department of Archives and History, I consider the recurrence of Medusa
imagery in Welty’s work as a new paradigm for understanding the interactive dimension
of ugliness, arguing that this imagery thematizes the intersubjective nature of ugliness.
Unlike more traditional readings of Medusa in Welty’s work, I focus on the Medusa
figure herself rather than on the effect of Medusa on her victims and Perseus’s ultimate
victory over her. Though Medusa herself is monstrous, Welty uses Medusa imagery less
to portray monstrous femininity than to construct an interactive model of ugliness and its
effects on both the viewer and the viewed. The Medusan paradigm of intersubjective
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ugliness highlights the centrality of fascination—that ugliness has a dimension of power
to it—in this process.
In fact, the frequent appearance of these characters in the work of southern
women writers affects the very nature of southern narrative form. In Chapter Three, “The
Ugly Plot,” I argue that these characters form the basis of what I propose as the ugly plot
in the work of southern women writers. Complicating the courtship plot/wedding plot
dichotomy observed by Elizabeth Freeman, I propose that there also exists this third
element. Though southern literature is replete with teleological courtship plots such as
John Pendleton Kennedy’s Swallow Barn and multitudinous marriage plots such as
Carson McCullers’ Member of the Wedding or even William Faulkner’s Absalom,
Absalom!, I demonstrate how authors such as Margaret Mitchell, Marjorie Kinan
Rawlings, Katherine Anne Porter, and Alice Walker deploy this ugly plot narrative
structure. Dramatizing ugliness as representing a productive mode of failure, the ugly plot
highlights women whose identities represent what many queer theorists characterize as
illegible, and as such, challenge the stability of the dominant, white southern culture that
the South’s gyneolatrous traditions attempt to uphold.
In Chapter 4, “Choosing To Be Ugly,” I focus on one particular category of the
ugly plot, one in which women make the conscious choice to be ugly in order to opt out
of the expectations of marriage, motherhood, and passive femininity. Starting with the
southern expression “Don’t be ugly,” I argue that the frequent appearance of female
characters in the work of southern women is itself a form of “being ugly” on the part of
the authors. By drawing upon the counterplot of ugliness as a choice, southern women
imagine alternatives to marriage and motherhood, undoing the male homosocial triangle
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and the homosocial underpinnings of southern society. The authors in this chapter are
those who engage in this politics of dissent through various kinds of conscious choices
about female appearance. In the works of authors such as Flannery O’Connor, Zora Neale
Hurston, Lee Smith, and Helen Ellis, characters choose to appear ugly, actively seeking
out an ugly appearance through their clothing, grooming, posture, facial expressions, and
even the way they walk.
More than simply engaging in a politics of dissent, I believe that these recurring
figures highlight the narrow vision of gyneolatry which for so long has been considered
as fundamental to (at least twentieth-century) southern ideology. By considering ugliness
as a category separate from these others with which it has heretofore been conflated,
Lopsided, Scarred, and Squint-Eyed: Ugly Women in the Work of Southern Women
Writers illuminates the ways in which these characters who fail to live up to the rigid
expectations of their gender show how such failure has productive potential. Though
Flannery O’Connor claimed that southern literature is rife with freaks because only
southerners were still able to recognize the freakish, I maintain that writers such as
O’Connor created so many ugly women as their own way of “being ugly.” These authors
call upon the ugly plot in order to imagine alternative futures for southern women who
fall out of the marriage market.
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CHAPTER 1
THEORIZING UGLINESS
One of the most important aspects of the turn to the “new southern studies” at the
beginning of the twenty-first century was a renewed emphasis on the significance of
gender to our understanding of Southern literature. In the preface to their special issue of
American Literature on Violence, the Body, and “The South,” Houston A. Baker and
Dana D. Nelson proposed a “new Southern studies” represented in part by works such as
Patricia Yaeger’s Dirt and Desire: Reconstructing Southern Women’s Writing, 19301990 and Anne Goodwyn Jones and Susan Donaldson’s collection Haunted Bodies:
Gender and Southern Texts. In particular, new southern studies brought attention to the
significance of the grotesque female body in southern literature: Yaeger importantly
focused on “the prevalence in southern women’s writing of flesh that has been ruptured
or riven by violence, of fractured, excessive bodies telling us something that diverse
southern cultures don’t want us to say.” She wished to “examine the importance of
irregular models of the body within an extremely regulated society and to focus on
figures of damaged, incomplete, or extravagant characters described under the rubrics
peculiarly suited to southern histories in which the body is simultaneously fractioned and
overwhelmed” (xiii). New Southern Studies worked to complicate the understanding of
the grotesque as merely as “decadent southern form,” as many had previously considered
it (xiii).
Yaeger is certainly not alone in her focus on the significance of such “fractured,
excessive” bodies. Sarah Gleeson-White, for example, identifies what she describes as a
“peculiarly southern form of ugliness” in the work of Carson McCullers, Eudora Welty,
and Flannery O’Connor,” arguing that “these freakish women that so loudly dominate
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these stories engage in a politics of dissent” (46). However, though ugliness has been a
part of these discussions, when ugliness has been considered, it has been conflated with
other categories, such as the grotesque and the abject. In this dissertation, I argue that
ugliness should be considered as a discrete, separate category, because of its very
ordinariness.
Admittedly, these are slippery categories: at what point does the plain slide into
the homely? Where exactly do we draw the line between the ugly and the grotesque?
Throughout this project, I try to remain cognizant of how these characterizations overlap
and often inform each other. However, the significance of my commentary lies in its
emphasis on the ugly rather than the grotesque or other categories. While plenty has been
written about the ramifications of Joy-Hulga’s prosthetic leg in Flannery O’Connor’s
“Good Country People” from the perspective of disability studies, or even the sort of
“freak studies” represented by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, I am much more interested
in the fact that she changes her name to Hulga because of its ugly sound, insists upon
frowning and wearing ugly clothes, and walks in such a way as to emphasize her limp
and make an “ugly-sounding” entrance each morning (267).
In these works, ugliness functions as a marker of defiance against social standards
and expectations. Similar to the abject and the grotesque, it calls attention to the
boundaries of normativity in society, in a sense reinforcing and reifying these boundaries.
However, unlike the abject and grotesque, which are more excessive, hyperbolic, and—at
least in the case of the grotesque—contain possibilities for connection to the sublime and
the explosion of boundaries, the ugly does not so much explode or reinforce boundaries
as it does threaten, irritate, and call them into question. Particularly under the rubric of
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the twentieth- and twenty-first century beauty-industrial complex, which approaches the
discipline of the proper body as a duty to be enforced, the figure of the ugly woman
functions as a figure of rebellion or moral failure.
More importantly, ugliness, as it fails to conform to social norms, forces a more
direct interaction between viewer and viewed than does the more conventional body.
Ugliness refuses to be dismissed: by forcing an interaction, the ugly woman denies the
possibility of mere objectification, as one judged as beautiful might. Rather, as the ugly
body requires explanation, a narration to bridge the gap between expectation and reality,
the ugly woman resists the object position and instead insists upon her own position as
subject. Opening up the possibility of sexuality which is not object-choice based, this
process not only has the potential to threaten the viewer who is forced to engage in ways
which call attention to her own vulnerability, but also offers potential empowerment for
the woman being viewed, as she resists passive objectification. Even if her ugliness is
more a form of passive dissent than active rebellion, it nevertheless provokes a reaction
in the viewer. Ultimately, the figure of the ugly woman functions as an important site of
potential resistance for women against the nearly irresistible interpellation into the beauty
industrial complex, strict southern gender roles, and their hegemonic value strictures.

The Interactive Nature of Ugliness
Ugliness, like beauty, is an aesthetic judgment which results from an interaction
between a viewer and one who is viewed. In Staring: How We Look, Rosemarie GarlandThomson focuses on this interactivity, specifically at the interactive aspects of staring.
She asks why we stare, what happens when we stare, and how staring affects both the
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starer as well as the one stared at. First, she breaks down what happens when we stare,
noting that at its core, “Staring is an ocular response to what we don’t expect to see” (3).
More importantly, she observes that “We stare when ordinary seeing fails, when we want
to know more. So staring is an interrogative gesture that asks what’s going on and
demands the story . . . . This intense visual engagement creates a circuit of
communication and meaning-making” (3). It is the narrative and “meaning-making”
aspects of staring which are most significant in the judgment of ugliness. Ugly women
grab our attention in ways that more conventional-looking women do not—they deviate
from the norm enough to be noticeable. They require an explanation for why they look
the way they do, what has scarred them or pushed them outside of the normal.
Similarly, in On Beauty and Being Just, philosopher Elaine Scarry sees beauty as
emerging from the interaction between the perceiver and the one perceived as beautiful.
To Scarry, it is in this interaction that the power of beauty is felt, as both parties provide a
sense of life for each other. Beauty makes the heart beat faster, makes the perceiver feel
alive. Describing a Pygmalion-like paradigm, Scarry claims that the attention of the gaze
bestows life upon the beautiful. To Scarry, what marks someone as what GarlandThomson would characterize as “stareable” is that they deviate from the expected norm
or average (in both positive and negative ways—beauty and ugliness share the quality of
deviating significantly enough from the norm to be notable). In fact, she emphasizes the
fact that, “Beauty always takes place in the particular, and if there are no particulars, the
chances of seeing it go down” (18). She also explains that typically, individual concepts
of the beautiful arise from what she paradoxically explains as a “composite of
particulars” (19). In other words, beauty results from a comparison to our own individual
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accretion of the particular details and traits of the people we have encountered, while
keeping intact a sense of individuality, rather than the kind of blurring together which an
average might imply. And by extension, ugliness is that which is outside of the “standard
deviation” of conventional appearance.
This seems to speak to Nancy Etcoff’s claim in Survival of the Prettiest that our
ideas of beauty are an average of what we have seen before: “The mechanism that stores
and averages faces is innate and universal, but the composite it forms is dependent on the
faces it sees. This means that in a multicultural world people’s internal averages might
begin to reflect the universal face” (146). In this model, the aesthetic judgment of beauty
reflects an individual viewer’s singular history, reflecting an average of those seen
before—but more than simply an average, there is still a focus on particulars.1 In Scarry’s
specification, it is the particular which is just as important as the composite. There must
be something extra on which the viewer is “caught” in order to facilitate the kind of
interaction required for a judgment of beautiful to occur.
However, being “caught” in this way does not only happen with the beautiful.
Garland-Thomson explains that, in any visual encounter, the brain must sift through a riot
of sensory input, a process she refers to as “orientation”: “Orientation is the attempt to
impose a frame of reference on the chaos of a visual field by integrating what is unknown
into what is already known . . . . [requiring] scrutiny to impose a logical narrative on what
at first glance seems to be random visual stimuli” (20). Data which does not align easily
with expected schemata or does not neatly fit into a logical narrative (because it deviates

1

My use of “average” here is not quite correct—in mathematical terms, beauty would be not so much a
mean value, which is based on a sum total, but rather a median value, which keeps the individual values of
the components intact in its consideration.
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from the norm) causes the need for additional data to be gathered, through further gazing
or staring. Whether someone is missing a limb, is scarred, or has an excessively large
nose, we stop and stare, trying to figure out why she is so different from us.
As I am interested in the interactive nature of what happens when we encounter
ugliness, I will briefly discuss different conceptions of how this interaction is enacted.
While Scarry uses “gazing” and “staring” interchangeably, Garland-Thomson not only
distinguishes between the two terms, but she also differentiates between different kinds
of staring. Gazing, according to Garland-Thomson, is “an oppressive act of disciplinary
looking that subordinates its victim” (9). In her discussion of different kinds of staring,
she differentiates between “the blank stare, the baroque stare, the separated stare, the
engaged stare, the stimulus-driven stare, the goal-driven stare, and the dominating stare”
(9). All of these different modes, however, whether gazing or staring, has at its heart “the
matter of appearance, of the ways we see each other and the ways we are seen” (9).
Despite the issues of power at play in staring, Garland-Thomson is most interested
in what she describes as staring’s “generative potential” (9). This “generative potential”
is one which results from an extended encounter:
If an encounter can be sustained, staring asks questions. And those questions open
up stories. To stare is to ask, ‘Why are you different from me?’ and ‘What
happened to you?” To observe the stare is to ask “Why are you different from
me?” and “What is his interest?” To undergo the stare is to ask “What is attracting
her?” or “What is wrong with me?” Each of these implicit questions is the nub of
a narrative about who we are, how we fit into the human community, or how we
understand each other. As such, scenes of staring can generate new stories. (95)
Garland-Thomson not only describes the possibilities for meaning-making during such
encounters, but she importantly highlights the ways in which these possibilities exist for
both the starer and the stared-at; it affects them both. Garland-Thomson characterizes
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what happens during staring as an interactive moment of possibility: “Staring,” she
explains, “makes things happen between people” (33).
Among the myriad paradigms of staring Garland-Thomson explores are two
opposing ones which are relevant. First, there is what she calls a “Foucauldian” mode of
staring, which builds upon Foucault’s Panopticon theory of discipline.2 The Foucauldian
paradigm is one in which the threat of the stare is internalized: “By institutionalizing the
dominating stare, the idea of the Panopticon tames Medusa, stripping away her petrifying
stare and replacing it with the banal surveillance camera we’ve all come to accept . . . .
Surveillance differs, however, from interpersonal face-to-face staring in that it is
controlling, static, and exercised by the few on the many” (43). In other words, this is the
kind of staring which implies expectations; this kind of staring expresses judgment based
on society’s standards.
An alternative to the Foucauldian mode is what Garland-Thompson refers to as
Sartre’s “parable of interpersonal shaming through domination staring,” in which
“[b]eing caught staring is as dangerous as being stared at.” Acknowledging the
interactive nature of these staring configurations, Garland-Thomson explains that “This
scene asserts the perversity of staring and the anxiety of being a staree.” The Sartrean
configuration complicates the Foucauldian binary configuration (in which the stare is
unidirectional, going from the starer to the one being stared at) by making the starer also
at risk of being caught staring—in other words, being in the double bind of being stared

2

Foucault used the analogy of a panopticon-styled jail—round, with a darkened-glass guard tower in the
middle—in which inmates had to assume that all of their activities were seen by the guards, whether or not
this was actually the case at any given moment. Such assumed surveillance leads to constant selfsurveillance and behavior modification among the inmates. It was Foucault’s contention that a similar
mechanism of self-surveillance occurs in society as well. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison.
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at while staring, which Garland-Thomson characterizes as “simultaneous domination and
subjection” (43).

A Peculiarly Southern Form of Ugliness
This intersubjective paradigm of staring at an ugly person is complicated further
when we take the regional meaning of the word “ugly” into account, as it adds an
important behavioral dimension to this schema. Ugliness has a unique meaning when
used in the American South: “being ugly” is a southern phrase meaning behaving rudely.
That ugliness has such a regionally specific dimension which is tied to behavior
highlights the function of ugliness in the work of southern women writers: ugliness
marks those who for various reasons are not suitable for the expected roles of marriage
and motherhood. Ugliness often marks women who “don’t count,” whose class status,
race, ethnicity, rebellion against the status quo, or other undesirable characteristics
threaten the stability of the dominant, white southern culture that the South’s
gyneolatrous traditions attempt to uphold. As the warning “don’t be ugly” implies,
southern ugliness is code for that which upsets the status quo, whether visually or
through inappropriate behavior.
Ugliness as a descriptor, then, marks women as inappropriate and disruptive in
ways that other negative descriptors do not. Unlike more dramatic signifiers—such as the
freakish, monstrous, abject, and grotesque—ugliness is remarkable in its very
ordinariness. Women who are described in these excessive terms can, on the one hand,
pose an overt threat to the status quo. On the other hand, the very excess of their
appearance can also render them less or other than human, thus negating any threat they
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might pose. We should look at female characters who are characterized as ugly separate
from characters who are described in other negative valences because ugliness has a
specific southern meaning. Even adjectives such as plain and homely, which one might
be tempted to consider as synonymous with ugly, actually signify quite the opposite.
While ugliness marks women who are unfit for marriage, plainness and homeliness are in
fact markers of fitness for traditionally feminine roles. A truly beautiful woman is not
ideal marriage material: first, in the long tradition of cuckoldry anxiety, her beauty stands
as a constant threat to her marriage; and second, beauty is distracting—it would interfere
with the running of a household. Instead, to be successful within the southern marriage
economy, a woman’s appearance should reflect her submissive nature, through her
plain—or even more appropriately, homely—appearance.

Ugliness as a Refusal of the Disciplining Pedestal
A woman’s appearance is not only a symbolic representation of her identity, but is
also a physical manifestation of her experiences. Low socioeconomic status, for example,
has material effects on the body, demonstrating what Foucault means in his discussion of
the body in Discipline and Punish as “caught up in a system of constraints and privations,
obligations and prohibitions” (11). He describes the economic dimension of the body’s
subjection in this field where “power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to
emit signs” (25). According to Foucault,
This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex
reciprocal relations, with its economic use . . . . This subjection is not only
obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can also be direct,
physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material elements, and yet without
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involving violence; it may be calculated, organized, technically thought out; it
may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a
physical order. (26)
Such subjection arises from material forces, and such subjection has visible effects on the
bodies under its jurisdiction.
The ugliness which marks the female characters in my study distinguishes them
from other female characters who, in contrast, do fulfill the expected roles of wife and
mother. Following Tolstoy, in these works beautiful women are often alike; ugly women
are often ugly in their own way.3 What we understand as “ugliness” is often history
rendered visible: stretch marks, scars, wrinkles, and posture are all potentially revelatory
of woman’s life. Life leaves marks on their bodies which can be read as an archive. Much
of what is read on the body as ugliness is often the result of the material conditions of
lifetimes of hardship and suffering. In Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937), for
example, Zora Neale Hurston describes people on the muck as being “ugly from
ignorance and broken from being poor” (131).
The material conditions of poverty, privation, and demanding physical labor have
very real effects on the body—and in turn, on a woman’s appearance. Even in Gone with
the Wind (1936), Scarlett’s hands reveal the reality of her post-war life at Tara, when
Rhett gasps at seeing “not Scarlett O’Hara’s soft, white, dimpled, helpless” hand, but
rather one “rough from work, brown with sunburn, splotched with freckles. The nails
were broken and irregular, there were heavy calluses on the cushions of the palm, a half-

3

In fact, recent studies seems to support this, as they suggest that less attractive faces are more distinctive
and memorable than faces considered to be attractive or even beautiful (Wiese, Altmann, and
Schweinberger 31).
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healed blister on the thumb. The red scar which boiling fat had left last month was ugly
and glaring” (397). Scarlett’s changed life of labor can be read in her “ugly” hands. 4
Susan Bordo takes Foucault’s explication of power and material forces and
connects it to the expectations of feminine appearance in the United States. After
explaining that, “Following Foucault, we must first abandon the idea of power as
something possessed by one group and leveled against another; we must instead think of
the network of practices, institutions, and technologies that sustain positions of
dominance and subordination in a particular domain” (“The Body and the Reproduction
of Femininity” 92). Bordo claims that through these practices, “we continue to memorize
on our bodies the feel and conviction of lack, insufficiency, of never being good enough.
At the farthest extremes, the practices of femininity may lead us to utter demoralization,
debilitation, and death” (“The Body and Reproduction of Femininity” 91). Within this
Foucauldian framework, ugliness is a dynamic, emergent property, creating the dynamic
body as an archive over time—as we see in Scarlett’s hands, for example.
Such a Foucauldian understanding of the nature of ugliness highlights the
importance of its intersubjective nature, which Erving Goffman emphasizes in his
discussion of the connection between ugliness and stigma. According to Goffman,
ugliness “has its initial and prime effect during social situations, threatening the pleasure
we might otherwise take in the company of its possessor . . . . we may discriminate
against him here simply because of the feelings we have about looking at him. Ugliness,
then, is a stigma that is focused in social situations” (50). In her discussion of what she

4

Although, she maintains enough of her earlier class privilege and the privilege currently accorded her
family name that she can hide her hands with gloves and still pass as someone who does not know manual
labor, as her subsequent marriage to Frank Kennedy demonstrates.
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refers to as “the female grotesque,”5 Mary Russo similarly calls attention to “the careful
calibration of anatomical differences and body types which characterize disciplines of
bodily production in consumer society; in terms, that is, of the continuing market
segmentation which requires different models for different markets and accordingly sorts
and measures one female body or body part from and against another” (23). As much of
what is characterized as attractive involves discipline and policing of boundaries, ugliness
is a practice of freedom. The power of ugliness lies in its ability to interrupt the power
flow within these “networks of practices, institutions, and technologies that sustain
positions of dominance and subordination in a particular domain.” The potential for
resistance which ugliness possesses arises from its ability to threaten the pleasure that
arises from such networks.6

Shock and Failure as Effects of Ugliness
Ugliness has an additional political function in these works, as it allows authors to
respond to various kinds of backlash reactions to political success achieved by women,
like what Bordo describes in her observation of 1980s cultural backlash to second wave
feminism. According to Bordo, “the contemporary preoccupation with appearance, which
still affects women far more powerfully than men . . . . may function as a backlash
phenomenon, reasserting existing gender configurations against any attempts to shift or
5

As I have already noted in my discussion of scholars such as Sarah Gleeson-White, Russo’s use of the
word “grotesque” similarly conflates variety of negative descriptors including ugliness. Nevertheless, her
observations about the place of the female body within consumer society are quite relevant to my analysis.
6

As I discuss below, I have set the parameters for my project beginning with the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment, a moment in history in which we see new networks of power emerging for women. The
backlash which arose from such new avenues of power may explain to some extent the preponderance of
ugly female characters who emerge in the writing of women after 1920, especially in the more conservative
cultures of the American South, as these characters provide a site of resistance to such backlash.
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transform power relations” (“Reproduction of Femininity” 91-2). As the passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment in 1919 is arguably one of the greatest American feminist
achievements of the twentieth century, I have limited the scope of my study to works
published after this date. Not only are women full legal subjects in this period, but in the
wake of the kinds of backlashes that Bordo describes, the authors in my study create ugly
female characters in order to refuse and speak back to these heightened expectations. As
many in the South have advocated for the re-emergence of traditional gender
configurations to silence unruly women, women writing in the American South have
continued to create unruly women who speak and act out, refusing the roles which are
expected of them through their very unruliness.
The intersubjective nature of appearance allows ugliness to function as an active
rebellion as it often evokes a visceral reaction in its viewers. Many not only express
disgust but also claim to experience real harm at the sight of ugliness, as hyperbolic
exclamations such as “I’m blind!” and “Oh, my eyes!” in response to, say, a fat woman in
a bikini, demonstrate. In fact, throughout the twentieth century, many laws known as
“ugly laws”—“ordinances [which] bar ‘unsightly’ citizens from public places because
they are in fact too sightly”—have been enacted in order to protect people from such
perceived harm (Garland-Thomson 73). By attempting to prevent encounters with bodies
which deviate too far from the norm, what these laws actually try to provide is protection
from a confrontation with the realization of bodily vulnerability. Such confrontation is at
the heart of the deployment of ugliness by southern women in their work. Rather than
rely on the grotesque, or the gargantuan, or other excessive registers, the ugly allows
writers to express this mode of affect in response to the incoherence of the (southern)
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world and the difficulty many women have in fitting into it—or their lack of interest in
fitting in.
Key to this reaction is the element of shock which ugliness offers. We see such
shock at ugly women registered in many of these stories, whether the unnamed narrator
of Welty’s “A Memory,” who feels a “peak of horror” at seeing ugly, fat women in
bathing suits (97) or Richard Burlage in Lee Smith’s Oral History, who is “stunned” at
seeing how “hugely, grossly fat” Justine Poole has grown since he last saw her (219).
Laurent Berlant and Lee Edelman consider the affective quality of such shock in Sex, or
the Unbearable. Considering the ways that “delegitimated being[s]” can “surviv[e]
dominations of power” (7), they emphasize the importance of shock as a strategy of
resistance. Ugliness has the potential to provide this kind of effective shock proposed by
Berlant and Edelman: “Even in its everyday form . . . the shock we encounter retains the
potential to undo our faith in our ongoingness, our sense of our consistency as subjects
(however inconsistently conceived), and to obtrude with an incoherence we cannot
master by finding it comic or resolve through the judgment of shame” (8, emphasis in
original). Berlant and Edelman’s focus on what they call “sex without optimism” builds
upon Edelman’s earlier work on “queer negativity” and his rejection of “reproductive
futurism.” In all of this work, Edelman generally expresses a suspicion of progressive
narratives and instead focuses on what happens in places of failure or refusal. However,
instead of characterizing these moments as particularly transgressive or subversive, they
instead “attend to the possibility of ‘making peace with’ or ‘being in the room with’ . . .
the ‘mess’ of affective intensities by engaging that mess in its ordinariness instead of as
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inherently traumatic” (64). Similarly, ugliness allows authors to engage with problems in
southern culture at the level of the ordinary, rather than in more hyperbolic registers.
The concept of queer negativity (as theorized by both Edelman as well as Judith
Halberstam) provides a generative framework from which to consider ugliness.
According to Edelman, the value of queer negativity “resides in its challenges to value as
defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social
itself” (No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive 6). My own feminist analysis of
ugliness parallels that of Halberstam’s description of queer negativity, in which it
represents a form of “feminist politics that issues not from a doing but from an undoing,
not from a being or becoming women but from a refusal to be or to become woman as
she has been defined and imagined within Western philosophy” (124). Even as a
moderate refusal, I wish to engage with ugliness in its ordinariness, rather than in more
extreme, grotesque iterations, especially in its capacity for “undoing,” a concept
discussed by both Edelman and Halberstam.
Edelman’s discussion with Berlant in Sex, or the Unbearable is particularly
appropriate for my consideration of ugliness, and not only because ugliness has been a
marker of sexuality in Western literature at least as far back as the Wife of Bath’s gapped
teeth.7 Ugliness, like sexuality, reveals a “mess of affective intensities” connected to the
corporeal and calls attention to that which is not easily controlled. In her unruliness, the
ugly woman is often she who cannot be contained. Ugliness often describes women who
are excessive: fat, hairy, or even loud. In this way, the inclusion of ugly women within a
narrative calls attention to the real complexities of life. In fairy tales, the ugly stepsister

7

See, e.g., Bauer’s discussion of ugliness as a marker of sexuality in the work of American women writers.
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must be disposed of; she cannot be rewarded in the end. Ugly women embody the
excesses outside of happily ever after.
Focusing on female characters who fall outside of such “happily ever after”structured courtship and marriage plots has allowed many southern women writers, as I
will discuss in chapter 3, to imagine alternatives to the marriage market, what I
characterize as the ugly plot. Though some works—such as Alice Walker’s The Color
Purple (1982), which ends with the ugly woman Celie having found her way to artistic
expression within a household of her extended family—imagine such alternatives as
happy endings, not all of the endings in these works are necessarily what I would
characterize as utopian. However, Berlant and Edelman’s discussion of the meaning of
the utopian with regard to negativity and failure does echo my understanding of these
imagined alternatives. For Berlant, a primary characteristic of the utopian—and why she
characterizes her own perspective as utopian—is that it contains the possibility for
transformation through a willingness to tolerate difference. Describing Berlant’s “utopian
perspective,” Edelman explains it as
this belief that the conditions supporting abjection, aggression, and domination by
norms are susceptible to transformation in such a way that won’t dramatize their
negativity by defensively disavowing that negativity but might enable us, instead,
to accept it as part of our openness to the world. Difference, conceived as “benign
variation,” might thus give rise to a vitalizing experience of engagement and
curiosity rather than encouraging a fearful retreat to normativity’s fortified
bunkers. (64)
Admittedly, I am loath to characterize the ugly female characters in my study as utopian,
even in Berlant’s usage: ugliness in these works functions as more than simply “benign
variation.”
However, I do think that there may be some sort of utopian impulse at work in the
humorous aspects of ugly female characters. Ugly characters in works such as Helen
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Ellis’s Eating the Cheshire Cat or Flannery O’Connor’s “Good Country People” evoke a
complex affective response in readers, including sympathy, shock, and amusement. The
combination of amusement and sympathy allows the reader to reach a state of openness
like that described by Berlant and Edelman. The affective potential in these characters
permits readers to reevaluate the myths of southern female beauty and consider not only
different understandings of the role of women in the South but also the very role of the
South itself within the nation. It’s important to note, however, that the ugly women in
these texts remain ugly—these are not ugly duckling stories which end with swan-like
transformations. Instead, they encourage us to imagine a world in which there is a place
for ugly women.
Certainly, many southern women have made explicit the connections between
southern beauty ideals and with submissive femininity. In “No Place for You, My Love,”
for example, Eudora Welty provides a description of “the Southern Look,” which she
describes as a “Southern mask—of life-is-a-dream irony” (562). Even historian Anne
Firor Scott discusses the concept of the southern lady in aesthetic terms, reporting that,
“In 1925 a North Carolina woman thought the image of the lady died when the suffrage
amendment was passed,” and quotes the woman as claiming, “The pedestal has crashed
. . . it is broken thank God beyond repair.” Scott claims, however, that “It lived on, not as

a complete prescription for woman’s life but as a style which as often as not was a façade
to ward off criticism of unladylike independence or to please men. It gave an illusory
uniformity to the southern female personality” (225, emphasis added). Here, Scott draws
a straight line between the expectations of southern female beauty and what she identifies
as an illusion of compliance to conservative gender norms. Many southern women have
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used the aesthetic style of “southern ladyhood”—markers which admittedly change over
time, from Scarlett’s protected, pale skin to the Ya-Ya Sisterhood’s iodine-enhanced
suntans—in order to give the appearance of adherence to gender norms, whether they are
actually in favor of these norms or not.
Elizabeth Grosz and Sandra Bartky both address the significance of these material
markers of femininity in their analyses of gender roles and expectations of appearance.
Importantly, Grosz disagrees with what she characterizes as Bartky’s contention that
women’s use of markers of femininity such as makeup and clothing to “signal women’s
acceptance of and absorption into prevailing patriarchal paradigms.” Rather, Grosz points
out that,
The practices of femininity can readily function in certain contexts that are
difficult to ascertain in advance, as modes of guerrilla subversion of patriarchal
codes, although the line between compliance and subversion is always a fine one,
difficult to draw with any certainty. All of us, men as much as women, are caught
up in modes of self-production and self-observation. (144)
In fact, in “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” Bartky
argues that Foucauldian ideas of discipline inform ideas of enforced and internalized
norms of femininity (95). While I agree that there is certainly an internalized surveillance
mechanism at work in women's conformity to gender norms, I disagree that it is a
“panoptical man,” as Bartky maintains, which women have internalized. Rather, I
maintain that women are much more aware of other women as gender police.
Regardless of the gender of the enforcers, however, the role of a disciplinary
system in these judgments of beauty and ugliness is key. Grosz explicates the role of the
Foucauldian body-as-archive within a particular place and time, highlighting the
significance of ugliness in its southern inflection: “The body is not outside of history, for
it is produced through and in history. Relations of force, of power, produce the body
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through the use of distinct techniques . . . and harness the energies and potential for
subversion that power itself has constructed” (148). Similarly, Judith Butler explains that,
“being outside the norm is in some sense being defined still in relation to it. To be not
quite masculine or not quite feminine is still to be understood exclusively in terms of
one’s relationship to the ‘quite masculine’ and the ‘quite feminine’” (Undoing Gender
41). In other words, even as ugly female characters fail to achieve marriage and
motherhood, their exclusion from these roles simultaneously points to their centrality to
mainstream, primarily white southern culture as represented in these works while it
acknowledges and imagines alternatives to these prescribed and proscribed roles.
That the system which governs aesthetic ideals is so culturally and historically
specific and changeable reflects that it is in no way an innate or organic system, but
rather a construct which must be policed and reinforced. As Grosz points out,
Makeup, stilettos, bras, hair sprays, clothing, [and] underclothing mark women’s
bodies . . . in ways in which hair styles, professional training, personal grooming,
gait, posture, body building, and sports may mark men’s. There is nothing natural
or ahistorical about these modes of corporeal inscription. Through them, bodies
are made amenable to the prevailing exigencies of power. (142)
In this way, Grosz examines the ways in which “the body can be understood as the site of
the intermingling of mind and culture . . . [and] the symptom and mode of expression and
communication of a hidden interior or depth” (116). In this model, the body is considered
two-dimensional. Rather than having a mind/body, inside/outside, dualistic understanding
of the self, here the body is a two-dimensional surface for inscription, understood
as a social object, as a text to be marked, traced, written upon by various regimes
of institutional, (discursive and nondiscursive) power, as a series of linkages (or
possibly activities) which form superficial or provisional connections with other
objects and processes, and as a receptive surface on which the body’s boundaries
and various parts or zones are constituted, always in conjunction and through
linkages with other surfaces and planes. (116)
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Importantly, Grosz discusses this surface in terms of its moëbial properties and
potentialities: rather than designating a boundary between inside and outside, this
inscriptive surface is both. This perspective rejects the concept of a totalized subject:
The body is thus not an organic totality which is capable of the wholesale
expression of subjectivity, a welling up of the subject’s emotions, attitudes,
beliefs, or experiences, but is itself an assemblage of organs, processes, pleasures,
passions, activities, behaviors linked by fine lines and unpredictable networks to
other elements, segments, and assemblages. (120)
Here, the body is less an individuated actor within a system than a changeable gestalt
constantly emerging from the larger system.

Ugliness, Self-Fashioning, and Invisibility
Many of the works by southern women dramatize the many ways in “the body can
be understood as the site of the intermingling of mind and culture.” Florence King’s
Confessions of a Failed Southern Woman, for example, characterizes a “true exemplar of
southern womanhood” as a “malleable girl . . . someone delicate and fragile in both body
and spirit” (7). Although the malleability which King describes is one of fragility, I
believe that this property is equally present in the ugly women in these texts, women
whose appearances are affected by their experiences. Such malleability is central in
Grosz’s discussion of the moëbial body, in which she says that
it is crucial to note that these different procedures of corporeal inscription do not
simply adorn or add to a body that is basically given through biology; they help
constitute the very biological organization of the subject—the subject’s height,
weight, coloring, even eye color, are constituted as such by a constitutive
interweaving of genetic and environmental factors. (142)
Or, more succinctly, “There is no ‘natural’ norm; there are only cultural forms of body,
which do or do not conform to social norms” (143). In other words, in Grosz’s system,
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there are no inherent, essentialist entities such as beauty or ugliness. In Undoing Gender,
Butler elaborates on this connection between constructed norms and power: “To the
extent that desire is implicated in social norms, it is bound up with the question of power
and with the problems of who qualifies as recognizably human and who does not” (2).
Beauty norms, then, reinforce ideological systems of subjectivity—in other words, who
does or does not “count” in a particular society.
Despite such compelling arguments for the social construction of aesthetic
judgment, there are those who argue for a more essentialist understanding of beauty and
ugliness. Symmetry, for example, is often cited by those who approach physical
attractiveness from the perspective of evolutionary advantage. Nancy Etcoff claims that
“there is a core reality to beauty that exists buried within the cultural constructs and the
myths” (233). Her work posits an “argument for beauty as a biological adaptation,” as she
claims that “beauty is a universal part of human experience, and . . . it provokes pleasure,
rivets attention, and impels actions that help ensure the survival of our genes” (24).
Tracing her project back to classical thinkers who similarly tried to quantify beauty,
Etcoff examines various elements which seem to underlie all human concepts of beauty.
I am intrigued by the idea of symmetry as central to judgments of attractiveness,
especially in its relationship to more abstract ideals. Elaine Scarry’s discussion of beauty,
for example, considers it in terms of the notion of “fairness”: both in terms of meaning
beautiful, but also in terms of its implication of justice. She quotes John Rawls, who
defined fairness as “a symmetry of everyone’s relation to each other” (93). According to
Scarry, beauty acts as a concrete example or representation or reminder of much more

27

abstract laws and principles of justice in the world (102). Further, it inspires and calls out
for justice. The vision of beauty requires the existence of truth and order in the world.
If beauty inspires justice, then ugliness may illuminate prejudice or mark what is
outlawed. Generally, physical appearance is closely tied to ideas of morality and moral
character, as Debra Gimlin discovers in her sociological study of the ways in which
women participate in shaping their bodies in an attempt to meet cultural norms.
Acknowledging that many of the physical norms they aspire to are unachievable for most
women, she claims that “Women’s bodies are, therefore, by definition, violations of
cultural imperatives” (5). Focusing on four locations where women take active roles in
their physical appearance—a beauty salon, an aerobics class, a plastic surgeon’s office,
and a political and social organization for fat women—Gimlin claims that these women,
rather than simply being “dupes” of cultural power (as she understands Foucault’s
descriptions of power to indicate), are in fact consciously repositioning themselves with
respect to (as well as resisting) these hegemonic cultural forces (7). In Gimlin’s
sociological approach, she focuses on the significance of social structures such as “group
forces, commercial interests, professional considerations, and the structures of
communities” (9) in the “body work” these women engage in and undergo.
Ultimately, Gimlin says that she “learned that arenas of body work provide
women with the ‘socially approved vocabularies’ that explain their failure to accomplish
ideal beauty and thus serve to neutralize the flawed identity that an imperfect body
implies in Western society” (15). However, I maintain that when southern women enact
such failures—particularly through ugly fictional characters—it is much less a
neutralization of a flawed identity than it is an act of defiance. In Blain Roberts’ 2014
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Pageants, Parlors, and Pretty Women : Race and Beauty in the Twentieth-Century South,
she observes the changing meanings of such beauty practices in the twentieth century to
southern womanhood:
Many of the beauty practices that second-wave feminists would later condemn as
tools of female subordination were perceived as dangerous instruments of female
liberation to conservative southerners living in the interwar years. Makeup and
beauty contests, for example, represented a threat to southern male power. While
their meaning later changed, we should not lose sight of how they were initially
received and interpreted. Even if they failed to upend southern sexual relations,
these products and rituals created possibilities for a femininity that was
deliberately crafted by women themselves. (9-10)
I argue that rejecting such practices enacts a similar self-construction against these
norms. As Bartky explains, in failing to live up to society’s expectations, “the female
body is revealed as a task, an object in need of a transformation. There are no ugly
women, just lazy ones” (“Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal
Power” 135, emphasis added). Such judgment is central to my inquiry. If ugliness is a
choice—if it reveals a rejection of the disciplinary regimes of femininity, a failure in
moral responsibilities—then the ubiquity of ugly female characters in the work of
southern women writers illuminates a wellspring of dissent which has heretofore been
undertheorized.
Gimlin emphasizes the fact that “Meanings of the stigmatized body are clearly
difficult to displace because self and body, at least in mainstream American culture, are
too closely linked” (131). This link between the self and body is strongly reinforced by
the role of sexuality in subjecthood. According to Grosz, in her discussion of embodied
experience,
It is only the sensory, perceiving subject, the corporeal subject, who is capable of
initiating (sexual) desire, responding to and proliferating desire. The libido is not
an effect of instincts, biological impulses, or the bodily reaction to external
stimuli. It emanates from the structure of sensibility, a function and effect of
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intentionality, of the integrated union of affectivity, motility, and perception.
Sexuality is not a reflex arc but an “intentional arc” that moves and is moved by
the body as an acting perceiver. (109)
In fact, many have read the characteristic of ugliness in women as a marker of sexuality.
In contrast to beauty, which may be connected to purity and other ethereal qualities,
ugliness is a reminder of corporeality. In her analysis of ugliness in late nineteenth and
twentieth century American literature, Dale Bauer specifically links ugliness to sexuality
through a Freudian reading of Medusa, in which “Medusa represents knowledge of
sexual difference” (61). As I explore in the next chapter, the Medusa myth ultimately
calls attention to gendered dimensions of ugliness, as the sexuality and rebellion
represented by the ugly woman gain strength from a dynamic of gender difference. When
the ugly woman faces a man, he is not only forced to stop, but is petrified (in both
physical as well as emotional meanings of the word) by the threat she represents. The
extent of the threat she represents is so great that it requires a mythic register in order to
be fully represented.
Such a denial of prevailing norms which is read as a marker of sexuality may
more generally be also read as a marker of agency, of disobedience in a system which
requires women be passive. In Bauer’s analysis of ugliness as a marker of uncontrolled
sexuality, ugliness is deployed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to
signal a shift away from sentimental literature, which “deliberately obscured physical
intimacy since it could not contain or account for sexuality.” For Bauer, this literature
demonstrates “how culture sentimentalized sexuality by displacing sex onto
unsentimental—i.e., ugly—bodies” (58). Female purity required that sexuality be located
elsewhere from romantic plots.
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Bauer describes this displacement as being both a historically-specific move as
well as a primarily class-based one:
While the rising commercial culture was obsessed with advertising and selling
beauty culture to middle-class women as an alternative to sex-expression, the
Social Gospelers imagined that they discovered in working-class women perhaps
the source of cultural degeneration. Those who did engage in sex are depicted,
curiously enough, as “ugly girls.” The cultural logic that links ugliness and
sexuality goes like this: if sexuality can be found to originate in ugliness, then
patriarchal control can flourish when it is exerted over beauty. (62)
Once again, ugliness and sexuality are implicated together within the strictures of the
beauty-industrial complex. More importantly, however, are the ways in which ugliness
marks a class-based stigma, as women of a lower socioeconomic status have less
access—neither time nor money—to the disciplinary regimens which conventional
beauty requires. What Gimlin identifies in ugliness as a judgment of laziness—“there are
no ugly women, just lazy ones”—similarly reveals judgment against women who lack the
leisure and other resources (in addition to those who lack the desire) necessary to achieve
an acceptable physical appearance. Bauer’s identification of “patriarchal control” as the
source of conventional beauty standards reinforces the Foucauldian framework from
which my own analysis emerges.
However, these effects are not simply confined to the ugly woman herself. In
Garland-Thomson’s configuration, staring has disciplinary effects on all of those
involved in the interaction. Scarry denies the validity of claims that the gaze has a
destructive potential against that upon which it gazes, despite the fact that being the
object of a stare (for whatever reason—whether because of great beauty or ugliness) is
often seen as objectifying the person being seen—and such objectification is understood
by many as having a dehumanizing effect on the person being stared at. However, Scarry
says, “It is odd that contemporary accounts of ‘staring’ or ‘gazing’ place exclusive
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emphasis on the risks suffered by the person being looked at, for the vulnerability of the
perceiver seems equal to, or greater than, the vulnerability of the person being perceived”
(73). Rather than acknowledging the ways in which the person being stared at loses her
humanity, Scarry instead privileges the vulnerability of the person caught staring (as
described in Garland-Thompson’s Sartrean mode). What Scarry does not take into
account, however, is the fact that, typically, when “the gaze” is being discussed, the
perceiver is typically in a position of more power—a less vulnerable position—than the
person being seen. And in this schema, the person being seen is being framed solely in
terms of (usually) her beauty, which takes away her own personhood. The gazer has the
ability to frame that which is deemed beautiful, and the frame/pedestal functions to
restrict the agency of the person being gazed at.
Garland-Thomson quantifies the claim that Scarry makes, that beauty gives life to
the beholder and the beheld, by pointing out how such encounters can have physiological
effects, making the heart beat faster:
The staring encounter arouses us as well. Our heart rate increases when we are
stared at; being subjected to a stare even registers on a cortical EEG. So viscerally
potent is the staring encounter that we can even feel stares directed at us. In fact,
humans from infancy can detect unseen stares. We not only believe that we can
tell when we are being stared at, but repeated experiments dating as early as the
late nineteenth century suggest that in fact we do. (17)
So, contrary to Scarry’s claim that staring and gazing do no harm to the object of the
stare, according to Garland-Thompson, they do have a palpable quality to them. Further,
Scarry’s claims are framed in terms of staring at beauty: what happens when the object of
the stare is striking for other reasons? What is the effect of the stare on the ugly?
In “Meanest Woman Ever Left Tennessee,” Dorothy Allison characterizes staring
as a weapon of defiance. In this story, Shirley Boatwright finds her daughter Mattie’s
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stare unbearable: “She hated the way they cringed away from her. After all, she never hit
them. A pinch was enough, if you knew how it should be done. But more than their
shameful fear of her, she hated the way Mattie would stare back at her and refuse to drop
her eyes” (Trash 23). What emerges as most significant in these configurations is the
importance of the interactivity of these encounters. It is not simply a one-way vector,
however, but a more dialectic process at work, one which leaves all parties involved
changed and takes place within what Jessica Benjamin calls “intersubjective space.”
Building on the work of Jürgen Habermas, Benjamin’s concept of “intersubjective space”
is that which “refers to that zone of experience or theory in which the other is not merely
the object of the ego’s need/drive or cognition/perception but has a separate and
equivalent center of self” (30). The success of such intersubjective space between two
people, however, requires that each party recognizes the subjectivity of the other person.
This does not always occur; as Benjamin acknowledges, “recognition is a capacity of
individual development that is only unevenly realized” (30). Despite this unevenness,
however, it is the very possibility of intersubjective space which explains the ways in
which bodies are interactively influenced and marked by the meanings given to them by
others.
Butler expands on Benjamin’s discussion of recognition, focusing her discussion
on the important role that communication plays in the process of recognition. According
to Butler, recognition “takes place through communication . . . in which subjects are
transformed by virtue of the communicative practice in which they are engaged” (Bodies
That Matter 132). This explains what Scarry refers to as “being caught,” what happens
when we see something unexpected and find ourselves staring. The delay in “being
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caught” is caused by the transformation which takes place during the time it takes to
explain to one’s self the encountered deviation. Staring is related to recognition because
during the process of recognition, the Other is seen as “structured psychically in ways
that are shared” (Butler, Bodies That Matter, 131). When we stare at the ugly, we stare
because the Other is not recognizable. We do not see a shared psychic structure, so we
stare, trying to figure out the structure we do see, trying to give it structure, to explain, to
narratize.
In this way, ugliness constitutes a confrontation, a demand for recognition.
Ugliness issues a challenge which insists on being recognized; it insists upon an
acknowledgment of a shared psychic structure which the viewer might not wish to
acknowledge. If the viewer admits that she is similar to the ugly woman she encounters,
then that admission forces her to acknowledge the possibility of her own vulnerability:
she, too, might become scarred, fat, wrinkled, disfigured, any of the qualities which
might be characterized as ugly. We recoil from ugliness because we don’t wish to
acknowledge these possibilities.
In what she calls a theory of “corporeal feminism,” Grosz similarly traces how
one’s body image is itself an emergent phenomenon of life experience and—important to
my current discussion—social interaction. She proposes an intriguing schema, one
originally formulated by psychologist and psychoanalyst Paul Schilder, in which “social
and interpersonal attachments and investments, as well as libidinal energy, form a major
part of one’s self-image and conception of the body.” What I am interested in here is
Grosz’s claim that, “For Schilder, every touch is already oriented in a visual register, for
it evokes a mental (that is to say visual) image of the spot touched.” She goes on to
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explain that in Schilder’s model, the optical and the tactile, which are separated in other
phenomenological models, are integrated, reflecting our ability to “see an object with our
ability to touch it. The body image is synesthetic, just as every sensation, visual or tactile,
is in fact synesthetically organized and represented” (67). Grosz’s characterization here
echoes the idea of the significance of intersubjective space, in that there seems to be a
feedback loop that occurs, reinforcing (or even reifying) the judgments made or stories
invented to explain the gaps which occur when we encounter the unexpected.
Ultimately, I agree with Grosz’s conclusion that “What psychoanalytic theory
makes clear is that the body is literally written on, inscribed, by desire and signification,
at the anatomical, physiological, and neurological levels” (60)—and, more importantly,
“the body which presumes and helps to explain is an open-ended, pliable set of
significations, capable of being rewritten, reconstituted, in quite other terms than those
which mark it, and consequently capable of reinscribing the forms of sexed identity and
psychical subjectivity at work today” (60-1). Such a synesthetic organization leads Grosz
to conclude that “The body image . . . is formed out of the various modes of contact the
subject has with its environment through its actions in the world” (67). While Grosz’s use
of “body image” here is referring to a primarily physical, tactile understanding of the
body, it is possible to extend her meaning to the psychological, emotional sense of the
phrase as it is used when discussing more psycho-corporeal phenomena such as eating
disorders. Again and again, the idea of the body as a dialectically constructed entity
emerges, refuting any notions of the body’s essentialist or fixed nature.
In Doris Betts’s “The Ugliest Pilgrim,” for example, Violet Karl’s scarred
ugliness—which she considers to be a form of infirmity which she hopes to have healed
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by a preacher—is primarily the result of a horrific accident in which her face was slashed
by an ax head which slipped from its handle. Though Violet is impatient to have her
affliction healed, she realizes that even her scarred, ugly appearance is mutable without
divine intervention. If she were not anxious to be pretty while she is young, she realizes
that “If I could wait to be eighty, even my face might grind down and look softer” (14).
Violet demonstrates an implicit understanding of the dialectically constructed,
Foucauldian body, subject to myriad external forces—as much as her face was altered by
a momentary trauma, so, too, will it be changed by future experiences, even if they are
less traumatic.
Grosz characterizes such a dialectically-constructed body—one which interacts
with, responds to, as well as affects those around it—as conforming to a
phenomenological view of the body, and references the work of philosopher Maurice
Merleau-Ponty in her analysis of this malleable, mutating body. She explains that he
begins with the “negative claim that the body is not an object. It is the condition and
context through which I am able to have a relation to objects” (86). In other words, the
body shapes and is shaped by experience. From the perspective of phenomenology, she
discusses the central place that vision has occupied, a sense which has been considered
superior to the other senses since the Greek philosophers. Again relying on MerleauPonty, she makes a number of important observations about the role of sight in
knowledge, such as that:
Merleau-Ponty describes vision in terms of an activity undertaken by a subject in
relation to a distinct and separate object. To this bare presumption—shared
equally by empiricists and idealists—Merleau-Ponty adds two other factors: the
claim that subjects are always and necessarily embodied, incarnate, corporeal
beings and the claim that vision is always composed not of a given sense datum
but of a set of relations between figure and ground, horizon and object. (96-7)
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What I find significant here is the idea that vision always involves a relationship between
at least one embodied subject—and in the case of a judgment of ugliness, this judgment
takes place between two embodied beings. Here is where Benjamin’s concept of
intersubjectivity is key. Even if the person making the judgment of ugliness perceives
their relationship as being one between a subject and object, this is a mistaken
understanding: every interaction of this sort takes place within a realm of intersubjective
space, whether the intersubjectivity is acknowledged or not. Even if the fat woman on the
beach feels the judgment in the stare of Welty’s narrator in “A Memory,” the narrator is
equally affected by the vision of such unruliness. In this way, the vision of the ugly
woman constitutes a potential site for productive resistance in its confrontational nature.
Conversely, southern women who adhere to the conservative norms of physical
attractiveness are engaging in more than the act of constructing an appealing persona. As
Virginia Kent Anderson Leslie explains in “A Myth of the Southern Lady,” “the cultural
expectations that ‘Southern ladies’ ought to be weak, dependent, illogical, and pure
served the purposes of ideology—that it was to keep the ruling gender/class/race ruling;
specifically, that this definition-myth was self-consciously used to justify the domination
of both Southern ladies and slaves by elite white men” (19). That many southern women
have chosen to create ugly characters, then, reveals a political dimension to what at first
appears to be an aesthetic choice. Characters who fail to meet the standards of southern
beauty are signaling their rejection of both this ideology as well as their role within it
through their aesthetic style.
Aesthetic style in the South, however, is not simply a split—or even a spectrum-between beauty and ugliness. Throughout this dissertation, my challenge is to clarify
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what sets each of these fictional characters apart as specifically ugly, and the particular
purposes being served by these ugly appearances. Again, I refer to the framework of
queer and sexuality studies for my understanding, particularly Edelman’s description of
his project with Berlant, which he describes in part as a
political desire, to think the enabling conditions of an anti-anesthetic space that
would not reproduce the pacifications of aesthetic ideology or the sublimations
that recuperate the sublime’s distinctive undoings. Instead it would permit the
encounter with negativity to initiate transformations whose end is only the endless
opening onto the necessity of new ones. (18)
So, too, does ugliness permit a similar opening onto new transformations, as it highlights
female characters for whom, to a certain extent, the categories of traditional southern
gender roles fail. Ugliness is that which does not fall within the expected norms of
appearance; but unlike beauty, ugliness is deviation with a negative register. In this way,
it defies containment, challenges intelligibility, and endangers the very boundaries which
contain and control societal systems.
Here, my figuration of ugliness is informed by what French feminist theorist Julia
Kristeva has characterized as the “abject”: “the jettisoned object, [which] is radically
excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses . . . . It lies outside,
beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules of the game. And yet, from
its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master” (2). To
Kristeva, the abject concurrently defines and challenges borders. We recoil from ugliness,
but cannot simply ignore or disregard it. In Butler’s analysis, abjection “presupposes and
produces a domain of agency from which it is differentiated” (Bodies That Matter 243 n.
2). For both Kristeva and Butler, the abject’s existence outside of a system constitutes a
threat to this system, while at the same time is necessary for the upholding of said system.
The abject provides delineation of boundaries.
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The Ugly Body, Defiance, and the Marriage Market
While ugly female characters are not fully abject, their position in southern
society is certainly related to the abject. Ugliness marks them as unsuitable for the roles
of wife and mother, roles central to the marriage economy-based society which not only
provides the basic structure of southern society, but is also responsible for its
continuation through reproduction. However, as I discuss at more length in Chapter 3,
unmarried women in the South have played important roles in their communities, albeit
with varying degrees of acceptability. As schoolteachers, for example, unmarried women
have been able to live outside of the marriage economy while simultaneously
contributing to its continued production, by educating future generations of southern
citizens.
The ways in which these roles that ugly women play allow them to
simultaneously rebel against while at the same time support this system highlight the
ways in which many Marxist feminist theorists see capitalism as implicated in systems of
abjection. For example, in “Narcissism, Femininity, and Alienation,” Bartky looks at the
ways in which the role of women in capitalist society entails an additional layer of
alienation to that which Marx describes as occurring generally in capitalism. She points
out that, in what she refers to as the “modern beauty-industrial complex,” the norms of
femininity and sexual objectification mean that women become their own alienated Other
on which they pass judgment. According to Bartky, the beauty-industrial complex under
capitalism is reinforced in ways that regular capitalist alienation of labor is not: “Women
of all classes buy large numbers of books and magazines which teach them how to be
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better, that is more ‘feminine’ women. There is no comparable body of popular literature
which teaches workers to be better workers” (131). In addition, in Meat Market: Female
Flesh Under Capitalism, Laurie Penny sets out the “parameters for the trade in female
flesh as sexual and social capital, and demonstrate[s] . . . . how women are alienated from
their sexual bodies and required to purchase the fundamentals of their own gender” (2).
Penny’s materialist Marxist reading is quite enlightening, as she demonstrates that,
ultimately, such market alienation results in the separation between the marketable erotic
and the repulsive corporeality of actual sexuality. Penny argues that it is disgust and fear
of female flesh which lie beneath much of twentieth century misogyny, which is “fear of
female power, the sublimated power of women over birth and death and dirt and sex”
(32). That which defies and lies outside of beauty standards—that which is ugly—is
connected not only to abjection, but to an uncontainable, uncontrollable (and anticapitalist) sexuality.
Contemporary feminist critics continue to connect appearance directly to the
market aspects of marriage. Virginie Despentes, for example, illuminates the connection
between abjection and market economics in the opening to her manifesto-like King Kong
Theory with, “I am writing as an ugly one for the ugly ones: the old hags, the dykes, the
frigid, the unfucked, the unfuckables, the neurotics, the psychos, for all those girls who
don’t get a look in the universal market of the consumable chick” (7, emphasis in
original). Abjection in such terms resonates with Sarah Gleeson-White’s consideration of
female ugliness in the work of southern women writers, especially as she sees these
images “engag[ing] in a politics of dissent” as they “challenge idealized and, needless to
say, oppressive visions of white southern womanhood” (46). Such visions were supposed
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to be embodied through physical manifestations of the “cult of true womanhood”
described by Barbara Welter in her germinal feminist essay of that same name, in which
she identifies the foundations of this archetypal femininity as “piety, purity,
submissiveness and domesticity” (152). Any physical characteristics which detract from
this image—such as scars (which violate purity) or a generally slovenly appearance
(which violates all of the True Womanhood characteristics)—are physical markers of
failure to conform to these norms. Women described as “ugly” are in direct violation of
systems which uphold and rely upon such enforced feminine ideals and therefore pose a
threat to the supposed integrated nature of these systems.
As these theories of abjection demonstrate how ugliness simultaneously reifies the
very borders it threatens, so do theories of the grotesque similarly inform my
understanding of ugliness. However, where theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s grotesque bodies
were characterized by “Exaggeration, hyperbolism, [and] excessiveness” (303), the ugly
body does not have these hyperbolic qualities. Where the grotesque explodes boundaries,
the ugly irritates and seeps through them. While the grotesque is characterized by the
“exaggeration of the inappropriate to incredible and monstrous dimensions” (321), the
ugly remains within the realm of the inappropriate—not enough to destroy boundaries,
though enough to threaten them.
The ugly body is best described by what historically has succeeded the grotesque
body in modernity, what Bakhtin calls the “body of the new canon.” With the
development of this new body under the disciplining surveillance of modernity,
carnivalesque possibilities inherent in the grotesque body are no longer possible:
In the modern image of the individual body, sexual life, eating, drinking, and
defecation have radically changed their meaning: they have been transferred to the
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private and psychological level where their connotation becomes narrow and
specific, torn away from the direct relation to the life of society and to the cosmic
whole. In this new connotation they can no longer carry on their former
philosophical functions. (321)
While the grotesque entails a connection to the communal and the sublime, ugliness,
then, is only an echo in this new, individuated body of the formerly sublime grotesque.
Instead of engaging in grotesque interactions of a carnivalesque nature (and the
revelatory possibilities such interactions contain), we instead are only able to stare. I
contend that part of what makes us stop and look at an ugly figure is this echo of the
grotesque (and the potential for the sublime) it contains. We still feel (and perhaps miss)
the echo of the grotesque in our new individuated bodies. That some characters, such as
O’Connor’s Joy-Hulga, combine elements of both the ugly (her ugly name, ugly clothes,
and sneering face) with the grotesque (as an amputee) only complicates the strength of
their force as characters.

Parameters and Purpose of This Study
In their discussion of the grotesque, Stallybrass and White observe that “what is
socially peripheral is so frequently symbolically central (like long hair in the 1960s)” (5,
emphasis in original). I believe that the ubiquity of ugly female characters in the work of
southern women writers functions similarly: while Scarlett O’Hara or the Ya-Ya
Sisterhood have yet to be fully replaced in the southern (and national) imaginations by
Joy-Hulga or Celie, the constant presence of these latter characters who are overtly
described as ugly announces their symbolically central role. Physical appearance often
defines character, as Welty discusses in a Paris Review interview:
In those early stories I’m sure I needed the device of what you call the
“grotesque.” That is, I hoped to differentiate characters by their physical qualities
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as a way of showing what they were like inside—it seemed to me then the most
direct way to do it. This is an afterthought, though. I don’t suppose I did it as
consciously as all that, and I didn’t know it was the easiest way. But it is easier to
show somebody as lonely if you make him deaf and dumb than if you go feeling
your way into his mind. (“Eudora Welty, The Art of Fiction No. 47” n.p.)
Certainly, the strategy of characterization through physical description is not new.
However, that Welty refers this strategy as a utilization of the grotesque is illuminating,
as it reveals that the important characters in her work are the ones with ugly outer
appearances. In fact, while she discusses characters such as Lily Daw as an example of
her deployment of this device, I would firmly categorize Lily’s appearance as ugly, and
certainly not extreme enough to be described as grotesque. Although Welty used the
word “grotesque” to describe Lily, her explanation is important in demonstrating that her
usage does not signal Lily’s affiliation with the theoretical meanings of the grotesque of
Bakhtin or Stallybrass and White. Rather, Welty’s explanation emphasizes both the
significance of her characters’ physical appearances as well as (perhaps unintentionally)
how often these appearances are ugly ones.
That Welty in particular created so many ugly female characters highlights
another of the parameters of my study: that I am limiting my analysis to the work of
southern women, rather than including characters written by men. Certainly, there are
plenty of ugly female characters created by southern men, such as Ellie May in Erskine
Caldwell’s Tobacco Road, or the goat woman in Charles Frazier’s Cold Mountain.
However, I maintain that women writers are held to different standards themselves in
terms of their appearance, which gives them a unique perspective from which to write.
Welty exemplifies this phenomenon, as the opening of Ann Waldron’s unauthorized
biography of her amply demonstrates. The first chapter begins,
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By all rights, Eudora Welty should have been miserable every minute of the day
when she was growing up. “The thing you have to understand about Eudora is
that she was not a belle,” a man a few years younger than Eudora who grew up in
Jackson. “She was not pretty, and that is very important.” He talked about this a
little more. “Oh, she had friends who were boys—not boyfriends—but one of
them, Frank Lyell, was such a sissy that even his own brother made fun of him.”
“It wasn’t that Eudora was plain,” said a woman who had grown up in Jackson
and now lives in Boston. “She was ugly to the point of being grotesque. In the
South, that was tantamount to being an old maid. You could either teach school,
be a librarian, or teach music, if you were far out.” (9-10)
Later on in the biography, Waldron claims that Welty’s being named one of People
Magazine’s “Ten Great Faces” was significant because, ”The girl who was remembered
for being so ugly had reached a pinnacle where her looks and style clearly eclipsed those
of the Jackson belles who had been invited to dances in the Delta” (335). It’s important to
note that Welty asked her friends not to participate in the project, so the people Waldron
interviewed for her research were not particularly close to her.
Nevertheless, these Jackson residents are not the only ones to comment on
Welty’s appearance. For example, recalling her interview with Welty that was published
in the interview in the Harvard Advocate in 1973, Alice Walker said, “I liked Eudora’s
calm, clear, gray-eyed gaze . . . . She was very present, very there. Of course I felt again
the security all around her, as with Flannery, as with Bill [Faulkner]; in a large, handsome
house her father had built and left to her, a society in which she was prized. Still. She had
a deformity of the upper back/spine. And this is probably what saved her” (White 221).
And even Welty’s authorized biographer, Suzanne Marrs, reported that Welty’s friend
Katherine Anne Porter once told Welty, “You will never know what is means to be a
beautiful woman” (566).
I admit to being perplexed as to why Welty’s appearance is so frequently
commented on, and so often in such hyperbolic terms, such as “ugly to the point of being
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grotesque.” According to Marrs, Welty’s “comments about beauty were always matterof-fact, and she had long been dismissive of the American obsession with cosmetic
enhancements” (566). However, it does demonstrate the different standards to which
women and men are held: male authors are simply not written about in this way. By
confining my analysis to the work of southern women, I can keep my focus on works
written by people who share a sense of heightened awareness aesthetic standards.
In this way, I intend to demonstrate how the ubiquity of ugly female characters in
the work of southern women writers has provided an undercurrent of resistance to what
has often been understood as a generally rigid system of gendered expectations. Within
this model, in which the body functions as an archive, we are able to reconsider
progressive narratives of not only southern but also American history, especially in a
nation which many like to characterize as post-racial and classless. Though the popular
image of the southern woman is the beautiful Vivian Leigh as Scarlett O’Hara, the fact
that southern women writers populated their work with so many ugly female characters
suggests that they were not only refusing the expectations and responsibilities of the
gyneolatrous pedestal, but also calling into question the existence of a South
homogenously committed to racist, sexist, and classist hierarchies. Such a reconsideration
of the role of the South through the ubiquity of unattractive female bodies has important
implications for our understanding of the role played by the South within the life of the
nation. As Baker and Nelson explain in their introductory essay to their special issue of
American Literature, “We decided to focus on the body because our speculation was that
the visual, bounded body of the Other was bedrock for the construction of both
regionalism and racism in the United States” (232, emphasis in original). That this visual
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body has been so often cast as ugly—particularly given the southern meaning of the
word, meaning unruly or rude—reveals a discomfort with and pushback against this role.8
Jennifer Rae Greeson is among many scholars who have observed that the South
functions as an “internal other for the nation, an intrinsic part of the national body that
nonetheless is differentiated and held apart from the whole” (1). Observing that the
United States “has been defined against many antitheses, from wholly external entities
like ‘the Old World’ to places and peoples not included in the body politic at its origin
but assimilated later: ‘the West,’ ‘the woman,’ ‘the Indian,’ and so on,” Greeson argues
that the South
provides a different sort of juxtaposition . . . . As an internal other from the start
of U.S. existence, it lies simultaneously inside and outside the national imaginary
constructed in U.S. literature. Our South thus serves in that literature as an
unparalleled site of connection between ‘the United States’ and what lies outside
it—a connection to the larger world, to Western history, to a guilty colonial past
and a desired and feared imperial future. (3)
Considering the bodies of ugly women in the work of southern women writers as archives
of various modes of tragedy makes us reconsider both national and regional narratives of
progress which posit trajectories of steady movement toward equality and democracy.
Reading the history marked on the bodies of ugly female characters results in a clearer
understanding of the disruptions and fissures which exist within these apparently
seamless narratives. By countering the stereotype of the beautiful, white southern belle,
southern women writers call into question the validity of the assumptions that have been
made based on the South’s role as the nation’s “internal other.” As the South has so often
relied upon the stereotype of the beautiful white woman in need of protection to justify an
8

Certainly, this use of ugliness is a regionally and historically specific one, and I am aware that ugliness
has had different meanings in different times and locations (as, for example, Dale Bauer’s work on ugliness
in American literature near the turn of the century demonstrates).
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ideology of racism and violence, the microtraumas of life as a southern woman recorded
on the bodies of these characters challenge the very foundation of southern ideology. And
in terms of national identity, replacing the iconic representation of the South as a
beautiful woman with that of an ugly woman complicates what is generally considered to
be a much more binary, dialectic relationship between the nation’s center and its margin.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MEDUSA STARES BACK: UGLY WOMEN IN THE WORK OF
EUDORA WELTY
This chapter is a case study in analyzing ugliness, using the ugly women who
appear in the short fiction of Eudora Welty as my focus. In her consideration of ugly
women in the work of Welty and other southern women writers, Sara Gleeson-White says
that Welty’s first collection of stories, A Curtain of Green and Other Stories (1941), is
the one in which Welty is most “preoccupied with female ugliness” (49). Certainly, ugly
women appear in her later work: her 1970 novel Losing Battles, for example, is
particularly noteworthy for women such as the tall, bony spinster Miss Beulah Renfro. I
realize that by focusing on Welty’s early work, I risk perpetuating the error of “see[ing]
only one facet of Welty’s art” (7), an error which Michael Kreyling decries in much of
Welty scholarship. However, as Welty’s later work veers away from the grotesque, it also
becomes less preoccupied with overtly ugly images of women.
In this chapter, I will examine some of the ways in which Welty probes the
possible meanings of ugliness in a number of her short stories, ending with “A Memory,”
the story that best thematizes what I characterize as the Medusan mode of ugliness: one
which forces a prolonged interaction between the ugly woman and her viewer through its
power to freeze, to catch, and to captivate. I propose that the Medusa imagery in Welty’s
earlier work offers a new paradigm for understanding ugliness. We stare at ugliness
because it represents some sort of disorder or violation of expectation. Like victims of
Medusa, we are caught in a stare in an attempt to make sense of what we are seeing. In
Rosemary Garland-Thomson’s explanation, we “attempt to impose a frame of reference
on the chaos of a visual field by integrating what is unknown into what is already known”
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(21). People—whether the characters in the stories, or the readers of the stories—draw on
their own previous experiences with human appearance in an attempt to comprehend
appearances which don’t fit with their expectations. Ugly people defy these expectations
to varying extents and require extra attention in order to reconcile their appearance with
our thwarted expectations.
In Welty’s short stories, she deploys a particular kind of female ugliness, an
ugliness which grabs the reader’s attention in a way different from other kinds of
disagreeable visages. Unlike the overtly grotesque and abject women which populate
southern literature (about which quite a bit has been written),9 the women in Welty’s
work are not so much grotesque as they are ugly, lacking the physical beauty so often
connected to traditional ideals of southern womanhood. The variety of ugly women
throughout Welty’s work catches not only the attention of her other characters, but that of
her readers, too, as we cannot help but be fascinated by women such as the “common”
women on the beach or Mrs. Fletcher in the beauty parlor chair.
Welty was not alone in writing such fascinating characters in the early part of the
twentieth century. In her discussion of images of ugly women appearing in American
literature from this period, Dale Bauer attributes the ugliness in this fiction to a shift away
from the sentimental in literature. Signaling even more than a move away from the
sentimental, the ugly women in Welty’s short fiction challenge idealized white southern
womanhood, as their appearance becomes an embodied history of sexuality and violence.
Patricia Yaeger describes Curtain of Green as a “book set in the Great Depression that
9

See, e.g., Ellen Glasgow, “Heroes and Monsters” and Flannery O’Connor, “Some Aspects of the
Grotesque in Southern Fiction,” or more recently, Haunted Bodies: Gender and Southern Texts (eds. Anne
Goodwyn Jones and Susan V. Donaldson) and Patricia Yaeger, Dirt and Desire: Reconstructing Southern
Women’s Writing, 1930-1990.
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dramatizes the defamiliarization of the American Dream as it is mapped onto depressed
southern bodies” (“Beyond the Hummingbird” 310). These “depressed southern bodies”
are my focus in this chapter, as I examine the emergence and meaning of the ugly women
who populate these stories. Unlike beauty, which is both an inspirational virtue and
unattainable ideal,10 ugliness not only functions as a marker of immorality but also
reveals (and at times rebels against) the borders of societal norms. Ugliness, like beauty,
is an aesthetic judgment which results from an interaction between a viewer and one who
is viewed. In both cases, the interaction is often prolonged into staring, such as that
observed by Garland-Thomson: “We stare when ordinary seeing fails, when we want
know more. So staring is an interrogative gesture that asks what’s going on and demands
the story . . . . This intense visual engagement creates a circuit of communication and
meaning-making” (3). It is the narrative and “meaning-making” aspects of staring that are
most significant in my consideration of ugliness in Welty’s stories. Similarly, philosopher
Elaine Scarry claims that what marks someone as “stareable” is that they deviate from the
expected norm or average in both positive and negative ways—beauty and ugliness share
the quality of deviating significantly enough from the norm to be notable. There must be
something extra on which the viewer is “caught” in order to facilitate the kind of
interaction required for a judgment of beauty or ugliness to occur.11
This moment of “being caught” is connected to the theme of petrifaction which is
such a fundamental aspect of Welty’s work, a theme which often reveals itself through

10

Welty herself observed that beauty (along with sensitivity) is one of “two qualities that cannot be
imitated in this life” (On Writing 27). Though she does occasionally create pretty or attractive characters,
the absence of physical beauty in Welty’s work does imply the impossibility of fully achieving beauty.
11

See, e.g., Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just, and Elaine Scarry ed., Literature and the Body:
Essays on Population and Persons.
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her use of Medusa imagery. Like many scholars, Lauren Berlant points to gender as a key
element in Welty’s use of the Medusa myth, explaining that the “Perseus-Medusa myth
contains a paradigm of sexual difference; for Welty, the violence it embodies is
inevitably inscribed in desire” (59). Berlant’s observation foregrounds the corporeal
qualities of beauty and ugliness that the Medusa myth evokes. The gendered nature of
this exchange emphasizes the gendered dimension of my own argument, that it is the ugly
women in Welty’s work who represent a rebellion against southern gender expectations.
The preponderance of Medusa imagery in Welty’s work thematizes the
intersubjective nature of ugliness. Ugliness is that which differs enough from the norm
that it catches the viewer’s attention and forces us to stare—and in staring, we are forced
into an interaction with the object of our attention. In Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s
analysis, this relationship is significant as an interactive moment of possibility: “Staring,”
she explains, “makes things happen between people” (33). We stare in order to make
sense of what we are seeing: what is that? What makes that different? The uglier the
person, the longer and more against our will we stare, trying to understand the ugly face
(or ugly body, or even ugly clothes) within the context of our expectations and aesthetic
values. The interaction which results from this staring imposes a kind of relationship onto
the participants, often against their will. This is one reason why it’s generally considered
impolite to stare, because it does impose an unasked-for relationship between strangers: it
is in part the involuntary nature of this relationship which makes it intolerable.
Certainly, much attention has already been given to Welty’s use of Medusa
imagery. Early critics saw the incorporation of Medusa (as well as other mythological)
elements into Welty’s work as a way of infusing everyday life in Mississippi with a sense
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of the mythic.12 Robert L. Phillips, Jr., sums up much of this early scholarship on Medusa
imagery in Welty’s work by observing three primary categories of ways in which Welty
incorporated the mythic within her work: first, she uses mythological allusions to subtly
“enhance realistic characters and settings” (58); second, “the narrator defines character
and setting almost entirely in terms of myth and fantasy so that the reader’s
understanding develops from the narrator’s arrangement of allegory and symbol”; and
finally, “some characters consciously experience the rich, imaginative dimension of myth
and fantasy” (59). Phillips observes that these different modes pose different demands on
the reader, ranging from basic interpretation of the allusions present to reconciling both
the characters’ as well as the narrator’s understanding of the presence of the mythic.13
I am following in the tradition of scholars such as Danielle Pitavy-Souques, who
observes that for Welty, “Myth here is technique, imposed on the world of action,
shaping our perception and reaction to it” (259). I see the Medusa story as an organizing
principle in much of Welty’s work, whether the imagery is overtly referenced or not.
However, my interest in Welty’s evocation of Medusa differs in two specific ways from
these traditional views. First, my focus is less on Perseus—or the effect of Medusa on her
victims and Perseus’s victory over her—than on the Medusa figure herself. Phillips, for
example, observes that in “The Wanderers,” when Virgie Rainey remembers the picture
of Perseus holding the head of Medusa that Miss Eckhart used to own, “Virgie identified
with Perseus in that she too faced the terrible risk of becoming as lifeless and stone-like
as the statue of the angel Cassie had bought to mark Mrs. Morrison’s grave. One glimpse
12
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Phillips points to “Shower of Gold” as an example of such a challenge of reconciliation, and certainly
other stories such as “Asphodel” and “The Worn Path” exemplify this kind of reading.
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of the head of the Medusa would turn the unfortunate beholder to stone. Virgie saves
herself from that fate” (66). However, though Virgie may have once fully identified with
Perseus in this picture, at the point of her reflection, she realizes that “she must believe in
the Medusa equally with Perseus” (The Golden Apples 554). In other words, after the
trauma of her mother’s death, Virgie realizes that being struck lifeless is not her only
option. In realizing her own mortality, Virgie is also reminded of her vitality as well.
Second, I am equally interested in the intersubjective nature of the
Medusa/Perseus paradigm. While I concur with Phillips’s reading, I also see that Welty
emphasizes the Perseus/Medusa story as an interactive narrative: it does not only exist as
a static picture on the wall, but is also part of a larger unfolding story. In “The
Wanderers,” the narrator observes that when considering the picture of Perseus and
Medusa, Virgie “saw the stroke of the sword in three moments, not one” (554-555).
Further, for Virgie, “Every time Perseus struck off the Medusa’s head, there was the beat
of time, and the melody. Endless the Medusa, and Perseus endless” (The Golden Apples
555). Virgie experiences the Medusa/Perseus encounter as a series of events, more than
simply Perseus’ reaction. As a series of events, this encounter emphasizes the interactive
nature of the Medusan process of fascination: both parties are affected by their encounter.
To a certain extent, Pitavy-Souques acknowledges the interactivity at the heart of
this paradigm, observing that “the centre [sic] of this trinity is fascination—Medusa’s
deadly gaze, or rather fascination defeated, overcome by another gaze—Perseus’ in the
mirror . . . . At the level of human relations, it refers to that spell, that abus de pouvoir by
which we tend to objectify the other, to make him lose his identity and become a thing,
an object” (263). However, her subsequent focus is on Perseus’s fascination and
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petrifaction, rather than on the dynamics of this paradigm as a whole. The fact that there
is such an abus de pouvoir present in this structure demonstrates a real potential for
feminine dissent and rebellion—even if the rebellion manifests less as working against
the system than as actively opting out. To that end, I propose a change in focus to
Medusa herself, and the interactions between the characters in these mythic allusions,
rather than on Perseus and the petrified outcomes which have so long been the center of
attention.
Central to the Medusan theme of petrifaction is the idea of the viewer “being
caught” and the intersubjective dimension to this encounter. Sianne Ngai’s work on what
she characterizes as “ugly feelings” elucidates this interactive nature of ugliness. Ngai
describes the kinds of “ugly feelings” which she investigates as being “explicitly amoral
and noncathartic, offering no satisfactions of virtue, however oblique, nor any therapeutic
or purifying release” (6). Unlike beauty, which is supposed to inspire virtue, or the
grotesque, which has similar abilities to provoke dramatic change, ugliness is analogous
to these less dramatic, “noncathartic” emotions. Ngai’s distinctions speak to how I
distinguish “ugliness” from other, more highly theorized kinds of negative appearances.
Ugliness is a similarly minor affect; I maintain that the interaction evoked by ugliness is
more likely to produce political and aesthetic ambiguities than passions. However, such
ambiguities offer many tantalizing possibilities for rebellion and dissent.
“Petrified Man” contains the most overt retelling of the Medusa myth in the
Curtain of Green collection, focusing on women in a beauty parlor, with their grotesque,
dripping hair (echoing Medusa’s head of snakes) and a petrified man (which might refer
to the effects—physical, physiological, and emotional—of Medusa on those who looked
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upon her). Berlant’s explication of the story echoes Gleeson-White’s contention that ugly
women in Welty’s fiction work against expectations of passive white southern
womanhood:
“Petrified Man” is designed strategically to expose the grotesque, the inelegant
level of women’s desire: not to assert that monstrosity and violence are essentially
feminine, but to refuse the nostalgic and sentimental construction of female
superiority by creating a scene of embarrassment, to insist that monstrosity is
female as well as male. (60)
Alternately, Berlant’s explication of Medusa imagery also supports Bauer’s reading,
which sees ugliness as connected to female sexuality. Berlant explains the Freudian
reading of Medusa, in which “Medusa represents knowledge of sexual difference” (61).
Ultimately, the Medusa myth calls attention to gendered dimensions of ugliness, as the
sexuality and rebellion represented by the ugly woman gain strength from a dynamic of
gender difference. Though women’s strength is by no means limited to her looks, in this
paradigm a woman’s strength resides not in her beauty but in her ugliness, by her failure
or refusal to fulfill societal expectations of appropriate appearance. When the ugly
woman faces a man, he is not only stopped by her appearance when it fails to meet his
expectations of female beauty, but is petrified by the threat she represents. The extent of
this threat is so great that it requires a mythic register in order to be fully represented.
Such a mythic register is evoked in a different way in the story “Clytie.” We first
see Clytie out in the rain with her bonnet drooping “like an old bonnet on a horse.” The
description of Clytie is one of an ugly woman: “The old maid did not look around, but
clenched her hands and drew them up under her armpits, and sticking out her elbows like
hen wings, and ran out of the street, her poor hat creaking and beating about her ears”
(100). Not only is she characterized as an “old maid”—a state at odds with the
expectations of woman as wife and mother—but in this description she is compared to
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two different barnyard animals: a horse and a hen. Further, her posture draws attention to
her armpits—loci not usually connected to feminine beauty—and makes her appear
unfeminine.
The story draws its strength at least in part from the irony produced by the tension
created by the mythical names given to such ugly characters. Clytie is an ugly, bitter old
maid, nothing like the mythic water nymph who pined after Apollo so desperately that
she was transformed into a sunflower. Nor is she like Clytemnestra: sister of Helen,
murderous wife of Agamemnon, and another potential namesake. As an allusion to
Clytemnestra, it is possible to read the name “Clytie” as both a reference to the inferior
sister of the world’s most beautiful woman as well as to her potential power. Nor does the
character Clytie’s sister Octavia, an angry bedridden invalid, resemble Mark Antony’s
virtuous wife. The irony in the meanings implied by such possible allusions is
complicated, though, by Clytie’s trust in the meaning of the external, as such trust leads
her to expect that such external signs as names should be indicative of the person’s
character. According to Clytie, “The most profound, the most moving sight in the whole
world must be a face. Was it possible to comprehend the eyes and the mouths of other
people, which concealed she knew not what, and secretly asked for still another unknown
thing?” (101). Welty’s use of the word “comprehend” in the free indirect discourse here
signals Clytie’s belief that a person’s internal character should be able to be read in her
outward appearance, though her actual experiences with other people demonstrate that
appearances are generally deceiving.
Nevertheless, as the mythical Clytie in her sunflower form kept her face
constantly turned toward the face of the Apollo in his guise as the sun, so Welty’s Clytie
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is equally attached to outward forms. If appearances are to be trusted, then Clytie’s
physical hideousness confirms Gleeson-White’s assertion of feminine ugliness as a
challenge to traditional southern womanhood. Further, the short story “Clytie” clarifies
the potential power of ugliness, that it has a mythic mode. Generally, scholars have
focused more on Clytie’s behavior in this story—her uncontrollable swearing, for
example—than on her appearance. When they write about ugly women in Welty’s work,
their focus is more generally on appearances which can be categorized under the more
dramatic rubric of the grotesque.14 However, I would not characterize Clytie’s
appearance as differing from the norm enough to qualify as grotesque; in this story,
Clytie is ugly.
Focusing on Clytie’s appearance rather than her behavior (as so many others do)
demonstrates the power of ugliness, though a power that is less in the “sinister mode”
discussed by Gleeson-White (51) than it is a refusal of her community’s expectations of
womanhood. Clytie’s refusal is exemplified by the novel’s opening scene, in which the
ladies of the town watch her stand in the middle of the road, seemingly oblivious to the
rainstorm in which she is being drenched:
Now, under the force of the rain, while the ladies watched, the hat slowly began to
sag down on each side until it looked even more absurd and done for, like an old
bonnet on a horse. And indeed it was with the patience almost of a beast that Miss
Clytie stood there in the rain and stuck her long empty arms out a little from her
sides, as if she were waiting for something to come along the road and drive her
to shelter. (100)
Watching the rain further spoil Clytie’s already ugly appearance, someone finally calls
out and tells Clytie to seek shelter. She goes home, where her bedraggled, rain-soaked
appearance provokes her sister to declare her “Common—common!” (101). From the
14
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story’s beginning, it is Clytie’s appearance which leaves a wake of disturbance among
those whom she encounters.
Welty’s story “Petrified Man” dramatizes the violence inherent in the enforcement
of these norms and the challenge to them posed by ugliness. Gleeson-White sees violence
and issues of beauty as “intriguingly entangled in ‘The Petrified Man,’” a story which she
says “constructs feminine beauty not as something natural or innate, but as wholly
manufactured . . . . The women who are associated with southern beauty are, in a
nutshell, silly” (50). The story takes place in a southern beauty parlor where the
beautician Leota tells her customer Mrs. Fletcher about her adventures with the exciting
Mrs. Pike while she does Mrs. Fletcher’s hair. Indeed, the silliness of the pursuit of
artificial beauty is exaggerated to the point of absurdity, as exemplified in the anecdote
Leota relates about Mrs. Montjoy, who stopped by the shop to have a permanent wave
put in her hair while she was in labor so that she would look pretty for the birth of her
new baby.
Here, beauty not only is completely artificial but also has a definite forbidden,
sexual undercurrent. What Berlant refers to as an “illicit quality of pleasure” (63) in the
story is typified in this description of the beauty parlor, in which women are “Hidden in
this den of curling fluid and henna packs, separated by a lavender swing-door from the
other customers, who were being gratified in other booths” (22). This description of
customers being “gratified in booths” evokes scenes of peep shows and prostitution. The
beauty process is not a pretty one: hair frequently drips, for example, requiring cotton to
“sop it up” (45). Here, the process of changing ugliness to beauty is an overtly sexual
one. This is a sexuality of consumption, hunger, and need. It takes place between women
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in “booths.” Functioning as a semi-public, semi-private space, these booths provide
visual privacy for their female customers while allowing verbal communication between
them. Even with the assistance of the services the beauty shop provides, the women in the
story are ugly, in contrast to typical standards of southern beauty. Mrs. Fletcher, for
example, is described as having “her hair-line eyebrows diving down toward her nose,
and her wrinkled, beady-lashed eyelids battling with concentration” (23). It is important
to note that the beauty shop services seem to only magnify her ugliness, as her “hair-line
eyebrows” are unnatural and must be the result of a salon service.
In addition to the artificiality of the beauty salon, there is a submerged violence in
this story which many critics have identified as a constant theme in Welty’s work.15
Gleeson-White points to “Lily Daw and the Three Ladies” as a similar example of “the
violence so typical of the collection underneath the comic tenor of the story” (Curtain of
Green 50). In this story, Lily’s father beat her and tried to cut off her head after the death
of her mother, a violent history which is marked permanently on Lily’s body in the scar
on her neck. After her father attacks her, Lily is taken from him by the ladies of the town
who find her a safer home. These concerned ladies subsequently decide to send Lily to
the Ellisville Institute for the Feeble-Minded of Mississippi, as Lily “isn’t bright” (5),
and, further, she is in their judgment inappropriately sexual. The story opens with the
ladies searching for Lily, who has gone missing after the performance of a travelling
show. Even after hearing Lily’s claim to have become engaged to the show’s xylophone
player, the ladies assume that the xylophone player “was after Lily’s body alone and he
wouldn’t ever in this world make the poor little thing happy” (10). Further, they discuss
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the fact that Lily frequently wears only a petticoat for a dress (8), and Mrs. Watts offers
to give her a “pink crêpe de Chine brassiere with adjustable shoulder straps,” noting that
she “needs it” (11). This judgment that Lily’s breasts “need” to be contained combined
with the ladies’ assumptions about Lily’s promiscuity demonstrate that, once again, the
figure of the ugly woman represents a sexuality which is difficult to control.
Though not a femme fatale, Lily’s physical and mental scars do make her morally
dangerous, as they mark her as possessing an uncontrollable sexuality. Lily’s threatening
sexuality connects her to Betina Entzminger’s dark belle, who was “the opposite of the
ideal southern lady, the mature women the belle was intended to become” (2). That
Entzminger’s belle has somehow “gone bad,” or not fulfilled expectations of southern
womanhood, shows that she is no longer the young belle, virtuous and eligible for
marriage; instead, she “uses her sexuality as a tool” (2). Lily, too, is considered ineligible
for marriage, despite what turns out to be a legitimate proposal from the carnival’s
xylophone player. Her mental status, threatening sexuality, and history of violence make
her ineligible for the marriage market (at least in the opinion of the ladies), which is
reserved for those who would properly reproduce and perpetuate the correct kind of
society.
Though Entzminger focuses on Welty’s novels rather than her short stories, she
includes Welty in her larger characterization of contemporary southern women writers
who “use the bad belle figure to critique the southern social system, particularly as it
relates to the role of women” (123). In Welty’s novels, Entzminger sees Welty “us[ing]
the bad belle as a hyperbolic version of society’s traditional view of powerful women”
(129). In her early short stories, Welty’s ugly women represent a more nuanced critique
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of this system. Lily’s sexuality and existence (albeit an enforced one)16 outside of the
marriage economy demonstrate that a possible alternative to idealized southern
womanhood exists. It is, in fact, Lily’s Daw’s complete lack of autonomy which, while it
keeps her from maintaining any personal agency (as ultimately, she is sent to Ellisville
Institute for the Feeble-Minded of Mississippi), instead reveals the vulnerability of the
town’s traditional system represented by the ladies. Lily’s abuse at the hands of her father
highlights the dangers of trusting in paternalistic honor.
Lily’s is a sexualized ugliness, like that described by Bauer, who sees ugliness as
a marker of uncontrolled sexuality in fiction written by women at this time. In Bauer’s
consideration, fiction from this time period demonstrates “how culture sentimentalized
sexuality by displacing sex onto unsentimental—i.e., ugly—bodies” (58). Female purity
required that sexuality be located outside of romantic plots. Because Lily does not look
like a romantic heroine, the ladies cannot imagine her as an agent within a romantic
plot—and therefore, they can only assume that any attraction a man would have for her
would be solely a sexual one. Lily’s disfigurement, a marker of her violent and deprived
history, is a visible reminder of her difference from the kind of middle class southern
femininity represented by the ladies of the town.
Many of the women in Welty’s stories have bodies physically marked by class
difference, histories of violence, grief, and other aberrant experiences. As in the case of
Lily Daw’s scar, Gleeson-White notes “the contorted and fragmented bodies that fill
these writers’ stories at the same time own up to a tragic history in which they have
16
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partaken” (46). These bodies reflect what Yaeger refers to as the “body as testimony”
(Dirt and Desire 218), or the palimpsestic medium provided by the female body in
literature. Yaeger’s use of the word “testimony” emphasizes how visual appearance
functions as a speech act, a performative expression which not only tells a story but also
insists upon a response. In “Lily Daw and the Three Ladies,” for example, the scar on
Lily’s neck can be seen “if you knew it was there” (Dirt and Desire 9). The ability to see
Lily’s disfigurement implies a knowledge of the violence done to her and, consequently,
a responsibility to at least attempt to assuage the wrongdoing.
Though I agree with Gleeson-White that the Curtain of Green does seem to be
“preoccupied with ugliness,” Welty certainly returned to the theme throughout her work.
In “Moon Lake,” physical appearances convey socioeconomic status. Appearance
separates all of the orphan girls from the more affluent Morgana girls: at the lake, the
orphans stand “swayback with knees locked, the shoulders of their wash dresses ironed
flat and stuck in peaks” (413), while the Morgana girls “walked out of their kimonos and
dropped them like the petals of one big scattered flower” (414). Here, ugliness functions
as a physical marker of their marginalized class status as impoverished orphans. The
orphan girl named Easter in “Moon Lake,” for example, has “cropped and wiry” hair with
a dark band at her hairline which was “pure dirt” (The Golden Apples 417). Her
appearance is so dirty and disheveled that she is described as having “repulsed” her
campmates (445). However, Easter’s ugliness also marks her as “dangerous” (418) and
“dominant among the orphans” (417), a girl whose life of deprivation has toughened her,
though not turned her “provenly bad” like some of the other orphans. Unlike someone
like her friend Geneva, who is known to steal, Easter only hurts those who deserve it,
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such as the Bible teacher Mr. Nesbitt, whose “collection hand” she bites after he stares at
her developing breasts (418). Easter’s ugliness marks her as one who refuses the accepted
female position of objectification, especially as she already occupies the dehumanizing,
marginalized position of an orphan. Easter may be marginalized, but within her
marginalization she is a leader.
The unnamed narrator of “Why I Live at the P.O.” (who is only referred to as
“Sister”) is another example of abjected ugliness, who like Easter is cheerfully defiant
despite her rejected status. Stella-Rondo’s insulting description of Sister’s body as “onesided” (Curtain of Green 57) is a particularly sexual one, referring to Sister’s breasts. In
this way, Sister’s ugliness detracts from her femininity and her womanhood, and StellaRondo’s accusation leads directly to her losing her love interest Mr. Whitaker (with him
her chance at normative heterosexual couplehood). Sister’s ugliness is a form of
abjection, as it drives her from her family home to live at the P.O. where she is
postmistress and, presumably, allows the family to continue without the kind of threat
which Sister’s plain-spokenness and independence represent.
Sister exemplifies the kind of ugliness in southern fiction described by feminist
scholar Mab Segrest. In a slightly different vein from Gleeson-White, Segrest sees the
ugly women who appear in this fiction as not posing a challenge to the expectations of
southern white womanhood, but instead providing a necessary pressure valve for a
system which otherwise would implode from its own pressures. Segrest writes,
The town freak (or eccentric, the eccentric being in one’s own family, the freak in
someone else’s) is often sacrosanct, protected because her/his insanity is
recognized as necessary to preserve collective sanity . . . . These community
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demands for normalcy are particularly strong around matters of female
sexuality—hence the prevalence of the female grotesque in these fictions. (25)17
To Segrest, ugly women such as Sister provide a necessary outlet for the strictly policed
gender norms of the community, allowing others in the community to vicariously
experience rebellion without risking their own status.
While Segrest’s characterization falls more under the rubric of abjection,
Yaeger’s discussion of ugly women in A Curtain of Green relies more upon theories of
the grotesque. Unlike Segrest, who focuses on such women’s real-life counterparts in
southern communities, Yaeger is more interested in the larger canon of which works such
as Welty’s short fiction are a part. Yaeger writes that “southern women writers who
appropriate the grotesque are at work constructing a female tradition that refuses the
genteel obsession with writing (or inhabiting) the beautiful body in exchange for
something more politically active and vehement: for the angry sex- and class-conscious
writing of the southern gargantuan” (“Beyond the Hummingbird” 312). Like GleesonWhite, Yaeger sees the image of the ugly woman as enabling southern women writers to
perform a politics of dissent. While Segrest considers the role that ugly southern women
play within their communities, Yaeger instead focuses on the role of the southern woman
writer within the culture of the South.
In the larger tradition of southern literature, Yaeger identifies the “racially pure
and diminutive female body in need of protection” as a southern myth, a myth critical to
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maintaining racial hegemony. Yaeger claims that, “this fragile white body helps to
motivate (1) southern modes of population control reproducing black and white
populations as separate, (2) the regulated segregation of these racial bodies in space, and
(3) the need for deeply interiorized categories of racism that will do the work of
segregation” (“Beyond the Hummingbird” 312). Yaeger’s sees Welty’s writing as
refusing this requisite discipline, specifically through its portrayal of images of ugly
women and grotesque bodies. Through these images, southern women writers are able to
defy the forms of control which undergird the racism and racially motivated violence
which has pervaded southern history and culture.
The story “A Curtain of Green” addresses race more directly than many of
Welty’s other works do, especially the other stories in this collection. This is not to say
that Welty does not address race in her work—certainly, even within the Curtain of
Green collection, race plays a significant role in stories such as “Powerhouse,” “A Worn
Path,” and even “Keela, the Outcast Indian Maiden.”18 In “A Curtain of Green,” however,
the appearance of the grieving white widow both highlights the intersection of the fixed
categories of class and race within southern society while revealing the omnipresent
threat of violence which undergirds these divisions.
The widowed Mrs. Larkin’s attempts at mutiny within the community of “Curtain
of Green” underscores the ultimate futility of any attempts at resistance or deviation from
the norm. Hers is the “racially pure and diminutive female body” which Yeager describes
as motivating southern racial violence. However, Welty goes further than this, showing
that the seemingly fragile, white, female body in fact possesses the capability for violence
18
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itself. As she approaches Jamey, “the colored boy who worked in the neighborhood by
the day” (132), Mrs. Larkin stops in a moment of premeditation: “When she was directly
behind him she stood quite still for a moment, in the queer sheathed manner she had
before beginning her gardening in the morning. Then she raised the hoe above her head;
the clumsy sleeves both fell back, exposing the thin, unsunburned whiteness of her arms,
the shocking fact of their youth” (134). Contrary to the narrator’s claims, however, it is
not the youth represented by these white arms which is shocking. Rather, it is the
violence—and in this community, sanctioned violence—that such whiteness represents
which should actually be considered shocking.
What is also surprising is that it is not this scene which is viewed by Mrs.
Larkin’s neighbors and gossiped about, but the more banal details about Mrs. Larkin’s
appearance. Threatened violence against a young black boy is not notable; failure to meet
standards of feminine beauty are. The neighbors observe that Mrs. Larkin has put beauty
completely behind her in her widowhood. The neighbor woman who watches her
describes her appearance as slovenly: “Every morning she might be observed walking
slowly, almost timidly, out of the white house, wearing a pair of the untidy overalls, often
with her hair streaming and tangled where she had neglected to comb it” (130). The lack
of tidiness in her clothes and hair shows her unwillingness to submit to her neighbors’
expectations of a proper woman’s appearance. Grief has caused her to shirk the duties
expected of her by her conservative southern neighborhood, including the duty of
allowing her neighbors to comfort and care for her through tragedy. Even her
preoccupation with gardening, a potentially appropriate pastime for a woman of her
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status, is not executed appropriately. It isolates her, as she fails to share what she grows
with her community.
She further fails to take the community’s feelings into account in her gardening
methodology. Her neighbor complains, “And if she thought of beauty at all (they
regarded her stained overalls, now almost of a color with the leaves), she certainly did not
strive for it in her garden. It was impossible to enjoy looking at such a place” (131). In
the value system of the neighborhood, flowers are not beautiful by themselves: they
require cultivation and a proper context in order to qualify as beautiful. Growing wildly
without order disqualifies them from being considered beautiful, as does the widow’s
failure to use them to show the proper regard for her neighbors. The widow’s rejection of
beauty parallels her rejection of her community through her rebellion against its
aesthetics, values, and expectations.
While many of the descriptors of ugliness were present in early drafts of these
stories, both the intensity of the ugliness as well as the intersubjective nature of it are
properties which emerged over the course of Welty’s revisions to the manuscripts.
Certainly, many of the descriptions of ugliness are present in the original drafts of these
stories, The description of the mother in “Why I Live at the P.O.,” for example, is that of
a two-hundred-pound woman with little feet (MS 10), as it is in the final version, and Lily
Daw’s hair is described as “milky yellow” (a description which I find curiously ugly) in
the original as well (MS 9). The women in these stories are anchored in the tradition of
ugly women in southern literature which I see as prevalent.
Thus, Welty plans the inclusion of ugliness in her work from the beginning stages
of her writing, although the Medusan petrifaction theme is one which emerges over the
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course of her revisions. Surprisingly, many of the markers which signify the kind of
intersubjective space which I see as key in Welty’s stories—between characters as well
as between the reader and text—are absent from Welty’s early drafts of these stories. I
maintain that a great deal of what makes Welty’s characters so memorable is this very
dimension of intersubjectivity in her stories, so it is fascinating to see how this
characteristic emerges through seemingly small, sentence-level details such as word
choice over the course of her revision. For example, in “Why I Live at the P.O.,” it is not
until a later draft that Mr. Whitaker’s “Pose Yourself” business appears: earlier, he is
simply Sister’s boyfriend and Stella-Rondo’s husband (MS 1). The addition of the “Pose
Yourself” business underscores the theme of scopophilic vision that the Medusan themes
imply. In “Clytie,” the detail “while the ladies watched” was added to the description of
Clytie’s hat getting wet (MS 2), similarly highlighting that Clytie’s ugliness is one that is
seen by others. I even read the idea of intersubjective space in the edit Welty made in
“The Key,” when she revised the description of Ellie. In the first version, Ellie is
described as having “that too explicit representation of agony” (MS 2). The final version
reads “that too explicit evidence of agony.” Even this minor word change evinces a
growing preoccupation with witnessing and interactive vision, as “evidence” implies a
kind of intersubjectivity not present in “representation.”
Similarly, I many of Welty’s early drafts contained ellipses which were not
present in the final version.19 As Welty complained in a letter to her close friend John
Robinson, she was often dismayed with the changes made to the punctuation in her
manuscripts (“Letter to John F. Robinson, n.d. “Friday” [27 June 1941]”), and I suspect
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that she intended her final stories to have ellipses. While I am not aware of scholarship
that has specifically addressed this detail in Welty’s work, there is scholarship which
discusses the presence of ellipses in the work of Edith Wharton which I believe is
applicable to Welty’s punctuation.20 In Wharton’s work, many see her frequent use of
ellipses as places in which the reader is expected to fill in the narrative themselves, and I
see Welty’s use of ellipses in her earlier drafts as performing a similar function—once
again, foregrounding a more interactive role for the reader.
I now turn to “A Memory,” the story which best exemplifies not only the
interactive nature of readership and viewership but the broader Medusan themes I have
discussed so far, especially those of rebellion and sexuality, as the gross sexuality she
represents undercuts the idealization of the narrator’s romantic crush. In this story, the
unnamed adolescent girl who narrates the story has her daydreams about her school crush
interrupted by an encounter with a group of vulgar people on the beach. Gleeson-White
says that, for the narrator, “the group she encounters by the lake . . . will not fit into her
narrow vision. The woman overflows the bounds of acceptable identity to challenge
restrictive images of petite and gracious womanhood, written into a history of terror and
(self-) denial” (50). It is not only the ugly body that offends the narrator, but also the
evocation of foreignness in the description of the ugly group: “They were brown and
roughened, but not foreigners; when I was a child such people were called ‘common’”
(“A Memory” 94). Such a vague evocation of foreignness implies both a literal
foreignness, in that their dark complexions link them to geographical Otherness, as well
as a socioeconomic foreignness (as the narrator’s characterization of them as “common”
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implies). Both of these othering statuses represent a threat to the traditionally southern
ways of life, typified by the traditionally beautiful, upper class southern white woman.
Sexuality is present in this scene—but it is an earthy, uncontainable, base
sexuality completely located on the body. Such corporeal sexuality is in stark contrast to
the idealized, romantic fantasies that remain in the narrator’s imagination. Her
description of the woman on the beach is one of fear, alienation, and disgust:
She was unnaturally white and fatly aware, in a bathing suit which had no relation
to the shape of her body. Fat hung on her upper arms like an arrested earthslide on
a hill. With the first motion she might make, I was afraid that she would slide
down upon herself into a terrifying heap. Her breasts hung heavy and widening
like pears into her bathing suit. Her legs lay prone one on the other like shadowed
bulwarks, uneven and deserted, upon which, from the man’s hand, the sand piled
higher like the teasing threat of oblivion. (95)
In this description, the woman’s inability to appropriately fill the highly charged gender
marker of a bathing suit undercuts her own femininity even as it foregrounds the
monstrosity of her body, which is described in terms of violent nature imagery. This
threatens not only her own identity (“I was afraid that she would slide down upon herself
into a terrifying heap”) but also of civilization itself, as her legs described as deserted
bulwarks evoke a post-apocalyptic landscape.
Such threats also evoke French feminist Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection, as it
is “not a lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity,
system, order” (4). The abject defies containment, challenges intelligibility, and
endangers the very boundaries which contain and control societal systems. It is in this
way that my understanding of ugliness is informed by Kristeva, who characterizes the
abject as, “the jettisoned object, [which] is radically excluded and draws me toward the
place where meaning collapses . . . . It lies outside, beyond the set, and does not seem to
agree to the latter’s rules of the game. And yet, from its place of banishment, the abject
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does not cease challenging its master” (2). To Kristeva, the abject concurrently defines
and challenges borders. Similarly, Judith Butler says that abjection “presupposes and
produces a domain of agency from which it is differentiated” (Bodies That Matter 243 n.
2). As with the abject, we recoil from ugliness, too, but cannot simply ignore or disregard
it. The abject’s existence outside of a system constitutes a threat to this system, while it
simultaneously upholds it, by providing a delineation of boundaries.
Unlike abjection, ugliness resides within the system (however marginally). That
ugly women so frequently appear within these stories demonstrates their failure to qualify
as truly abject.21 Considering what ugliness shares with abjection, however, highlights
what the abject shares with the ugly in Sarah Gleeson-White’s consideration of ugly
women, especially as she sees these images “engag[ing] in a politics of dissent” as they
“challenge idealized and, needless to say, oppressive visions of white southern
womanhood” (46). Women described as “ugly” are in direct violation of a system which
simultaneously upholds and relies upon such enforced feminine ideals. In this way, ugly
women pose a threat to the supposed integrated nature of these systems.
Such a threat is quite apparent in the narrator’s response to the fat woman in “A
Memory.” To Kristeva, the abject delimits the “border of my condition of a human being
. . . the place where I am not and which permits me to be” (3). In “A Memory,” the
disgust the narrator feels in response to the fat woman’s appearance along with the overt,
vulgar sexuality of the people in the group reflects such a challenge to what she thinks of
as her ordered life. The narrator’s prolonged visual attention—staring, which is
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emphasized by her framing hands—reveals her attempt to impose what Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson calls a “regulating visual dynamic” (41), or “visual acts . . . [which]
help to create, enforce, and register our social positions (42). As the narrator literally
makes a frame around the group with her hands, she tries to construct a border between
herself and these people, attempting to re-establish the borders between what she
understands as normative and deviant behavior, borders which have been challenged by
the sight of this group.
Though the ugly woman on the beach is often discussed as an example of the
grotesque female body in southern literature,22 I would like to challenge this
characterization. While the grotesque is apparent throughout the tradition of southern
women’s writing, I contend that the heading of “The Southern Grotesque” has been
applied too liberally to characters who do not qualify as such. “Grotesque” as a descriptor
should be reserved for characters and bodies which truly are the “open, protruding,
extended, secreting body” (Russo 62) or monstrous freak (Russo 75), such as the amputee
Joy-Hulga in O’Connor’s “Good Country People” or Dorothy Allison’s monstrous
Shannon Pearl. Even the fat woman’s bulwark-like legs and fat which hangs like “an
arrested earthslide” in “A Memory” appears human when compared to Shannon Pearl
who, “Looking back at me from between her mother’s legs . . . was wholly monstrous, a
lurching hunched creature shining with sweat and smug satisfaction” (Bastard Out of
Carolina 155). Shannon Pearl is a terrifying creature who evokes fears of a vaginadentata-esque incarnation of the monstrous feminine.
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In contrast to such truly sublime evocations of the grotesque, the characterization
of the woman in “A Memory” as “common” suggests that she is recognizable and human.
However, by characterizing women such as this one under the rubric of the grotesque,
critics attribute the Bakhtinian understanding of the grotesque as having the
“carnivalesque” potential to tear and shred organized society to the anonymous woman’s
unruly body. 23 While I agree that the fat woman’s appearance does have the potential to
endanger the societal norms it violates, I disagree with the characterization of the woman
as grotesque. Welty’s reliance upon Medusa imagery and the theme of petrifaction, in
fact, reinforces the fact that ugliness is different from the grotesque.
In “A Memory,” the group on the beach is provocative enough to elicit the
unnamed girl’s stare, a behavior which she surely has been taught is impolite. To begin
with, the interactive characteristic of staring means that the girl is interacting with this
“common” group, itself a rebellious behavior on the part of the girl. Notable among the
different paradigms of staring identified by Garland-Thomson in her discussion of the
interactive nature of staring is what she calls the Sartrean mode of staring, what I explain
in Chapter 1 is based on Sartre’s “parable of interpersonal shaming through domination
staring” (43). In this mode, to be stared at is to be recognized as failing to meet the
expectations of the viewer; to be stared at in this way is to be a victim, and to realize that
one is the recipient of such a stare is to concede defeat. Acknowledging the interactive
nature of the staring configuration, Garland-Thomson explains that such a scene “asserts
the perversity of staring and the anxiety of being a staree” (43). Certainly, being caught
staring is itself a failure to meet certain standards of civility.
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Such a double bind is demonstrated throughout “A Memory,” as the narrator’s
position as a viewer is emphasized from the beginning of the story, when she describes
how taking painting lessons has taught her to make “small frames with my fingers, to
look at everything” (Curtain of Green 92). At one point, however, her position as viewer
is threatened in the Sartrean mode by the man in the group whose careless gaze includes
the narrator. Being seen—being caught—while looking causes the narrator to be
“stunned” (96); in this story, she is the victim of Medusa. By the end of the story, she is
so horrified by the grotesque sexuality on display—“victimized by the sight”—that she
tries to end the interaction by closing her eyes repeatedly (97).
Among the various modes of staring which Garland-Thomson explicates in
addition to the Sartrean one, she also examines the role that curiosity plays in staring:
To those who condemn it, the curiosity launched by the impulse to stare at
inexplicable sights is a grab for unauthorized knowledge, a presumptuous
overreaching . . . . A poke in the eye of the gods, curiosity puts us in charge of the
story, trouncing obedience and risking sound punishment. Eve, Prometheus,
Icarus, Oedipus, and Frankenstein warn us the hubris of curiosity, of wanting to
know more than is good for you. (63)
The sense of hubris which Garland-Thomson argues is inherent in staring may explain
why it is considered impolite to stare: in this way, staring becomes a way of claiming that
which is not yours, or exhibiting an unearned agency.24 In Welty’s work, particularly in
“A Memory,” not only is the one who does the looking as important as the one being
looked at, but the interaction which results from this encounter is also crucial. The girl’s
looking at the group on the beach through her own fingers, framing the scene and calling
attention to the ugly woman, enacts the Sartrean mode by forcing us as readers to see her
24

This understanding of staring also explains why the man on the beach seems unaware of the impropriety
of his staring, while the girl is embarrassed: their reactions to being caught staring reflects their own class
status, through their varying levels of awareness of the rules of propriety. (Of course, the man’s gender is
also a factor in the complicated vectors of privilege at play in this scene, as I address below.)
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staring (as well as calling attention to our own role as onlookers). Here, the staring
relationship is a highly sexualized one, as the girl’s framing of both the overtly corporeal
scene on the beach as well as her own idealization of her school crush give her a sense of
sexual agency, even if only in her imagination (which, especially in the context of a short
story, is itself a form of action).
Additionally, Yaeger draws attention to the uniqueness of the narrator of “A
Memory”: “Unlike most of the characters in Curtain of Green . . . the heroine of ‘A
Memory’ seems out of place, for she is solidly middle class and hopelessly lyrical . . . .
suggesting that this story’s narrator may be Welty herself.”25 As a photographer, Welty
certainly saw value in what many others registered as a lack of beauty. I agree with
Yaeger, who explicitly points to the transformation of the narrator from one who is “at
first repelled but finally feels eroticized by the grotesque world around her” (“Beyond the
Hummingbird” 311), drawing attention to the significantly gendered nature of these
dynamics. Further, as Garland-Thomson explains, “Whereas the male stare is a
potentially hostile instrument to be mastered, the female stare compromises a woman’s
virtue, which is the ultimate threat to her position as a lady” (69). By openly staring at the
group on the beach, the narrator further subverts the expectations of her own ladylike
status, as her willingness to witness overt sexuality compromises her own moral standing.
In other words, by being the instigator of a Sartrean stare, the young woman on the beach
becomes both Medusa and her victim: both the perpetrator of the destructive gaze as well
as its petrified victim. The intersubjective space in which this interaction takes place,
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from Welty’s own life (Marrs “Eudora Welty: Panel Discussion and Gallery Walk-Through”).
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however, allows for a potentially productive petrifaction. In this beach scene, the young
woman will presumably emerge from the intersubjective space of this stare a changed
person, with a changed vision of the world.
I was surprised to discover that the theme in “A Memory” of intersubjectivity
aroused by ugliness did not develop until a later draft, as I consider this story to
demonstrate this dynamic more overtly than her other stories. In the published version,
the narrator of the story frequently holds her fingers up in a frame shape through which
she views the world. These frames emphasize the extent to which she, as a viewer, is
responsible for constructing her vision of the world, and calls attention to the reader’s
similar role in constructing her own understanding of the story. Significantly, this hand
gesture is absent from early drafts.
And in fact, when it does appear, it is first described as a “shield,” and only later
as a “device,” a distinction which I find quite revealing (MS 2). As the gesture is one that
the narrator learned in an art class, I read the original “shield” characterization as one in
which artistic creation functions as a protection from the ugliness of life, as she holds it
up between herself and the debased people on the beach. However, Welty’s work is not
about hiding from the baser aspects of life, and this is why this earlier characterization of
the gesture as a “shield” changes to “device” in the final version. A more neutral
descriptor, “device” implies a facilitation of something, a tool, as the narrator’s hand
gesture ultimately functions not as a shield but as an attempt at connecting with reality.
As the end of the story leaves the narrator with her romantic visions of her imaginary
love story shattered, what these revisions emphasize to me is the ways in which artistic
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vision functions as a connection to, rather than a shield against, the harsher aspects of
reality in Welty’s writing.
Elaine Scarry claims that “Beauty brings copies of itself into being. It makes us
draw it, take photographs of it, or describe it to other people” (3). If this is true, what is
the purpose, then, of bringing ugliness into art—why have ugly women in literature at
all? Despite the troubling meanings implied by ugliness, its power to captivate remains.
In Welty’s work, the images of ugly women offer openings in the narratives, the
kind of “open-ended . . . capacity to create meaning” described by Garland-Thomson
(39). Especially when Welty’s stories are read together, the frequent appearance of the
ugly women throughout the stories cannot be ignored. While some readers might be
content to dismiss them as a gesture toward the Southern Gothic or a reliance on
stereotypes for comic relief, I maintain that their appearance is more complicated than
this.
Exemplified by the unresolved endings of “A Memory” and “Why I Live at the
P.O.,” Welty utilizes the dynamics of ugliness and staring in order to leave open a
generative space. In her discussion of Welty’s writing process, Marrs observes that Welty
realized that “in the pages of stories . . . writer and reader met, jointly bringing their
imaginations to bear upon a narrative” (Eudora Welty: A Biography 36). By making us
look at ugliness repeatedly, Welty puts the reader into an uncomfortable position. Within
the frames of her stories, she includes elements of the abject and grotesque which
threaten the very borders she constructs. However, the dynamic which emerges from the
images of ugly women as well as the staring they provoke offers the reader new and
productive opportunities for considering female characters previously caught in a
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tradition of southern literature which offered limited models of femininity. Despite
popular images of southern women as beautiful belles, stories such as Welty’s reveal that
these images are not the only model of southern womanhood. Though many dismiss these
characters as humorous stereotypes of inferior southerners, I maintain that their
ubiquitous presence throughout Welty’s work means that they are too important to simply
be dismissed as comic relief. As we can see in the girl’s response to the group in “A
Memory,” these characters’ appearance signify more than comedy: the ugliness read on
their faces and bodies function as markers of dissent, sexuality, and histories of violence
and neglect. These stories interrupt our expectations of southern angels of the house, and
thus make us stop and reconsider our expectations of southern women. As ugliness
requires the one staring to imagine a story to explain what is being seen, so Welty’s ugly
women require us to imagine our own new narrative possibilities.
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CHAPTER 3
THE UGLY PLOT
In her 2002 The Wedding Complex: Forms of Belonging in Modern American
Culture, Elizabeth Freeman differentiates what she sees as the conservative courtship plot
(one in which the main plotline ends in an engagement or a wedding) from the much
more complex and potentially radical marriage plot (one which contains an actual
marriage or wedding within the text, but does not end with it). She observes that, in the
courtship plot, “various alternatives to marriage are systematically deployed and then
rejected or overcome, and the wedding finale signals, at best, acquiescence to a social
order only slightly modified by bourgeois feminine values. But . . . when a wedding took
over a plot, narrative and social chaos ensued” (xiv). While courtship plots contain a
return to order by the end of the story, wedding plots can provide critiques of the status
quo. In a marriage plot, “the wedding actually served to demystify marriage, illuminating
and critiquing the power of marriage law to maintain structures that do not seem
immediately connected to it, such as the nation-state, racial taxonomies, and so on”
(Freeman xiv). Unlike the courtship plot, which is teleological, building to one particular
ending, the wedding plot is multitudinous, containing many possibilities.
Similarly, Joseph Allen Boone examines the tradition of what he refers to as the
“love-plot”26 within the Anglo-American literary tradition. According to Boone, the
generic “love-plot” consists of “complex interchanges whereby ideological structures of
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text, but does not serve as the climax of the novel’s plot.
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belief—of which the ideal of romantic wedlock is a prime example—are translated into
narrative structures that at once encode and perpetuate those beliefs” (2). Similar to
Freeman’s discussion of the courtship plot, Boone claims that the tradition of the loveplot has “served a powerful conservative function promoting exaggerated expectations of
everlasting bliss that have enforced the subconscious acquiescence of many readers . . . to
a limiting position within the social and marital order” (2). Both Boone and Freeman see
these plots with their pre-determined endings as confining women to narrow, traditional
roles and reinforcing retrogressive traditions.
However, as Freeman identifies the marriage plot as one which offers alternatives
to these confining roles, so does Boone identify a counter-tradition within the love-plot,
one which pushes back against the ideological underpinnings of the conservative
narrative structure. Boone argues that love-plots often contain contradictions which
require careful deciphering by the reader, a process which creates a “simultaneous
counter-narrative: the persistent ‘undoing’ of the dominant tradition by the contradiction
concealed within the specific forms that its representations of ‘life’ and ‘love’ have
assumed” (2). For example, although a novel such as Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice
conforms to a standard courtship plot structure in which a series of obstacles are
eventually overcome to unite Elizabeth and Darcy by the novel’s end, there are enough
“devious inflection[s] and glancing blows[s] at sexual roles and marital institutions”
throughout the novel to provide a counter-narrative of critique which coexists with the
primary narrative’s “affirm[ation of] a progressive vision of marriage as a viable social
good” (91). What Boone identifies as these “small but subversive attack[s] upon the
evolving hegemony of the marriage tradition in Anglo-American fiction” (2) are similarly
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present throughout much of the fiction written by southern women through their
deployment of the ugly plot.
Similar to these counterplots, I propose the ugly plot as counterplot to the more
familiar courtship and marriage plots. As a vehicle for social rebellion in many works by
southern women writing in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, ugliness marks those
who for various reasons are not suitable for the expected roles of wife and mother. In the
ugly plot, a woman described as ugly lives outside of normative marriage and
motherhood. As an alternative to a love plot, the ugly plot imagines other possible
relationships for women, often those with other women similarly excluded from
marriage. In some versions of the ugly plot involve characters such as Welty’s Lily Daw
or Porter’s Cousin Eva whose appearance reflects their inability to fully inhabit their
expected role as a southern woman. However, there are other variations of the ugly plot
in which women actively choose to adopt an ugly appearance in order to opt out of these
expectations. Rooted in Flannery O’Connor’s “Good Country People” and her character
Joy/Hulga who consciously frowns, slumps, and stomps around in order to appear
unattractive, this variety of the ugly plot highlights the important role that privilege
places in choosing ugliness, as only women who have the resources to meet their material
needs outside of marriage can make the conscious decision to opt out of it.
Ugly plots have the potential for much more variety than courtship plots, whose
outcomes are rather fixed as happy endings. Ironically, these plots involving women
unsuitable for marriage are more closely related to Freeman’s formulation of the marriage
plot, which demystifies marriage by showing the variety of possibilities—both good and
bad—which exist after vows are exchanged. Unlike these love plots, however, the ugly
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plot enables a rebellious existence outside of normative southern gender roles and
marriage economies. By taking them outside of the marriage market, the ugly plot offers
women ways of living that are alternative to marriage, although not necessarily utopian.
The ugly plot acknowledges women who “don’t count,” whose class status, race,
ethnicity, rebellion against the status quo, or other undesirable characteristics threaten the
stability of the dominant, white southern culture that the South’s conservative traditions
attempt to uphold.
Ugly female characters who fail to achieve marriage and motherhood are another
way in which authors illustrate the “slippages in the logic governing marriage and
marriage fiction,” as Boone argues that the contradictions throughout love-plots
highlight. Exemplifying the type of counterplot which “tap[s] the [novel] genre’s original
radical impulse to subvert what (and while) it conserves” (2-3), the ugly plot as a
narrative structure imagines alternatives to expectations of marriage and romance.
Southern women writers write ugly plots in order to revive the radical potential for
critique and dissent and in the once subversive genre of the novel.
Though Boone’s primary interest is in the effect of the revival of such
subversiveness on the novel’s form, I am more interested in the implications for a
feminist critique of traditional southern gender roles as well as the potential for queering
the love-plot. Because ugliness has a specifically southern dimension, the deployment of
the ugly plot is a strategy to rebel against these regional ideological strictures. By
creating ugly characters, southern women writers themselves are able to “be ugly,” to not
only push back against these expectations of femininity, but also imagine ways of living
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alternative to established roles. By taking them outside of the marriage market, the ugly
plot offers women ways of living that are alternative to marriage.
This is not to say, however, that these alternatives are always utopian (or even
positive) in nature: while some texts, such as Gone With the Wind and The Color Purple,
do leave readers with a sense of hope for the characters’ futures, others, such as “Lily
Daw and the Ladies” have a much more ambiguous ending. Still, ugliness provides these
female characters access to a sort of freedom, at least in the terms discussed by Foucault
in “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.” Observing that “power
relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free,” Foucault insists upon a broad
definition of freedom: “Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when
it can be truly claimed that one side has ‘total power’ over the other, a power can be
exercised over the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of
leaping out the window or of killing the other person” (441). Though the ugly plot does
not promise utopian futures, it does demonstrate a spectrum of positions relative to the
marriage market, as opposed to more traditional love-plots which trace a more linear
progression from single to married.
Further, the constellation of alternatives to marriage which these texts
demonstrate is not a static system. Women’s appearances change over time, and these
changes are reflective of their positions relative to marriage and motherhood. Certainly,
when an ugly woman tries to interact with the marriage market, the interaction affects
both the woman and the market. It is what is left out of the Cinderella story, the fairy tale
which Rudman and Heppen have appropriated for their characterization of “the glass
slipper effect,” in which “the idealized association of men with chivalry and heroism
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might be linked to a hobbling of women’s personal power aspirations” (1359). This
paradigm of marriage as limiting women’s identity and options for ways of living is
reflected in retrogressive models of marriage in the South.
However, the ugly plot demonstrates that interpellation into the roles of wife and
mother is not the only option which women have. The ugly plot illuminates a fictional
space similar to that described by Kathryn Bond Stockton as the realm of the queer child
in fiction. Just as “the gay child lights up the problem of History[, l]ying outside of
historians’ focus—not ‘in’ it yet” (8-9), so does the ugly woman highlight problems of
southern gender roles and show alternatives which exist outside of the focus of loveplots. In her discussion of the gay child, Stockton posits a concept of “sideways growth”
as “something that locates energy, pleasure, vitality, and (e)motion in the back-and-forth
of connections and extensions that are not reproductive.” Denied a place in progressive
narratives of growing up as well as heterosexual couplehood and reproduction, the gay
child instead “grows to the side of cultural ideals” (13). The ugly plot imagines similar
ways of living “sideways” to the cultural ideals of the American South.
Ugly women have appearances which mark them as failing to live up to these
ideals. What Stockton refers to as “living sideways” is similar to what many queer
theorists have characterized as “illegibility.” Although Judith Butler emphasizes the
importance of having identities which are legible in the political system, Judith
Halberstam questions the usefulness of legibility in such systems. Halberstam claims that,
“Illegibility may in fact be one way of escaping the political manipulation to which all
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. . . . fields and disciplines are subject” (88),27 and I think that illegibility in the marriage
market may similarly be a way of escaping the “political manipulation” to which
southern women are subject by virtue of their gender. To clarify, being legible in the
marriage market is different from being eligible for the market: legibility is primarily a
matter of possessing a visage which is recognizable as a member of the system. A
married woman, for example, or a widow would be legible to the system, having an
identity and role which was acknowledged, approved of, and understood—despite being
ineligible for marriage.
However, a woman who qualifies as ugly—because of physical characteristics
which mark her as belonging to a lower class, for example, such as Mrs. Slattery in Gone
With the Wind, who was a “snarly-haired woman, sickly and washed-out of appearance
(67)—is not only ineligible for the marriage market (which women such as Scarlett aspire
to), but has an appearance which is illegible to the market. There is no place for Mrs.
Slattery in the dominant white, hegemonic marriage market populated by families such as
the O’Haras and the Tarletons. Her daughter Emmie is later seen by Scarlett as being a
“dirty tow-headed slut,” an “overdressed, nasty piece of poor white trash” (747);
Emmie’s appearance signifies her class status which renders her illegible (though not
invisible) to the marriage market. Certainly, Scarlett would never consider Emmie to
inhabit the same system as she does, because of Emmie’s class status and known sexual
promiscuity.
Ironically, Emmie Slattery does, in fact, marry Jonas Wilkerson, the former Tara
overseer who was fired after he was revealed to be the father of Emmie’s child. After
27
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they are married, however, Scarlett’s characterization of Jonas as a “Scallawag”
demonstrates that she continues to see them as inhabiting a very different status stratum
from herself, despite the Wilkerson’s possession of much more money than the O’Hara’s
have. The only legibility which Emmie possesses is that of a threat to Scarlet’s system:
first through her family’s typhoid germs, which ultimately are responsible for the death of
Scarlet’s mother, and then through Jonas’s “Scallawag” wealth and his attempt to buy
Tara when Scarlett cannot pay the property taxes on the plantation.
Emmie Slattery demonstrates the variety of positions relative to marriage which
the ugly plot demonstrates are available to women outside of the linear progression from
belle to married lady, a progression which novels such as Gone with the Wind overtly
imply is the only suitable one. At first glance, the continued popularity of Gone with the
Wind appears to sustain beliefs in traditional femininity and feminine gender roles
represented by the belle ideal. Although the concept “southern belle” is firmly rooted in
the nineteenth century, 28 as an ideal it refuses to die, as demonstrated by contemporary
magazines such as Southern Living and Garden and Gun.29 Within the hegemonic, white
southern culture, women have not traditionally had many accepted roles besides those of
wife and mother. However, I maintain that Gone With the Wind remains popular at least
in part in the ways in which it attempts to subvert these ideals through the deployment of
ugly counterplots.
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White southern womanhood—or in its ideal form, ladyhood—has quite rigid
requirements. Taking a sociological approach, scholars John Lynxwiler and Michele
Wilson have identified a “specific cultural image” of southern womanhood, with
nineteenth century roots whose tenets were still observed at the time of their study in the
1980s:
Southern womanhood is essentially white and relatively well to do . . . . Southern
by ‘the Grace of God,’ she is a lady in her innocence, including the absence of
knowledge of vulgar topics and language. Her timidity, never marred by
assertiveness or anger, is complemented by her submissiveness to her parents,
husband, spiritual counselor, and God. All of these protect her from the harsh
realities of money, the world of work, and rapists. She, of course, matches or
rewards this protectiveness with self-denial and a compassionate concern for
others. (113)
Lynxwiler and Wilson’s observations are echoed by Mab Segrest’s memoir of growing
up female in the South, especially in her explanation of the centrality of manners (and the
denial which they facilitate) to southern ladyhood: “Manners, lies and truth were all
intertwined in the world I grew up in. Manners were, in fact, elaborate rituals for getting
at or avoiding the truth” (63). In both of these examples, white southern ladies facilitate
the preservation of the white hegemonic system through the preservation of their own
appropriate façade.
Scarlett O’Hara exemplifies the struggle to preserve this façade throughout Gone
with the Wind. The novel provides several fascinating examples of ugly plots contained
within larger, seemingly more conventional narratives of courtship and marriage. The
incorporation of these ugly plots within the often romantic sweep of the larger narrative
draws attention to the very unromantic nature of marriage—at least the type of marriage
held up as an aspiration for women such as Scarlett—which is to perpetuate a very
specific kind of southern society: one which is white, affluent, and supports retrogressive

87

values. The ugly plot calls attention to women who are typically illegible in this system—
and while illegibility is not necessarily synonymous with invisibility, the illegible is often
ignored. By calling attention to women who would typically be illegible in this system,
the ugly plots in Gone with the Wind not only demystify marriage but also call attention
to the many possible ways of “living sideways” which marriage often overshadows.
From the novel’s beginning, romantic aspirations for marriage are called into
question. Gerald O’Hara dismisses his daughter Scarlett’s romantic aspirations for
Ashley Wilkes and instead encourages her toward a more practical union: “If you had any
sense you’d have married Stuart or Brent Tarleton long ago. Think it over, daughter.
Marry one of the twins and then the plantations will run together and Jim Tarleton and I
will build you a fine house, right where they join, in that big pine grove” (23). In fact,
despite a description of their gentlemanly traits of “raising good cotton, riding well,
shooting straight, dancing lightly, squiring the ladies with elegance and carrying one’s
liquor like a gentleman,” it is ultimately their wealth which distinguishes them from
others: “Their family had more money, more horses, more slaves than anyone else in the
County, but the boys had less grammar than most of their poor Cracker neighbors” (2).
And the purpose of marriage in this society is to preserve this wealth among those who
will preserve this society of affluent whites who live by retrogressive, southern values.
The visibility of the character Belle Watling further demystifies any romantic
notions about marriage. Belle’s appearance evokes the Medusa-like qualities of the ugly
woman discussed in Chapter Two, as her appearance is striking, but catches the attention
because it is too bright and inappropriate. When Scarlett first encounters Belle, her “eye
was caught by a figure on the sidewalk in a brightly colored dress—too bright for street
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wear,” and observing her red hair, “it was the first time she had ever seen any woman
who she knew for certain had ‘done something to her hair’ and she watched her,
fascinated” (101). Belle’s appearance poses a threat, in that it has the potential to catch
and fascinate. After Uncle Peter refers to her as Belle Watling—without a “Miss” or
“Mrs.”—and refuses to specify anything more than she’s one of the “passel of no-count
folks” in Atlanta, Scarlett realizes that Belle must be a “bad woman” (102). According to
the narrator, “Bad women and all they involved were mysterious and revolting matters to
her. She knew that men patronized these women for purposes which no lady should
mention—or if she did mention them, in whispers and by indirection and euphemisms”
(171). In this way, the existence of Belle in the novel functions not only to demystify
marriage but also to acknowledge an alternative to marriage, as Belle is the proprietor of
a brothel.
Unlike the film version, in which Ona Munson’s brightly made up Belle Watling
shares screen time with Vivian Leigh, Olivia de Havilland, and Clark Gable, in Mitchell’s
novel these scenes with Belle are more often recounted by those involved, rather than
directly narrated. For example, the memorable film scene in which Belle gives Melanie
money for the hospital is only recounted by Melanie to Scarlett in the novel in retrospect.
Importantly, Belle is rarely fully seen in the novel: upon Scarlett’s return to Atlanta, for
example, Scarlett sees her carriage, in which “a woman’s head appeared for a moment at
the window—a too bright red head beneath a fine fur hat . . . . It was Belle Watling and
Scarlett had a glimpse of nostrils distended with dislike before she disappeared again”
(382). The only scene in which we see Belle directly interacting with another takes place
inside her dim carriage, when she is apologizing to Melanie for having to imply that
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Ashley was an unfaithful husband. This dimly-lit scene consists primarily of dialogue,
however: even when interacting with Melanie, Belle remains invisible as a person; her
too-bright hair is only able to catch attention—otherwise, she lacks any real personhood,
other than being a non-grammatical voice who resents the old ways even as she reveres
the Confederate ideals. And in fact Belle is quite aware of the importance of being
unrecognizable, as she is concerned about someone recognizing her carriage while
Melanie is in it. In order for her business to be successful, she must remain
unrecognizable while interacting with people of “proper” society.30
At the time that Mitchell was writing Gone with the Wind, marriage laws were
being passed which exemplified the kinds of attempts at political manipulation described
by Halberstam through their new requirements such as tests for venereal diseases and
restrictions on marriage between relatives. These new laws signaled the importance of
marriage in the reproduction of a physically healthy and, I would argue, morally
appropriate population.31 Admittedly, one could argue that ugly bodies are not so much
illegible as they are undesirable. Nevertheless, I maintain that there is still a distinction to
be made between the two characterizations. Women may have appearances which
register in a negative valence—Melanie Wilkes in Gone with the Wind, for example,
whose “serious heart-shaped face that was plain almost to homeliness” (14)—and still be
legible in the marriage economy. In fact, Melanie’s “heart-shaped” plainness reveals her
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See, e.g., Mitchell 569.
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See Freeman 23. Though she ties these laws only to the reproduction of a physically healthy population, I
maintain that the moral undertone to these rules—specifically those regarding sexually transmitted diseases
and marriage between relatives—function not only to police the physical health of the population, but also
to regulate the moral character of the population as well.
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to be the ideal woman for marriage: romantic yet compliant. She loves Ashley and will
not be a difficult wife.
Melanie’s non-threatening visage signifies her as good marriage material;
similarly, the connection between being unattractive and being unmarried was a common
one in the South as well. However, spinsterhood was not a dead end for these women, as
historically, unmarried women in the South at times did have more opportunities than
their married sisters. In her historical account of nineteenth century unmarried women in
the urban South, Christine Jacobson Carter reports several accounts of ugly women
whose single status marked them as having “failed in the usual trajectory to mature
womanhood” (19), such as Harriot Pinckney, the wealthy, unmarried daughter of a
Revolutionary War hero who was described as being “plain to distinction”32 and “filled
with all the beauty that nature had left out of her countenance” (16). Carter claims that, in
the nineteenth century, southern single women in cities shared what Lee ChambersSchiller has identified as a “Cult of Single Blessedness” with their northern sisters, an
ideology which “held that remaining single and useful to others was better than marrying
the wrong man for the wrong reason and that women achieved their highest purpose and
happiness in service to others” (5). According to Carter, “What made southern single
blessedness distinctive, however, and the experiences of elite southern spinsters unique,
was that their places within families and their understandings of themselves as daughters,
sisters, and aunts still shaped their identities” (6).
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While I have worked to differentiate ugliness from plainness in my work, that Pinckney was not only
plain but “plain to distinction” qualifies her, in my reading, as exceeding the boundaries of plainness and
entering the realm of the ugly.
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While single women in the nineteenth century may have depended on their
“original families” to “[ensure] them their social places and identities” (Carter 7), what
we see in twentieth century fiction written by women is single women whose unmarried
status not only allows them to reimagine and reinvent alternatives to the household
organized a heterosexual couple and children, but also reveals the limitations of marriage,
especially as southern households began to move from larger, extended family schemas
to smaller families centered around one heterosexual couple and their children.33 By the
end of the Civil War, many single southern women “found that the legacy of antebellum
single blessedness and benevolent activity was not enough to sustain them in the new
economic, social, and political landscape.” According to Jacobson, “Many assessed their
lives and changed circumstances and began to wish for independence from family
burdens—and from being a burden on their families” (153). And in fact, she claims that
once the war began, the antebellum “relative permissiveness, or blind-eye attitude, about
spinsterhood was shattered”; unmarried women were put “under the microscope of public
discourse,” with plenty of “debates on the roles of single women, and hand-wringing over
their lots” (153).
My understanding of such hand-wringing over the failure to marry is informed by
scholars such as Lee Edelman and Judith Halberstam, who write about the concept of
failure in terms of queer theory. Specifically, the ugly plot challenges the imperative of
“reproductive futurism,” a concept which Edelman explains “impose[s] an ideological
limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of
33

Orville Burton observes that, while families in the South were slower to change from larger households
(which conformed to stricter gender roles), they did eventually respond to changes wrought by
industrialization and urbanization, including smaller, more consumer-driven households as well as more
women working outside of the home. See Burton 460-461.
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heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the
possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations” (2).
Instead, Edelman and Halberstam both embrace a model of queer negativity, what
Halberstam describes as “a project within which one remains committed to not only
scrambling dominant logics of desire but also to contesting homogenous models of gay
identity within which a queer victim stands up to his or her oppressors and emerges a
hero” (149). Edelman sees the value of queer negativity “in its challenges to values as
defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social
itself” (7).
In the same way that queer negativity is a refusal of futurism, there is a similar
refusal deployed by southern women writers in their continued creation of ugly women
who are barred from sanctioned, reproductive sexuality through marriage. Ugliness
functions in a similar mode as queerness, in the way that “queerness exposes the
obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the
fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through
the figural logics, the linguistic structures, that shape them” (Edelman 7-8). The ugly plot
similarly reveals the limits of the structures underlying the seemingly requisite roles of
wife and mother by imagining alternative household configurations and ways of living,
by presenting ugly women who have found ways to “live sideways” to these roles.
However, Halberstam is critical of Edelman’s “negative critique [which] strands
queerness between two equally unbearable options (futurity and positivity in opposition
to nihilism and negation).” Halberstam asks, “Can we produce generative models of
failure that do not posit two equally bleak alternatives?” (120). The ugly plot is exactly
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such a “generative model of failure,” as it imagines a variety of alternatives to the
teleological straits of courtship, marriage, and motherhood. Importantly, such a
generative failure signifies a “a feminist politics that issues not from a doing but from an
undoing, not from a being or a becoming women but from a refusal to be or become
woman as she has been defined and imagined within Western politics” (Halberstam
124).34 The creation of unmarriageable, ugly women in these works demonstrates just
such a possible refusal to Woman as she has been even more narrowly defined within the
culture of the American South.
This is not to say, however, that such endings represent some sort of feminist
utopia. Certainly, Welty’s “Lily Daw and the Three Ladies” should be considered under
the rubric of an ugly plot, for while it is discovered that Lily did, in fact, receive a
marriage proposal from a traveling xylophone player—complicating the plans of the
town’s ladies who have arranged to send her to the Ellisville Institute for the Feeble
Minded of Mississippi—the story’s end leaves Lily’s fate unclear. Lily, once excited
about her engagement to the xylophone player, claims that she wants to go to Ellisville
instead. The story’s end emphasizes its ambiguity: “The band went on playing. Some of
the people thought Lily was on the train, and some swore she wasn’t. Everybody cheered,
though, and a straw hat was thrown into the telephone wires” (15). Even this state of
ambiguity is an alternative to a settled state of marriage, one which I argue fits under this
rubric of queer failure. In this way, the ugly plot posits a way of reading women who
have typically been considered illegible to the dominant system, not only highlighting
34

Though the southern marriage economy is not completely synonymous with “Western politics,” I
maintain that the ways in which white southern womanhood was defined in terms of marriage and
motherhood is similar enough that the analogy between the two systems—Western politics and southern
marriage—is appropriate.
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their ineligibility for the system and its rewards but also pointing to alternative ways of
living for women in the South. While these alternative models may not fully subvert the
institutions of southern marriage and family, they do certainly challenge the hegemony of
this model and demonstrate that alternatives are possible.
I would like to clarify that the failure demonstrated by the ugly plot is different
from the kind written about by many southern male writers. Ellen Douglas observes that
when William Faulkner (like so many others) writes about women, women are not only
likened to the South in general (as W. J. Cash observed), but to the failed South in
particular: “the projection of human purity onto women is doomed always to failure,
doomed to produce, inevitably, disappointment and hatred” (87). Faulkner’s mode of
feminine failure is one of symbolic representation: women such as Miss Rosa in
Absalom, Absalom!, for example, who exude a “rank smell of female old flesh long
embattled in virginity” while resembling a “crucified child” (4). In contrast, the “failure”
of women such as Cousin Eva or Scarlett O’Hara35 to succeed at marriage is not symbolic
of larger Southern tragedies, but is instead a rejection of this symbology, a rejection of
the pedestal.
Failure as a mode of possibility is particularly apt in the marriage economy,
specifically because of its relationship to the free market economy. Judith Halberstam
explains that failure “goes hand in hand with capitalism. A market economy must have
winners and losers” (88). Importantly, Halberstam observes that, “as a practice, failure
recognizes that alternatives are embedded already in the dominant and that power is
never total or consistent; indeed failure can exploit the unpredictability of ideology and
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I address both of these characters later in this chapter.
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its indeterminate qualities” (88). The ugly plot is one possible answer to Irigaray’s
challenge to imagine what would happen to the social order “if women left behind their
condition as commodities . . . and took part in elaborating and carrying out exchanges?
Not by reproducing, by copying the ‘phallocratic’ models that have the force of law
today, but by socializing in a different way the relation to nature, matter, the body,
language, and desire” (191). Female characters in the ugly plot do just this, as they find
alternatives to the reproductive nuclear family household,36 alternatives which allow
them to experience their identity more fully than in other, more traditional situations.
Failure in these plots possesses generative potential.
Such failure is related to that exhibited by spinster characters in the traditional
courtship plot. Considering Jane Austen’s spinster figures with other women in her work,
D.A. Miller observes that, “Amid the happy wives and pathetic old maids, there is no
successfully unmarried woman; and despite the multitude of girls who seek to acquire
‘accomplishments,’ not one shows an artistic achievement or even an artistic ambition
that surpasses mediocrity” (28). Unlike the courtship plot, however, the ugly plot
highlights successfully unmarried women as not only a possibility, but as a real
alternative to the limits of often unsuccessful marriage. Southern women writers deploy
ugly characters to imagine such alternatives. I recognize their creation of these ugly
characters as an act of rebellion amid narrow expectations of successful womanhood:
namely, marriage and motherhood. While failure may seem a particularly negative mode
within which to cast such imagining, my use of the concept is similar to that of
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Halberstam, who explains that “Negativity might well constitute an antipolitics, but it
should not register as apolitical” (108).
The aunt figure in particular highlights the existence of an alternate system of
production which is nonprocreative but nevertheless productive. The existence of ugly
women outside of the marriage economy demonstrates that there is a space outside of
marriage and motherhood. These women do other things: teach school, provide for
nieces, and otherwise interact with the public sphere. However, spinsters and
schoolteachers were not the only participants in non-dominant (though significant)
economies. Unmarried aunts are a frequent occurrence in this literature, as they represent
productive members of society who are outside of the dominant system. Southern women
writers often recognize the significance of outsiders in their employment of the ugly plot,
as the ugly plot enables those who fail to meet the standards of marriage eligibility—
whether because they are racially or economically marginal or perceived to be
deformed—to find a place outside of the strict gender ideology of the American South.
One of the more acceptable roles adopted by unmarried women has been that of the
spinster aunt, a role which allows women to adopt a somewhat maternal role without the
requirements of actual marriage and motherhood. Despite the fact that the spinster role is
an acceptable one within southern society, I wish to emphasize its place within a separate
realm which is productive and yet non-procreative. When a spinster aunt’s
unmarriageable state is called attention to by her ugliness, the ugly plot highlights the
alternatives to the procreative roles of wife and mother she must seek out, demonstrating
the kind of “productive failure” discussed above. In fact, Charlotte M. Wright traces
ugliness in twentieth-century American literature primarily to the nineteenth century
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spinster figure. Wright sees any exclusion from the realm of the beautiful as marking the
character as unattractive, and, by extension, undesirable (13-14).
And certainly, aunts have traditionally played an important role in the southern
family. There is an entry on the “Maiden Aunt” in the Encyclopedia of Southern Culture,
which explains that, while unmarried women often lived on the fringes of society because
of their questionable status, within the home of a married sibling, “she was often a
cherished and fond member of the family circle” (Clinton 483). In fact, the Encyclopedia
identifies “aunt adoption” as a recognized southern phenomenon, in which unmarried
women would single out a niece for particular attention, through emotional and even
financial support. Nevertheless, while the maiden aunt may have been “often a cherished
and fond member of the family circle,” ultimately they were still considered “social
outcasts, denied the status a woman could achieve only through her role as matriarch.”
Their essentially outsider status is reflected in Catherine Clinton’s observation in the
Encyclopdia entry that, “Few parents, even those of enormous wealth, would bequeath
money to an unmarried daughter” (483). In the conservative southern society, wealth was
used to perpetuate and reproduce the dominant society, not to facilitate and fund
alternative ways of living, such as that represented by the spinster aunt.
These dominant white economic and social structures were built upon and
dependent upon the oppression of African Americans, through the chattel slavery system
and the racist precedents it established. Though the novels I am examining were written
in the twentieth century, after both women and people of color were legally enfranchised,
the dominant white marriage model is firmly rooted in antebellum institutional structures,
and the economic (and other) inequalities of slavery continue to echo long after
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Reconstruction. These structures were guarded by practices which best guaranteed their
reproduction, such as the appropriate marriage practices of white men and women which
promised to perpetuate the dominant white culture.
This reproduction was reinforced through a marriage market firmly grounded in
the homosocial exchange of women. While many scholars have written about the
centrality of marriage—especially the role of women as “the supreme gift” (in the words
of Claude Lévi-Strauss)37 between groups in society—I am most influenced in my
thinking here by Luce Irigaray’s analysis of marriage’s importance to a market economy.
Irigaray writes: “Mothers are essential to its [the social order’s] (re)production
(particularly inasmuch as they are (reproductive) of children and of the labor force:
through maternity, child-rearing, and domestic maintenance in general). Their
responsibility is to maintain the social order without intervening so as to change it” (185).
The preoccupation of so many southern women writers with the ugly plot, a plot which
calls attention to and interrupts the idea of mandatory marriage, reflects these writers’
recognition of the growing regulatory nature of marriage in the twentieth century.
Marriage ensures the reproduction of not only a physically healthy population, but one
which preserves southern values of traditional gender roles and a family-centered
community.
Many southern women writers have written stories about these excluded women
and shown how, in the absence of marriage, they compose alternative households which
imagine alternative ways of living. When Patricia Yaeger observes that, “The marriage
plot looks pretty tragic viewed under the politics of patriarchy” (“Genre”), she identifies
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what these authors seem to be implicitly reacting against: the real limitations imposed
upon women in marriages in the South. Even after gaining full legal citizenship through
the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, white women were still expected to
fulfill the expectations of southern ladyhood.38
Such ladyhood represents the aspirational ideal of southern womanhood, an ideal
which often reveals what Anne Goodwyn Jones characterizes as a “complex and
sometimes contradictory set of values.” Using the image of “Dixie’s Diadem” to
represent this unattainable ideal, Jones observes that the southern lady “is not a human
being; it is a marble statue, beautiful and silent, eternally inspiring and eternally still . . . .
Efforts to join person and personification, to make self into symbol, must fail because the
idea of southern womanhood specifically denies the self” (Tomorrow is Another Day 4).
Aspiring to southern ladyhood requires that women embody many cultural tensions and
contradictions of the South, especially those involving the intersection of race and
sexuality. Diane Roberts is among many scholars who identify the centrality of the white
ladyhood to the white supremacy of southern ideology: “In the collapse of slavery, the
white South reinvented its racial binaries and reimagined the psychosexual world of
blacks and whites, elevated white ladyhood even higher into a bodiless realm, while
black men and black women, cast out from the ‘moral order’ of slavery, sank deeper into
depravity” (156). Despite its ultimate unattainability, southern ladyhood provided a rigid
model of idealized white womanhood to which all southern women were expected to
emulate.
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The ugly plot shows what happens to those women who do not embody the
retrogressive southern values represented by the figure of the eligible young lady.
Women who are eligible for the marriage market are middle and upper class white
women of childbearing age. Their purpose is to marry, maintain the household, inspire
their husbands, bear children, instruct children, and support their part of the structure of
society. Though it was a product of their study from the 1980s, the code of the southern
belle which sociologists Lynxwiler and Wilson identified is largely applicable to the
primary components of ideal southern ladyhood throughout the twentieth century:
Never Forget Your Status Lest Others Forget Theirs
Honor the “Natural” Distinctions Between Men and Women
Don’t Be a Slut
Remain Loyal to the Southern Tradition
You Can Never Be Too Rich or Too Thin39
Pretty Is as Pretty Does.40 (117-119)
All of these tenets function to reinforce and reproduce the status quo of a retrogressive,
white supremacist, sexist southern society, one in which people recognize their
prescribed roles and submit to them.
In fiction, women who are best fit for these duties are marked as physically
appealing. Ellen O’Hara’s physical appearance in Gone with the Wind typifies an ideal
wife. Though attractive—“her neck, rising from the black taffeta sheath of her basque,
was creamy-skinned, rounded and slender, and it seemed always tilted slightly backward
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This tenet reflects the cultural norms of the 1980s more than any of the others in its encouragement of
excess. Given that excessiveness is usually considered at odds with traditional southern femininity, this
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However, that it is encouraging women to maintain a thin appearance in the midst of wealth certainly
harkens back even to Scarlett and her famous seventeen-inch waist.
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This last admonition importantly emphasizes the moral and behavioral dimensions of physical
appearance in the same way that the warning “Don’t be ugly!” does with respect to inappropriate and
rebellious behavior. See Chapter 4.
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by the weight of her luxuriant hair in its net at the back of her head”—her appearance
further reflects her temperament: “She would have been a strikingly beautiful woman had
there been any glow in her eyes, any responsive warmth in her smile” (27). Had she been
a striking beauty, she would not have been as ideal as a wife—her striking appearance
would have been distracting to those around her, rather than nurturing. However, that
Scarlett “had never seen her mother stirred from her austere placidity, nor her personal
appointments anything but perfect, no matter what the hour of day or night” (27)
demonstrates how Ellen’s appearance marks her as the epitome of the selfless southern
wife and mother.41
In fact, contrary to more common understandings of beauty, which typically see it
as a culturally constructed concept, bound to time and place, scholars such as Nancy
Etcoff claim that “there is a core reality to beauty that exists buried within the cultural
constructs and the myths” (233). Etcoff says that her work posits an “argument for beauty
as a biological adaptation . . . . beauty is a universal part of human experience, and . . . it
provokes pleasure, rivets attention, and impels actions that help ensure the survival of our
genes” (24). Tracing her project back to classical thinkers who similarly tried to quantify
beauty, Etcoff examines various elements which seem to underlie all human concepts of
beauty, such as symmetry, highlighted gender-specific physiological differences (such as
female breasts and male square jaws), and certain markers of youth and nobility, such as
large, round eyes. Etcoff claims that many markers interpreted as beautiful are in fact
markers of reproductive fitness and fertility, as well as youth and vulnerability. That such
41

Certainly, it is possible to read this description of the unsmiling Ellen as lacking any warmth, even for
her children. However, I believe that the emphasis on manners in southern ladyhood—as Mab Segrest
explains, “Feelings were what manners hid” (64)—explains what otherwise might seem like a shocking
lack of affection within the family circle. Once again, appropriate femininity eschews any excess—whether
excess flesh or excess emotion.
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characteristics evoke feelings of protection not only point to stereotypical gender roles in
this reading, but also underscore procreation as the basis of attractiveness, and
subsequently the heterosexual, procreative couple as the organizing structure of this
society. A properly feminine woman who willingly takes on the responsibilities of the
roles of wife and mother is what this society wishes to reproduce, and thus the woman
who embodies these characteristics is desired.
Katherine Anne Porter’s The Old Order contains many examples of women
whose physical appearance—whether beauty or ugliness—is an embodiment of their
personality traits and values. For example, in his analysis of the collection, Jay Watson
compares symptoms of romance exhibited by Porter’s female characters with symptoms
of illness: “Subordination, exhaustion, economic and emotional dependence, passivity,
silence, the retreat from public to private sphere—this is the same fate that awaits the
heroine of southern romance when her story inevitably arrives at marriage and
motherhood” (258). In Watson’s reading, he focuses on Miranda’s Aunt Amy, whom he
describes as “run[ning] head-on into the romance plot and the traditional society it helped
to legitimate and sustain. Here also the marketplace in flesh . . . reappears in more
specific terms as a marriage market, scene of an Irigarayan traffic in women” (238). Amy
is the beauty of the short story collection, the only one who meets the family’s high
standards of beauty, the “points of beauty by which one was judged severely”:
First, a beauty must be tall; whatever the color the eyes, the hair must be dark, the
darker the better; the skin must be pale and smooth. Lightness and swiftness of
movement were important points. A beauty must be a good dancer, superb on
horseback, with a serene manner, an amiable gaiety tempered with dignity at all
hours. Beautiful teeth and hands, of course, and over and above this, some
mysterious crown of enchantment that attracted and held the heart. It was all very
exciting and discouraging. (102)
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Though Amy’s beauty wins her marriage, her illness reveals such beauty as ultimately
being less than desirable. In fact, the “mysterious crown of enchantment” in its evocation
of the angelic (and the requirements of “lightness and swiftness of movement”) marks
this mode of the beautiful woman as being less than corporeal. As an invalid, Aunt Amy
typifies the kind of “difficult embodiment” which Watson identifies as permeating
Porter’s work. By focusing on images of sickly women, Watson concludes that “Porter’s
illness stories are feminist fables in which love can only end ‘unhealthily ever after’”
(261).
I agree with Watson’s identification of Aunt Amy as an exemplar of Porter’s
sickly women who reveal the limitations of marriage. However, I am less interested in
Aunt Amy’s success at marriage than I am in Cousin Eva’s failure: Eva, whose ugliness
marks her as illegible to and ineligible for the marriage market. Miranda’s father Harry
claims that Eva’s entire life was determined—and doomed—by her weak chin, which he
blames for both her failure to marry and her strident political activity as a suffragist: “For
even then it was pretty plain that Eva was an old maid, born. Harry said, ‘Oh, Eva—Eva
has no chin, that’s her trouble’” (111). Though Miranda’s father, Harry, claims that there
is a direct causal relationship between this particular physical flaw and her failure at
marriage, an earlier description in the text gives a much more complex picture of Eva,
both in her ugliness as well as the relationship that her appearance bears to her life’s
trajectory:
Eva, shy and chinless, straining her upper lip over two enormous teeth, would sit
in corners watching her mother. She looked hungry, her eyes were strained and
tired. She wore her mother’s old clothes, made over, and taught Latin in a Female
Seminary. She believed in votes for women, and had traveled about, making
speeches . . . . Eva was a blot, no doubt about it, but the little girls felt she
belonged to their everyday world of dull lessons to be learned, stiff shoes to be
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limbered up, scratchy flannels to be endured in cold weather, measles and
disappointed expectations. (104)
Even basic physical attractiveness is out of Eva’s reach, as it takes an effort to simply
close her mouth. Her eyes and mouth—two of the most expressive parts of the face—are
described by variations of the word “strain.” Eva exemplifies the ugly plot, in which a
physical trait reflects her personality and the fact that she is ill-suited for marriage and
motherhood.
Race is, of course, the most pronounced physical marker which disqualifies
women from the dominant marriage market. The requirement that a beautiful woman’s
skin must be “pale and smooth” highlights the exclusion of any nonwhite women from
the dominant marriage economy as well. Although it would be possible for a nonwhite
person to have pale, smooth skin, given the rigid gender expectations not only of the
society Porter creates in this collection but also within the family itself, I read this
proscription of “pale and smooth” as code for “white.” In The Old Order, the exclusion
of nonwhite women from the dominant marriage economy is demonstrated through the
character of Old Nannie, a family slave (and later servant) whose sole identity within the
household is determined by her race and role as a slave. Nannie was purchased by Sophia
Jane’s father when she was a baby and Sophia Jane was five years old. As a child, Sophia
Jane does not see Nannie as a fellow human being; after Nannie is bought, Sophia Jane
claims her as a pet “monkey” and sees her as a plaything, equivalent to her new pony.
However, the close juxtaposition of Sophia Jane’s wedding with that of Nannie’s
in the text is remarkable enough that I believe it merits attention here. In fact, this
juxtaposition highlights the fact that women not only occupy a variety of positions
relative to the marriage market, but there are, in fact, multiple marriage markets which
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are foundational to southern society. Just as Emmie Slattery’s marriage to Jonas
Wilkerson lie outside of the realm of possibilities of marriage which Scarlett O’Hara
would consider appropriate, so, too, does Nannie’s marriage to another slave lie outside
of Sophia Jane’s marriage market. Nevertheless, both Emmie Slattery’s marriage as well
as Nannie’s marriage have demonstrable effects on the narrower system of white, affluent
marriage, especially in economic terms. The Wilkerson union gives an appearance of
legitimacy (through marriage) to Jonas’s non-inherited wealth—itself a threat to the
previous system of marriage which cemented systems of consolidated power through
inherited wealth. And Nannie’s marriage to Uncle Jimbilly is purely arranged by their
owners, presumably motivated by their owners’ desire to produce more slaves through
the offspring of their forced union, rather than by any desire on the part of those being
married.
In fact, Nannie’s wedding, taking place a few days after Sophia Jane’s, seems
almost an addendum to Sophia Jane’s ceremony. The proximity of these events in the text
highlights the transactional nature of Sophia Jane’s marriage while it emphasizes the
contrast in legible personhood between Sophia Jane and Nannie. In fact, that the
attractive, white, upper class Sophia Jane marries is so expected it is almost unnoteworthy in the narrative. The description itself is, however, noteworthy enough that it
bears recounting in full:
Nannie had slept in a bed and had been playmate and work-fellow with her
mistress; they fought on almost equal terms, Sophia Jane defending Nannie
fiercely against any discipline but her own. When they were both seventeen years
old, Miss Sophia Jane was married off in a very gay wedding. The house was
jammed to the roof and everybody present was at least fourth cousin to everybody
else. There were forty carriages and more than two hundred horses to look after
for two days. When the last wheel had disappeared down the lane (a number of
the guests lingered on for two weeks), the larders and bins were half empty and
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the place looked as if a troop of cavalry had been over it. A few days later Nannie
was married off to a boy she had known ever since she came to the family, and
they were given as a wedding present to Miss Sophia Jane. (19)
First, the intimacy between Nannie and Sophia Jane is emphasized in this passage as the
description appears at the beginning of the paragraph, I read it as particularly significant.
The middle of the paragraph is dedicated to Sophia Jane’s wedding, describing it in detail
as a lavish event. Significantly, though, the groom is never mentioned. In the last
sentence, Nannie is married.
It is important to note that the same wording is used to describe both marriages:
“Miss Sophia Jane was married off…”; “Nannie was married off…..” This passive
construction emphasizes that both women lack agency with regard to their marriages
while it obscures the identities of those who do have power over these events. The
description of Nannie’s marriage (significantly, not “Miss Nannie”), however, is
followed by the additional clause, “and they were given as a wedding present to Miss
Sophia Jane.” Though Sophia Jane and Nannie are both seventeen years old and married
off to men whose individual identities are less important than their spousal roles,
Nannie’s inferior status is emphasized by the fact that she can constitute a “wedding
present” for Sophia Jane.
In a subsequent passage, the description that we do get of Sophia Jane’s husband
emphasizes that their marriage has family interest, rather than romantic attraction (or
even real fondness) at its center. Observing in her husband a “lack of aim, failure to act in
a crisis, a philosophic detachment from practical affairs, a tendency to set projects on foot
and then leave them to perish or to be finished by someone else; and a profound
conviction that everyone around him should be happy to wait upon him hand and foot”
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(21), Sophia Jane’s contempt for her husband emphasizes that marriage and motherhood
are roles she has been thrust into, rather than relationships and responsibilities she has
actively sought.
As an attractive woman, Sophia Jane is expected to fulfill these roles, which she
does. What I am interested in, however, is the ways in which Nannie’s character is used
to demonstrate what exists outside of Sophia Jane’s marriage economy. Once again,
ugliness marks those who occupy a position outside of marriage, positions which
highlight the unromantic, economic basis of this system. Though Nannie is married off to
the slave known as Uncle Jimbilly when she is seventeen, their marriage is even less
sentimental than Sophia Jane’s:
That marriage of convenience, in which they had been mated with truly royal
policy, with an eye to the blood and family stability, had dissolved itself between
them when the reasons for its being had likewise dissolved . . . . They took no
notice whatever of each other’s existence, they seemed to forget they had children
together (each spoke of ‘my children’), they had stored up no common memories
that either wished to keep. (45, ellipses in original)
Nannie bears thirteen children, of which only three survive. Though both Nannie and
Jimbilly stay on with the white household after Emancipation, the family’s younger
generation of white children do not even realize that they had been married. Once the
children which Nannie was responsible for nursing are raised, and she becomes “Old
Nannie,” she moves out of the house and lives alone in an abandoned cabin where she
“aim[s] to pass my las’ days waitin on no man” (46). Old Nannie spends her evenings
sitting by herself in the night air; she spends her days sitting with Sophia Jane sewing and
talking about the past.
Following Michael Bibler’s analysis of the collection, I agree that the
complicated, dynamic relationship between the women demonstrates what he terms a
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“southern kitchen romance,” what in Porter’s hands constitutes “an attempt to create out
of the mythologized past a model of more equitable relations between southern whites
and blacks that does not replicate the injustices of the past” (168). Further, Nannie’s
marriage to Jimbilly represents another demystification of marriage, as we are
encouraged to compare their marriage’s arranged, pragmatic characteristics to that of
Sophia Jane. A close reading of these two weddings and marriages reveals the economic,
political, and eugenic qualities of marriage that white southern culture works hard to
obscure.
As an example of a southern kitchen romance, Nannie and Sophia Jane
demonstrate a far from utopian vision of an alternative household arrangement. Often,
ugly plots highlight the importance of such relationships, especially in cases of
unsuccessful marriage. For example, in Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’s short story “Gal
Young’Un,” an unlikely bond grows between Mattie and the Elly the “gal young’un” of
the story’s title, whom Mattie’s husband Trax brings home to live with them as his
acknowledged lover. Mattie’s appearances seems ground down by time, as she grows to
resemble her house, “tall and bare and lonely, weathered gray, like its unpainted cypress”
(148). Often compared to her weathered house, much of Mattie’s ugliness is age-related,
such as when she “smoothed back her gray hair from her worn face and presented her
middle-aged bulk in a clean apron” (163).
In fact, much of Mattie’s ugliness is made poignant through her attempts at
making herself attractive, such as smoothing her hair here and wearing a clean apron. Of
course, the starkest contrast occurs when Trax (whom everyone, including Mattie, is
aware only married her for her money) brings home Elly, expecting Mattie to wait on and
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care for them. Trax’s mistreatment of Mattie has a material effect on her, as she finally
realizes that she “had not been whole. She had charred herself against the man’s youth
and beauty. Her hate was healthful. It waked her from a drugged sleep, and she stirred
faculties hurt and long unused” (171). Once again, though her appearance is affected by
her treatment and her environment, it is not static. She goes from being “a gray bulk”
(167) when Trax brings home Elly, to being terrifying in her anger, as Trax sees her
“straggling gray hair down the length of her frame. Her apron was smudged and torn. Her
hands were black and raw. He came back to her implacable cold eyes” when she destroys
his prized car (179). By the story’s end, once she discovers the strength within her to send
Trax away, she becomes “strong and whole. She was fixed, deep-rooted as the pine trees.
They leaned a little, bent by an ancient storm. Nothing more could move them” (181).
She does not become beautiful, but her ugliness changes, reflecting her changing
responses to the difficulties she faces.
Despite being Trax’s momentarily favored one, even with her youth, Elly, too,
often looks ugly. Picked up by the disreputable Trax after being abandoned by a father
who “romped on me reg’lar” (173), Elly’s appearance similarly reflects her rough
treatment. Elly “was painted crudely, as with a haphazard conception of how it should be
done. Stiff blond curls were bunched under a tilted hat. A flimsy silk dress hung loosely
on an immature frame. Cheap silk stockings bagged on thin legs. She rocked, rather than
walked, on incredibly spiked heels” (167). The clothes that Trax buys her fit neither her
body nor her age, and the mismatch detracts from her appearance. She literally cannot fit
into the role he expects of her.
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Although it may seem a jarring transition from Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings to
Alice Walker, I believe that they both exemplify the kind of unexpected bond between
women within the ugly plot—a bond which often emerges in reaction against the man for
whom they are supposed to be rivals. Just as Mattie realizes that when Trax married her,
“she had been thrown in on the deal, like an old mare traded in with a farm” (166), so is
Celie’s marriage to Mr. ______ in Walker’s 1982 novel The Color Purple one of
convenience, as he is clear from the beginning of their relationship that he marries her
because his household needs a woman to provide childcare and housework. After
realizing that Celie is his only option, it still takes him four months to reach a state
desperate enough to marry her. Even then, he does not hide that his real desire is for the
singer Shug Avery (as well as Celie’s sister Nettie). And in fact, when Mr. ______
negotiates with Celie’s stepfather Alphonso over his marriage to her, the commoditybased nature of the exchange is emphasized by the addition of a cow to sweeten the deal.
Alphonso encourages Mr. ______ to see Celie’s ugliness as positive attribute, signifying
her hardiness and industriousness. Alphonso explains, “She ugly . . . . But she ain’t no
stranger to hard work. And she clean.” (8). A victim not only of poverty but also her
stepfather’s rape (which causes her to bear two children who are taken from her), Celie’s
ugliness also reflects her difficult life, which has required that she become hardy and
industrious in order to survive.
Shug is another compellingly ugly character in the novel. Though many find her
beautiful, hers is another appearance which fluctuates to reflect her current state.
Photographs always depict Shug as beautiful: when Celie first sees Shug’s photograph,
she remarks that Shug was “The most beautiful woman I ever saw. She more pretty than
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my mama. She bout ten thousand times more prettier than me. I see her there in furs. Her
face rouge. Her hair like somethin tail. She grinning with her foot up on somebody
motocar” (6). When they first meet in person, however, Shug is sick, and close up, she is
ugly: “Close up I see all this yellow powder caked up on her face. Red rouge. She look
like she ain’t long for the world but dressed well for the next. But I know better” (45).
Though Shug bewitches many, this bewitchment seems to be primarily a function of her
personality42 and, more importantly, her musical talent.
Despite the fact that the novel takes place within an almost exclusively African
American community, it is notable that the descriptors of ugliness such as nappy hair and
dark skin are particularly raced markers. When Shug and Celie first meet, Shug is almost
monstrous in her illness. Celie says, “Under all that powder her face black as Harpo. She
got a long pointed nose and big fleshy mouth. Lips look like black plum. Eyes big,
glossy. Feverish. And mean. Like, sick as she is, if a snake cross her path, she kill it”
(46). Further, like Rawlings’ Elly in her oversized, overly mature silk clothes, both Celie
and Shug appear ugliest when they are forced into roles or environment into which they
do not fit, especially roles informed by the South’s retrogressive gender roles.
My usage of variations of the word “fit” with respect to marriage is intentional, as
physical descriptions of both Shug and Celie often characterize them as physically
different from women who are “fit” for marriage. For example, when planning her house,
Shug wishes that she could live in a round house, explaining, “I just feel funny living in a
square. If I was square, then I could take it better” (209). Shug’s desire for a round house
reflects Shug’s inability to fit into a traditionally domestic space. Similarly, Celie’s body
42

In this respect, in fact, she seems to resemble Scarlett O’Hara, whose lack of beauty was compensated for
by her charm.
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is physically different enough from a normative, female body that Shug observes that
traditionally feminine clothing does not fit her right. Importantly, when Shug tells Celie,
“You don’t have a dress do nothing for you. You not made like no dress pattern, neither,”
and suggests that Celie make herself some pants (146), Shug unknowingly sets Celie on
the path which will lead to her self-discovery through her artistic awakening. By the
novel’s end, Celie is designing her own patterns, both for her clothing as well as her
living arrangements.
The Color Purple dramatizes such self-discoveries through a variety of sensual
awakenings, not only artistic but erotic as well. In Celie’s self-description above, though
some of the descriptive words have a negative valence, her unromanticized self-blazon is
ultimately not self-shaming: Celie’s hair is “short and kinky because I don’t straighten it
anymore. Once Shug say she love it no need to” (70). Shug teaches Celie to appreciate
her body in its current state—whatever form it takes—and Celie’s self-acceptance
reflects what Daniel Ross observes is “one of the primary projects of modern feminism”
exemplified in the novel, which is “to restore women’s bodies, appropriated long ago by
a patriarchal culture, to them” (70).
Not only does Walker restore Celie’s body, but, according to Linda Abbandonato,
through Celie she “replots the heroine’s text” (1106). Comparing The Color Purple to
Nancy Miller’s concept of “the heroine’s text,” which describes a tradition of endangered
heroines rooted in eighteenth century feminocentric novels, Abbandonato says that “by
exposing and opposing a powerful ideological constraint, institutionalized or
‘compulsory’ heterosexuality, the novel appropriates the woman’s narrative for herself, in
effect reinscribing ‘herstory’” (1106). Abbandonato says that the novel answers the
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question, “how can a woman define herself differently, disengage herself from the
cultural scripts of sexuality and gender that produce her as feminine subject” (1107). She
explains that the novel dramatizes the process of women “authoriz[ing] themselves as
women, to disengage their feminine identity from the ideological metanarratives that
inscribe it” (1110). As Celie’s self-blazon illustrates, while ugliness is often the result of
a difficult life, functioning as an archive of tragedy, women such as Celie or Mattie can
claim this ugliness by claiming their “herstory” as written on their faces and bodies.
The Color Purple represents one of the more utopian deployments of the ugly
plot, as Celie, characterized as ugly from the novel’s beginning, finds a satisfying life of
artistic expression outside of the expectations of marriage. Once again, though such a
comparison to The Color Purple may seem malapropos, I suggest that Gone with the
Wind presents a similarly optimistic vision of the ugly plot, as it ends with Scarlett,
abandoned by her husband, returning to her childhood home and her extended family
there. Certainly, I concur with Tara McPherson’s evaluation that “though the novel does
reveal a desire for union, this latency in no way mitigates the novel’s racism” (59), and I
am not suggesting that Mitchell’s novel achieves even gestures toward equality between
the races that Porter’s aspires to. Nevertheless, the novel deploys a variety of ugly plots
which further demonstrate that the assumed linear progression from unmarried belle to
happily married lady is not the only option, even for women born into affluent, white
circles.
Admittedly, it may seem disingenuous to consider Scarlett O’Hara under the
rubric of an “ugly plot,” as the actress Vivien Leigh who portrayed her in the 1939 film
adaptation of the novel has become an icon of beautiful southern womanhood, despite the
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novel’s opening claim to the contrary. While this amnesia is in part because the vision of
Vivien Leigh is permanently emblazoned on our collective consciousness, it is also
because, like the Tarleton twins, we as readers are also caught by Scarlett’s charm—or if
not charm, at least her wit and her candor. Importantly, what keeps her “arresting face”
from being beautiful is the clash of her mother’s delicate, aristocratic features and her
father’s heavier Irish ones (a clash which plays itself out not only in Scarlett’s features
and personality, but in the novel’s racial, gendered, and class-conscious thematic
conflicts as well). While plenty has been written about Scarlett as a proto- or antifeminist (or even what Bettina Entzminger has referred to as the “belle gone bad”), what
has been less examined is Scarlett’s actual physical appearance as Margaret Mitchell
wrote her. Throughout the novel, Scarlett’s arresting—but not beautiful—appearance
functions as a marker of race and class, revealing the significance of beauty in policing
the borders of the marriage economy.
In On Beauty and Being Just, philosopher Elaine Scarry explains that, typically,
individual concepts of the “beautiful” arise from what she paradoxically explains as a
“composite of particulars” (19). In other words, beauty results from a comparison to our
own individual accretion of the particular details and traits of the people we have
encountered, while keeping intact a sense of individuality. This explains why beauty
norms can vary from culture to culture, but that there are always those whose appearance
is different enough to catch attention.
The details in Mitchell’s description of her demonstrate that often the physical
markers which keep a woman from qualifying as beautiful are markers of race, ethnicity,
or class. Importantly, it is the clash of cultures in her face—the “too sharply blended . . .
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delicate features of her mother, a Coast aristocrat of French descent, and the heavy ones
of her florid Irish father” (1)—which keeps her from qualifying as beautiful. In Mitchell’s
description, it is Scarlett’s character—as Rhett so famously declared, the fact that she was
“no lady”—which comes through in her appearance and keeps her from meeting the
standards of her contemporary society’s definition of beauty. Mitchell is quite clear about
this: “But for all of the modesty of her spreading skirts, the demureness of hair netted
smoothly into a chignon and the quietness of small white hands folded in her lap, her true
self was poorly concealed. The green eyes in the carefully sweet face were turbulent,
willful, lusty with life, distinctly at variance with her decorous demeanor” (1). Once
again, her appearance reveals a clash of class and cultures, as “Her manners had been
imposed upon her by her mother’s gentle admonitions and the sterner discipline of her
mammy; [however,] her eyes were her own” (1). As her green eyes are to a certain extent
an expression of her Irishness, this description reveals that no amount of aristocratic
tutoring can disguise her Irish soul.
In her discussion of the appearance of Irishness in the novel, Geraldine Higgins
importantly observes that, “When Mitchell wants to signal Scarlett’s failure to live up to
the ladylike example of her mother, descended from French Catholic aristocrats, she
indicates that her features are becoming more and more like her father’s” (36). According
to Higgins, “Irishness in Gone with the Wind is shorthand for commonness and a certain
vulgar aptitude for social climbing” (37). As many have observed, throughout most of
American history, the Irish have often been seen as not deserving of the same privileges
as those who were considered to be more authentically white than the Irish, who were
perceived as an ethnic “other.” And while Higgins is ultimately dubious regarding the
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question of whether there is any “equivalence between the Irish and African Americans
in the ethnic hierarchies of Gone with the Wind” (40), she does observe that Mitchell
“undercuts racial essentialism with her Irish heroine as a survivor” (42). Higgins is
willing to go as far as concluding that, “Irishness does inflect the racial binaries of
blackness and whiteness in Mitchell’s text, even if we cannot go so far as to say that it
mediates between them. Tara and the O’Haras are significant ethnic markers in Gone
with the Wind, penetrating the traditional invisibility of ethnic differences in the white
South and troubling the homogeneity of its racial categories” (46). Eliza Russi Lowen
McGraw, too, considers that “Scarlett’s Irishness holds the possibility of positioning her
alongside the Southern ‘other’—African Americans” (127). In fact, McGraw goes so far
as to posit Scarlett following in the tradition of the tragic mulatta character (127-129).
However, unlike the traditional tragic mulatta character, it is Scarlett’s mixed
heritage which ultimately saves her. In fact, McGraw sees the central argument of the
novel as being that “survivors of the New South must have blood other than that of the
defeated Anglicized planters idealized by plantation legend. Within the economy of the
text, Scarlett’s Irishness accounts for her transgressive nature, and ensures she will thrive
in post-bellum Atlanta” (124). It is Scarlett’s stubborn practicality and her inability to
fully conform to expectations of gender which allow her to survive. From stealing her
sister’s fiancé to killing a Yankee, Scarlett takes the steps she sees as necessary to feed
her family, keep her home, and survive both the war as well as Reconstruction. However,
it is also these rebellious characteristics which keep her from achieving full ladyhood
and, with it, conventional beauty and successful marriage.
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As I noted earlier, Mitchell locates Scarlett’s rebellion in her eyes, eyes which are
“pale green without a touch of hazel, starred with bristly black lashes and slightly tilted at
the ends” (1). While some might read these pale green eyes as pretty, to me the
description of “bristly black lashes” undercuts their beauty. They are, however, powerful.
Entzminger observes that, “Like her antebellum analogue’s, Scarlett’s eyes, though green
instead of black, are used as hypnotic focal points of her feminine powers,” and she
points out that Scarlett relies on the power of her eyes when winning over the Tarleton
twins, Charles Hamilton, and Frank Kennedy (107). In The Southern Belle in the
American Novel, Kathryn Lee Seidel points out that,
Of all the belles I have studied, she is the only one with green eyes. By assigning
Scarlett this eye color, Mitchell both acknowledges and overturns this small detail
of the belle stereotype. It is a technique Mitchell uses masterfully throughout the
novel; with it, she compliments her audience’s knowledge of and affection of the
stereotype, but uses it for her own purposes. (53-54)
Further, green eyes not only emphasize Scarlett’s Irish heritage, but evoke the unladylike
quality of jealousy, a quality which Scarlett often displays.
I am intrigued by Seidel’s observation that Mitchell “captures the essentials of the
belle’s attractiveness” in her characterization of Scarlett’s lack of beauty, noting that “the
belle has not always been a great beauty, but rather seems to be considered one because
of her charm” (53). However, I disagree with her explanation that, “The imperfect beauty
of the belle reflects authors’ acknowledgment of female readers who certainly are not all
beauties and can better identify with a heroine who is more like themselves. Such a
description reassures the reader that being alluring, finding a husband, and establishing a
happy life are possible even for those who are not born beautiful” (53). And it is true that
even Swallow Barn’s Bel Tracy, to a certain extent the ur-belle, is described as having
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“quick impulses, that give her the charm of agreeable expression, although her features
are irregular, and would not stand a critical examination. Her skin is not altogether clear;
her mouth is large, and her eyes of a dark gray hue” (78). However, I don’t dare
characterize any aspect of Scarlett as “agreeable.” While Mitchell to some extent may be
following a tradition of imperfect belles (as Seidel claims she does with eye color, for
example), I see Scarlett’s appearance as marking her as unfit for the roles of lady, wife,
and mother, which her status as the daughter of a plantation owner insist she should
easily adopt.
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick uses Scarlett to discuss such interpellation. Sedgwick
observes that,
in the life of Scarlett O’Hara, it is expressly clear that to be born female is to be
defined entirely in relation to the role of ‘lady,’ a role that does take it shape and
meaning from a sexuality of which she is not the subject but the object. For
Scarlett, to survive as a woman does mean learning to see sexuality, male power
domination, and her traditional gender role as all meaning the same dangerous
thing. To absent herself silently from each of them alike, and learn to manipulate
them from behind this screen as objects or pure signifiers, as men do, is the
numbing but effective lesson of her life. (8)
According to Sedgwick, the obviousness of Scarlett’s mercenary motives is what draws
(especially female) readers to the novel, as it has “thematized for successive generations
of American women the constraints of the ‘feminine’ role, the obstacles to and the
ravenous urgency of female ambition, the importance of the economic motive, the
compulsiveness and destructiveness of romantic love, and . . . the centrality and the total
alienation of female sexuality” (8). Therefore, I believe that it is not so much Scarlett’s
failure to achieve acceptable standards of beauty which makes us root for her; rather, it is
the ways in which her struggles reveal how difficult and unappealing the expectations of
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traditional gender roles are that make us cheer when Scarlett defies these expectations.
Her appearance is a corporeal manifestation of her defiance.
Over the course of the novel, however, other revelations of physical ugliness also
signify her unladylike behavior and the ways in which appropriate behavior is tied to
class. In the scene where Scarlett visits Rhett in jail, for example, Scarlett almost fools
Rhett into believing that she has survived the end of the war unscathed at Tara, and that
her visit to him is motivated only by her fondness for him (and not from the great
financial need which is her actual motivation). As I touched on briefly in Chapter 1, her
deception succeeds until he sees her hands, which are “rough from work, brown with
sunburn, splotched with freckles. The nails were broken and irregular, there were heavy
calluses on the cushions of the palm, a half-healed blister on the thumb. The red scar
which boiling fat had left last month was ugly and glaring” (397). Scarlett’s scars reveal
that she has been engaged in physical work, behavior unacceptable for a lady of her
previous socioeconomic status. For once, all of Scarlett’s charm cannot disguise how
poverty has marked her body.
In this scene, Scarlett’s body betrays her, and she is unable to charm Rhett into
giving her the money she needs to pay the taxes on Tara to save her home. However, not
everyone is as astute at reading Scarlett as Rhett is, and she is able to charm the
financially flush Frank Kennedy into marrying her and saving Tara. After the privations
of the war and the beginnings of Reconstruction, Scarlett clings to her upper
socioeconomic status and the privileges it accords, though she is much more successful at
the financial aspects of her privilege than the social responsibilities it entails. I am quite
interested in the fact that, though she claims to have had plenty of experience in receiving
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proposals of marriage as a belle, and she does marry three times over the course of the
novel and bear three children, by the novel’s end she is alone, abandoned by Rhett, the
only husband she genuinely loved. I read her ultimate solitary status as proof of her
failure at marriage, as the end of the novel finds her abandoned by her husband—not a
successful ending for a nineteenth century heroine (even one written in the twentieth
century).
Scarlett’s failure at marriage demonstrates my contention that ugliness marks
those who are considered ineligible for the marriage economy: her inability to
consistently behave in a properly feminine manner emphasizes that Scarlett does not
fulfill the expectations of a married southern woman, and as such is excluded from any
permanent status in the dominant white marriage economy. As Entzminger observes,
“Scarlett is successful with these men only when she follows the rules of conduct against
which she protests” (110). Although many would consider her multiple marriages as
proof of her success at marriage—Charles Hamilton and Frank Kennedy in particular, as
they both seem to qualify as appropriate husbands within Scarlett’s social circle and
socioeconomic class—I maintain that the death of both of these men in fact symbolizes
their ultimate failure to act as an appropriate husband to Scarlett, one who is able to fully
inhabit the role of head of the household. It is important to remember that, prior to their
engagement to Scarlett, both Charles and Frank had “understandings” with other women.
Scarlett’s “success” at snaring them as husbands was at the expense of other women of
her community—certainly not exhibiting the “pretty is as pretty does” exhortation of
southern ladyhood. Scarlett’s unladylike, rebellious nature are marked by her arresting
appearance along with her Irish heritage, characteristics which disqualify her from being
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the kind of submissive, ladylike woman required by the role of the dutiful wife in this
society.
I argue that Tara at the end of Gone with the Wind offers a vision of the kind of
alternative to the traditional, heterocentric household made possible by the ugly plot.
Though she was married three times, the fact that the novel’s end finds Scarlett O’Hara
abandoned by her husband qualifies her as yet another woman who moves back and forth
between being unsuccessfully married and successfully unmarried. Though Scarlett
herself would never consciously admit to the possibility of being “successfully
unmarried,” she does have an epiphanic realization regarding what she has been taught
about gender roles:
A startling thought this, that a woman could handle business matters as well as or
better than a man, a revolutionary thought to Scarlett who had been reared in the
tradition that men were omniscient and women none too bright. Of course, she
had discovered that this was not altogether true but the pleasant fiction still stuck
in her mind. (862)
Her realization leads her to consider the “lean months at Tara” during which “she had
done a man’s work and done it well.” At this point, she even questions the necessity of
marriage:
Why, why, her mind stuttered, I believe women could manage everything in the
world without men’s help—except having babies, and God knows, no woman in
her right mind would have babies if she could help it. With the idea that she was
as capable as a man came a sudden rush of pride and violent longing to prove it,
to make money for herself as men made money. (863)
Despite Scarlett’s repeated attempts at marriage for a variety of motives, every time she
is at Tara—the novel’s beginning, after the fall of Atlanta, and her implied return at the
novel’s end—she is in a different state of singlehood. From her identity as an unmarried
belle, to a hard-working widow, to a grieving wife, life for Scarlett at Tara is successful
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(albeit in varying modes of success, from life as a flattered belle, to the hard work of
saving her family and family home, to the assumed recovery and recuperation at the
novel’s end) at least in part because she is unencumbered by either a spouse or
motherhood (as Tara’s extended kinship system provides caretaking for her children).
Scarlett’s story serves as an example of the ugly plot deployed to not only reveal the
limitations of marriage but also imagine an alternative household arrangement. In fact,
the novel’s end represents a more fully realized alternative than the nostalgic
reminiscences of Porter’s Nannie and Sophia Jane.
If beauty marks those who are deemed eligible for marriage, then what does it
mean that the quintessential southern belle fails to meet ideals of southern beauty?
Entzminger explains that, “The parallels between Mitchell’s life and that of her heroine
indicate that she saw similarities between her role as a southern lady during World War I
and the Great Depression and that of a southern lady during the Civil War and
Reconstruction” (105). As Anne Goodwyn Jones observes, “Margaret Mitchell was
simultaneously an unreconstructed southerner—a believer in the traditional values of the
southern lady—and a new kind of rebel. And out of the tension produced by the conflict
of different definitions of southern women, her life—and her novel—grew” (314).
Mitchell, infamous for her own occasional acts of rebellion against genteel femininity,
creates a character that highlights the rebellion at the heart of southern womanhood. As
Entzminger observes, Mitchell “sees that the bad belle’s worst qualities—her
deceitfulness, shrewdness, manipulativeness, and superficiality—are the very traits that
enable her to survive in the fallen South . . . . Paradoxically, the good lady’s best
qualities—trust, self-sacrifice, and loyalty—are the ones that make her unfit for the
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modern world” (106). Similarly, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese argues that the novel “grappled
. . . with the dilemmas of female identity in the modern world . . . . Scarlett engaged a
special identification from her readers by simultaneously mobilizing and obscuring the
tensions of female being and passion that plagued Mitchell and her contemporaries”
(392). Fox-Genovese also observes that at the core of the novel “lies a psychological
exploration of the place of women within the ruling class and of the tensions between
their subjective desires and their assigned objective role” (394). Ultimately, Scarlett’s
striking lack of beauty functions as a marker of defiance against societal standards and
expectations.
At the center of these expectations is the requirement that only women who
possess appropriately feminine characteristics be allowed access to the marriage market
and the potential for reproduction it possesses. In The Old Order, that Eva to some extent
inherits her ugliness from her mother (both in her physical appearance and its connection
to her behavior) demonstrates the very dangers posed by ugly women reproducing. Her
mother Molly is described as “an unnatural other to her ugly daughter Eva” (103). Molly,
“far past her youth” with her obviously dyed hair, “shamelessly” flirts with old beaus and
makes no attempt to hide her hunt for husband number three, despite societal
expectations that mothers should be more sedate. Molly should be emulating the matrons
described in Gone with the Wind whose appearance is so subdued that it barely registers:
they are “the older women seated in the drawing room, sedate in dark silks as they sat
fanning themselves and talking of babies and sicknesses and who had married whom and
why” (65). No longer commodities on the marriage market, safely ensconced in their
positions in society, these appropriately embodied married women have appearances
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which are not attention-catching. They also demonstrate the fact that, though the
connection of youth and beauty shows that beauty is fleeting, ugliness is not necessarily
eminent once beauty fades. Other categories—the plain, the homely, even the faded—
exist to describe women who do not qualify as beautiful, and such a lack of beauty does
not necessarily exclude women from the dominant marriage economy. It is only women
who are marked as ugly who are excluded. Certainly, this ugliness can emerge, as in the
case of Molly’s behavior. She was once appropriate married and not characterized as
ugly. However, as an older woman who attempts to re-enter the courtship market, her
attempts to change her appearance and appear younger obliterate her attractive features
and render her ugly.
Molly’s inappropriate behavior makes her appear ugly, and this ugliness marks
her as an “unnatural other” and alienates her from her daughter.43 While Molly flirts, the
young Eva hides in corners. Rejecting her mother’s unseemly flirtation, the adult Eva
nevertheless performs a different kind of ugliness, though an ugliness which is also
linked to both her character as well as her behavior. Her secondhand clothes are
described in the same sentence as her teaching Latin. She is described as being a “blot” in
the same sentence that she is thought of by her students as yet another daily trial to be
endured, along with scratchy flannels and measles. Watson, too, observes a direct link
between Eva’s character and her appearance, noting that, “Porter also hints at Eva’s
limited reliability as narrator, suggesting that the corruption she [Eva] attributes to Amy
may be a projection of her unattractive looks and her belief in women’s rights” (250).

43

In fact, it may be possible to read Eva’s congenital ugliness as a punishment for her mother’s unladylike
behavior.
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However, I believe that Porter ultimately favors Eva over Amy, because it is Eva
who survives (unlike the beautiful Amy, who dies a tragic and mysterious death on her
honeymoon in New Orleans) and with whom the collection ends. Porter does not
privilege marriage in these stories, despite the important role it plays in the lives of
women. Watson observes that, “Nowhere in Porter’s life or fiction, for that matter, do we
find a marriage that is mutually fulfilling or empowering for both partners. It is always a
zero-sum game, someone consumed, someone winning, someone losing, someone
bleeding” (260). Ugliness here is connected to industriousness, studiousness, and
intellect. Though society might not consider these characteristics attractive ones for a
woman, by ending the collection with Eva, Porter reveals a certain sympathy for the ugly
aunt.
In fact, the ugly plot’s structuring theme of a connection between appearance and
character is maintained throughout The Old Order. Miranda’s father Harry often espouses
these connections, not only in his appraisal of Cousin Eva, but in his parenting as well.
Though described as a
pleasant, everyday sort of father, who held his daughters on his knee if they were
prettily dressed and well behaved, [he] pushed them away if they had not freshly
combed hair and nicely scrubbed fingernails. “Go away, you’re disgusting,” he
would say, in a matter-of-fact voice. He noticed if their stocking seams were
crooked. He caused them to brush their teeth with a revolting mixture of prepared
chalk, powdered charcoal, and salt. (112)
Harry also passes judgment on Miranda, lamenting that she “was going to be a little thing
all her life, she would never be tall; and this meant, of course, that she would never be a
beauty like Aunt Amy, or Cousin Isabel. Her hope of being a beauty died hard, until the
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notion of being a jockey44 came suddenly and filled all her thoughts” (130). Significantly,
once the hope of beauty is gone for Miranda, it seems to clear the way for other
possibilities. The life of the beautiful belle is fixed, determined, and tragic; in these
stories, it seems to be the ugly women who have the potential for more interesting lives.

44

Though equestrian riding was an acceptable pastime for women and there are references to female
jockeys in the South as early as the 1850s, most of these references were in regard to women who were
trick riders in circuses. So, Miranda’s plan her to become a jockey here is analogous to running away to
join the circus. See, e.g., “The Circus,” an 1894 article in the Charlotte Observer which mentions female
jockey races.
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CHAPTER 4
CHOOSING TO BE UGLY
The American Heritage Dictionary observes that the use of the word ugly to mean
“rude” is “Chiefly Southern US” (“ugly”). This definition highlights that “ugly” carries a
regionally specific, ideological meaning. In addition to the characters whose ugly
physical appearances are beyond their control, there are also female characters who
consciously choose to be ugly in both physical and behavioral senses of the word. Stories
in which women actively take steps to make themselves look ugly constitute a
particularly important variation on the ugly plot. As the ugly plot illuminates how
ugliness marks those who for various reasons are not eligible for or legible to the
marriage market, so there exists a variation of the ugly plot, one in which women choose
to make themselves ugly in order to rebel, express dissent, or refuse the roles of wife and
mother and their rigid gender expectations.
In Chapter 3, I discussed Molly in The Old Order, whose attempts to make herself
appear pretty and eligible for marriage—her heavy make-up and her inappropriate flirting
at parties—instead give her an ugly appearance. As a mother of an advancing age,
southern society dictates that she should not be competing with other belles for marriage
and should instead adopt a quieter appearance, one which makes her less obtrusive.
Despite Molly’s intention to make herself more attractive, the end result of her primping
is that she appears ugly. However, in the work of southern women, there are also many
female characters who do the exact opposite: they purposefully set out to make
themselves appear ugly in order to opt out of the marriage economy, rebelling against the
expectations of femininity by which they feel strangled.
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Refusing the trappings of feminine beauty is an overt act of defiance: it takes
courage to resist cultural norms and expectations of femininity. Feminist critic Laurie
Penny emphasizes how embedded these norms are in capitalist-fueled conspicuous
consumption, observing that, “Women’s work-relationship to their bodies mirrors our
work-relationship to our homes: we labour [sic] at great personal cost to gild our cages,
our increasing resentment tempered by fear of the social consequences of refusal” (48).
To be clear, the characters I’m interested in here go further than improperly gilding, more
than simply failing to live up to the often impossible standards of beauty expected of
them. Rather, they actively seek out an ugly appearance through their clothing, their
grooming, their posture, facial expressions, even the way they walk. Instead of fading
into the background, their ugliness in fact draws attention to them.
American culture in general (not only the South) shuns the idea of a woman
making such a spectacle of herself. Reflecting upon such admonitions from her childhood
which still echo, Mary Russo observes that,
Making a spectacle out of oneself seemed a specifically feminine danger. The
danger was of an exposure . . . . For a woman, making a spectacle out of herself
had more to do with a kind of inadvertency and loss of boundaries: the possessors
of large, aging, and dimpled thighs displayed at the public beach, of overly rouged
cheeks, of a voice shrill in laughter, or of a sliding bra strap . . . were at once
caught out by fate and blameworthy. (53)
In the examples which Russo gives, it is more than simply making a spectacle of one’s
self which is appalling; an extremely beautiful woman is certainly spectacular. Rather, it
is ways in which their bodies exceed boundaries and reveal that which should remain
hidden which makes these women spectacularly ugly. As Penny explains, “Fear of female
flesh and fat is fear of female power, the sublimated power of women over birth and
death and dirt and sex” (32). Tracing these ideas back as far back as Augustine, Susan
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Bordo claims that “the body is the locus of all that threatens our attempts at control. It
overtakes, it overwhelms, it erupts and disrupts” (145, emphasis in original). This is why
so many beauty products—from Lycra undergarments to hair spray—are about
containing the body: that which cannot be contained is dangerous.
Contrary to the “inadvertency” which Russo attributes to women who appear in
public in such disarray, the female characters I am interested in are well aware of how
their excessive appearance is being read. For example, Janie’s first appearance in Zora
Neale Hurston’s 1937 novel Their Eyes Were Watching God demonstrates how her
community understands that refusing traditionally feminine trappings is an act of
defiance. Upon returning to the community of Eatonville after running away with her
beloved Tea Cake, the community focuses on her appearance to express its censure:
“‘What she doin comin back here in dem overhalls? Can’t she find no dress to put on?—
Where’s dat blue satin dress she left here in? . . . What dat ole forty year ole ‘woman
doin’ wid her hair swingin’ down her back lak some young gal?” (3). Talking to her
friend Pheoby about the community’s gossip, Janie acknowledges that her overalls were
Tea Cake’s idea, to make it easier for her to work in the field with him (7): in this way,
they signify the egalitarian nature of her relationship with Tea Cake. Janie’s overalls are a
convenient shorthand for the unconventionality of her relationship with Tea Cake, a
relationship whose failure to conform to the community’s values is a part of its strength.
Janie has never been interested in the security of traditional marriage, despite her
grandmother’s desire to “marry [Janie] off decent like” (13). Nanny sees marriage as the
safest route for her granddaughter, explaining to Janie that, “Ah don’t want yo’ feathers
always crumpled by folks throwin’ up things in yo’ face. And Ah can’t die easy thinkin’
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maybe de menfolks white or black is makin’ a spit cup outa you” (20). However, Janie’s
brief life as the wife of Logan Killicks, despite the material comforts afforded by his
“often-mentioned sixty acres” (21) leaves her indifferent, despite Janie’s claim that she
“wants to want him sometimes” (23). Her apathy to Logan renders her vulnerable to the
exciting offer of Joe Starks to take her away from her life of drudgery with Logan to the
enticing opportunities of Eatonville.
Though she settles down to something of a more conventional life as Joe’s wife in
Eatonville, even there she is seen as an ugly woman. In Eatonville, her ugliness marks her
as not fully capable of living up to Eatonville’s expectations of her as the wife of a
successful businessman and mayor. For example, after Janie rebuffs Amos Hicks’s
attempts at conversation, he connects this failure on her part (a proper southern lady
would know how to flatter a man with appropriate conversation) to her appearance: “‘at
‘oman ain’t so awfully pretty no how when yuh take the second look at her. Ah had to
sorta pass by de house on de way back and seen her good. ‘Tain’t nothin’ to her ‘ceptin’
dat long hair’” (38). Although Amos’s dismissal of Janie’s appearance is to a certain
extent an attempt to save face after Janie fails to properly acknowledge his presence, it is
notable that he points to her hair as her one exceptional quality. Throughout the novel,
Janie’s hair is consistently pointed out as her one beauty—later in the novel when Janie
and Tea Cake are working on the muck, for example, Mrs. Turner pursues friendship
with Janie based on Janie’s light skin and her “luxurious hair” (140). Janie’s husband Joe
finds her hair so beautiful that he requires her to keep it hidden under a kerchief. Even
Tea Cake is smitten with Janie’s hair, admitting to Janie that, “Ah ain’t been sleepin’ so
good for mor’n uh week cause Ah been wishin’ so bad tuh git mah hands in yo’ hair”
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(103). Janie has the potential to be an attractive woman, as her hair demonstrates, just as
her grandmother’s upbringing has given her the potential to be a proper wife and mother.
However, Janie’s physical beauty fails to live up to the promise of her hair, just as her
desires for sensuality and freedom keep her from being a submissive wife.
Despite the promise of escape originally offered by Joe Starks and life in
Eatonville, Joe’s vision of marriage is one in which his wife’s identity is fully defined by
his. As he explains to Janie, “Ah aimed tuh be uh big voice. You oughta be glad, ‘cause
dat makes uh big woman outa you” (46). Especially after Joe becomes mayor, he expects
Janie to adopt the role of the mayor’s wife, one which is primarily one of having the
proper appearance. At the grand opening of Joe’s store, for example, he “told her to dress
up and stand in the store all that evening. Everybody was coming sort of fixed up, and he
didn’t mean for nobody else’s wife to rank with her. She must look on herself as the bellcow, the other women were the gang” (41). However, Janie withers in Joe’s shadow.
When Joe rejects their guests’ request to have Janie speak to them, Joe explains that,
“She’s uh woman and her place is in the home.” At this response, Janie experiences Joe’s
lack of concern for feelings as though “he took the bloom off of things” (43). This
description is noteworthy for its imagery, as it connects to Janie’s loss of desire for Joe,
when “The spirit of the marriage left the bedroom and took to living in the parlor. It was
there to shake hands whenever company came to visit, but it never went back inside the
bedroom again” (71). Acknowledging the fundamental connection in Janie between
nature and sensuality, she’s described as no longer being “petal-open anymore with him”
(71).
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With Joe, Janie experiences the same sort of restricted identity and dull sense of
life which she had with Logan—and as with Logan, so, too, does Janie defy Joe’s
expectations. This is dramatized in the repercussions of the unintentionally lackluster
dinner which Janie produces one evening for Joe—not through any conscious rebellion
on her part, but simply “one of those dinners that chasten all women sometimes. They
plan and they fix and they do, and then some kitchen-dwelling fiend slips a scorched,
soggy, tasteless mess into their pots and pans.” Offended by her failure as some sort of
personal injury, Joe “slapped Janie until she had a ringing sound in her ears and told her
about her brains before he stalked on back to the store.” Though their marriage was
already deteriorating, it is at this point that “something fell off the shelf inside her.” After
Joe slaps her, she realizes that “she had an inside and an outside now and suddenly she
knew how not to mix them” (72).
Prior to this scene, Janie’s self-conception has been one rooted in sensuality and
desire. When she is most fully self-expressive in the novel (in childhood and once she is
with Tea Cake), Janie’s selfhood is connected to nature, especially trees, beginning with
the famous scene of Janie lying beneath the blooming pear tree, watching the “thousand
sister-calyxes arch to meet the love embrace ad the ecstatic shiver of the tree from the
root to tiniest branch creaming in every blossom and frothing with delight” (11). Janie’s
capacity for sensual delight is repressed by those such as her grandmother and Joe who
expect her to be a smaller voice than her husband.
It is not until she experiences her temporarily egalitarian romantic relationship
with Tea Cake that her original perspective is restored. Admittedly, it is with reservations
that I characterize Janie’s relationship with Tea Cake as “egalitarian,” which is why I
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qualify this period as of their relationship as temporary. I agree with Susan Edwards
Meisenhelder that their relationship moves from one which is originally reciprocal to one
which becomes increasingly similar to Janie’s marriage to Joe Starks, as well as
Meisenhelder’s contention that readings of the novel should acknowledge both the
“vigorous equality of their relationship and the threats to it the changes in Tea Cake
constitute” (81). Reading the novel through the lens of the ugly plot highlights
Meisenhelder’s claim that the novel “allow[s] a story of female resistance to ‘pass’ as
romance” (90). The novel’s frame shows Janie as a woman alone, having undergone a
transformation through her relationships, but ultimately forging a life alone and signaling
this choice through her chosen appearance.
When she returns to Eatonville after Tea Cake’s death and tells Pheoby her story,
she is described as seeing “her life like a great tree in leaf with all the things suffered,
things enjoyed, things done and undone” (8). In between, however, Joe’s attempts to
force her into submissive femininity transform her lived experience from the
multitudinous, nature-based desire of her youth to a less complex one: “mostly she lived
between her hat and her heels, with her emotional disturbances like shade patterns in the
woods—come and gone with the sun. She got nothing from Jo[e] except what money
could buy, and she was giving away what she didn’t value” (76). In other words, Janie
becomes alienated from her own body and develops a much more binary sense of
herself—inside/outside, shadow/light, hot/cold—rather than the fuller, lush capacity for
experience that the pear tree exemplifies Janie as possessing.
Critics continue to debate whether Janie’s reclaiming of her own sensual desire
and individual subjectivity over the course of the novel qualify the novel to be
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characterized as a feminist text. Jennifer Jordan provides a succinct summary of these
feminist debates surrounding the text:
The novel is seen as a vehicle of feminist protest through its condemnation of the
restrictiveness of bourgeois marriage and through its exploration of intraracial
sexism and male violence. It is seen as a quest through which the heroine, Janie
Killicks Starks Woods, achieves a sense of identity as a self-fulfilled woman and,
through her own self-realization, becomes a leader of women and of her
community. Although Their Eyes Were Watching God provides a most effective
examination of the stultification of feminine talent and energy within traditional
middle-class life, it ultimately belittles the suffering of the majority of black
women whose working-class existences are dominated by hard labor and financial
instability. Furthermore, Janie's struggle for identity and self-direction remains
stymied. She never defines herself outside the scope of her marital or romantic
involvements and, despite her sincere relationship with her friend Pheoby, fails to
achieve a communal identification with the black women around her or with the
black community as a whole. (108).
I am sympathetic to a feminist reading of the text (at least in terms of self-identity), as I
read Janie’s transformations as illustrative of Elizabeth Grosz’s proposal that a feminist
understanding of the body requires seeing the body as a complicated, changing
construction. Beginning with Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of difference, Grosz
suggests that their
notion of the body as a discontinuous, nontotalizable series of processes, organs,
flows, energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events, speeds and
durations, may be of great value to feminists attempting to reconceive bodies
outside the binary oppositions imposed on the body by the mind/body,
nature/culture, subject/object and interior/exterior opposition. (164)
Certainly, Janie’s appearance over the course of the novel reflects not only a recovery of
her dynamic, non-static, non-binary self, but also highlights the significance of the
dynamic nature of her appearance.
Janie’s realization of the split between her inside and outside marks a turning
point in her behavior with Joe, one which is signified by a change in her appearance.
Previously, she didn’t recognize a difference between her inside and outside: her outer
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appearance reflected her inner sensibilities, as in her refusal to wear a head kerchief. She
had previously complained about the head kerchief which Joe insisted she wear because
he realized that her hair was attractive to other men. However, once Joe severed any trust
remaining between the two of them when he physically attacks her, she is no longer
interested in communicating with him. Janie is then content to look on the outside in a
manner consistent with his expectations of an appropriately passive, feminine wife—
which includes wearing the head kerchief. This image stands in stark contrast to Janie’s
actual feelings, as she at this point begins “saving up feelings for some man she had
never seen” (72). Janie’s compliant outer appearance is a form of deception against her
husband.
Once Janie is aware of this divide within herself, she is able to consciously
control her outer appearance in order to control how people read her. Her appropriate, not
ugly appearance signals her acquiescence to her position as Joe Stark’s wife and her
suspension of rebellion against the expectations of her.45 Significantly, Hurston twice
describes Janie as “starching and ironing her face” in order to emphasize this control. In
one scene, Janie “starched and ironed her face, forming it into just what people wanted to
see” (87). Hurston uses the same phrase—“Janie starched and ironed her face”—a page
later to describe her preparation for Starks’ funeral (88). Hurston’s use of the language of
the domestic sphere to describe Janie’s control over her appearance is significant, in that

45

However, it is important to note that this acquiescence is only temporary. As she will later use her choice
of overalls to signal her rebellion against Eatonville’s gender norms, so at the end of her relationship with
Joe does she use her appearance to relay the message she wishes to get across: specifically, that she is no
longer interested in fighting. The fluctuating nature of Janie’s appearance throughout the novel highlights
the fact that ugliness is not a static quality: appearance can change over time in response to a variety of
factors.
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it implies that this power over what one’s outward appearance reveals is a specifically
feminine one.
Janie no longer uses this power for deception once she is with Tea Cake. With
him, she can integrate her inside and outside, returning to the open, sensual, desire-based
identity of her youth. Janie’s appearance reflects their egalitarian relationship,
particularly through the similar clothes they wear. Sometimes she would wonder, “What
if Eatonville could see her now in her blue denim overalls and heavy shoes?”46 In Lake
Okechobee, she is comfortable interacting with other men as an equal: “she could listen
and laugh and even talk some herself if she wanted to. She got so she could tell big
stories herself from listening to the rest” (134). Rejecting the strictures of Eatonville
femininity, Janie chooses to wear masculine work clothes, an action which signals her
position as Tea Cake’s equal, both in the field and in the household. The changing
significance of her masculine apparel—from being marker of her equal status to men on
the muck to a statement of her outsider status in Eatonville—highlights the role of the
community in the understanding of ugliness: both in the construction of standards against
which female ugliness is determined as well as providing women like Janie a system
against which to rebel. That even on the muck, Janie is aware of how her clothing would
signify differently in Eatonville highlights the contingent quality of ugliness: what
qualifies as ugly in one context is considered functional in another. And even at the
novel’s end, Janie has not capitulated to the community’s expectations of her appearance:
she continues to wear her overalls and to keep her outer appearance to her own liking,
despite Eatonville’s expectations.
46

As their later disapproval demonstrates, this was not an idle question. Janie is aware that she is breaking
rules as she breaks them.

137

Although Janie’s behavior in romantic relationships has generally gone against
her community’s expectations of appropriate gender roles, her appearance has not
prevented her from having romantic relationships with men (regardless of the
community’s disapproval). In other texts, female characters take on ugly appearances to
signal their resignation from the marriage market. What some understand as giving up on
the possibility of marriage and traditional southern womanhood can also be read as active
rebellion against and refusal of these expectations. From Hurston’s time until today,
Janie’s strategy of using a consciously chosen ugly outer appearance to acknowledge
being outside of (or at times even opposed to) marriage and motherhood continues to be
utilized by female characters who wish to opt out of the expectations of their gender. Lee
Smith, an author whose work Peter Guralnick describes as “Zora Neale Hurston
transported to the mountains of Appalachia” in the way that they share “a fine and
unbuttoned declaration of individuality” (141), has created a number of female characters
for whom ugliness clearly signals their distance from traditional femininity. In Smith’s
work, ugliness is a property over which women work hard to exert control—and though
some actively fight it in an attempt to keep themselves eligible for the marriage market,
others actively choose it, in order to signal their own rejection of marriage and
motherhood.
The characters in Smith’s early works, such as Family Linen, The Last Day the
Dogbushes Bloomed, and Black Mountain Breakdown, are constantly on guard against
any encroaching ugliness. Certainly, part of this fear of keeping ugliness at bay has to do
with the physical changes brought about by aging, as Family Linen’s Myrtle experiences
when she discovers that
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gravity set in. Myrtle realizes that gravity has always been around, but she never
noticed it until she was thirty-nine. Then right along her chinline, at either side of
her mouth, something started to droop. Her breasts changed shape, hung lower.
And her buttocks—which is probably what bothered her most, since Don is a selfprofessed ‘ass man’—really started to sag. (42)
While this description to a certain extent describes the “body as palimpsest,” it also
describes what ugliness represents to women such as Myrtle who fear it: the loss of
attractiveness, especially frightening when it seems to pose a threat to her marriage. If
successful femininity is defined as being physically attractive enough to entice a man to
propose marriage, reproduce, and provide for his wife and family, then a woman who
loses her looks also risks losing her husband, marriage, and the security which rests upon
this foundation.
However, ugliness in Smith’s work is not simply the result of the processes of age
and gravity. The work that Smith’s characters put into keeping up their physical
appearance also functions as a bulwark against laziness, slovenliness, and a general sense
of capitulation to the many forces which threaten the stability of this lifestyle of marriage
and motherhood. Scholars such as Grosz emphasize the role that these beauty rituals play
in constructing recognizable identities: “They make the flesh into a particular type of
body—pagan, primitive, medieval, capitalist, Italian, American, Australian” (142)—and,
I would add, southern and feminine. To those who engage in the struggle to tame their
bodies with beauty implements daily (whether hairspray or lycra), then, the act of “letting
one’s self go” seems a moral failing. Sybil, for example, in Family Linen, observes that
her sister Lacy would be pretty “if she kept herself up” (27). Similarly, their sister Candy,
though a beautician, has “let herself go” and “neglect[s] her own looks.” For Smith’s
women, “letting yourself go” is a signal that a woman lacks the correct disposition and
discipline for the compromises of marriage and motherhood. Certainly, “letting oneself
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go” has connotations of the kind of failure of self-discipline discussed by Russo.
However, the subjunctive mood evoked by the word “letting” emphasizes the importance
of permission. Significantly, letting yourself go is an action; it represents a trajectory of
motion instead of a condition of stasis. In contrast to ugliness as signifying an inadvertent
failure of discipline, women who let themselves go are actively allowing themselves the
freedom to “go.”47 The ugliness which results from refusing the discipline of beauty
regimens signifies that the woman in question has given herself permission to experience
freedoms and possibilities not available to those who choose a more traditional route.
Such characters represent the kind of challenge to compulsory heterosexuality that
Adrienne Rich described in her essay of the same name. As Rich observes, “Women in
every culture and throughout history have undertaken the task of independent,
nonheterosexual, woman-connected existence, to the extent made possible by their
context” (32, emphasis in original), so, too, are women who let themselves go similarly
staking their claim outside of the marriage market. In this way, women who let
themselves go are attempting to detach themselves from the economy of looking which
gleans its power from men’s desire. In Family Linen, for example, Myrtle explains the
overt connection between the discipline of keeping up one’s appearance and marital
success: “But if you want a successful marriage, you’ve got to work for it. You can’t
afford to get fat, for instance, or let yourself go” (37-38). For women such as Myrtle,
ugliness hangs as a constant threat to marriage, a threat requiring constant vigilance. If a
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The persistently apocryphal stories of second wave feminist bra-burning (based on the “Freedom Trash
Can” at the 1968 Miss America Pageant protest) emphasize how threatening the rejection of such symbols
of feminine beauty regimens are perceived.
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woman succumbs to ugliness, she is in fact responsible for her marriage’s demise.
Choosing to be ugly is choosing a kind of failure; it is siding with chaos and dissent.
It is important to remember, though, that failure in the context of the southern
marriage economy is not necessarily a bad thing. As I have already discussed, the failure
required by such systems can be a place for imaginative production and creative
alternatives to normative households and lifestyles. As a subcategory of the ugly plot, the
chosen ugliness plot also functions as a generative model of failure. In Their Eyes Were
Watching God, for example, Janie demonstrates how “success” in marriage requires a
constant performance in order to continually constitute herself as a wife in her life before
meeting Tea Cake. The world of marriage and motherhood is a realm of constant
production and reproduction. Once women achieve wifehood, they are expected to
reproduce themselves, literally through bearing children as well as socially through their
proper training and upbringing. Mothers have a duty to produce offspring who will adopt
appropriate roles in southern society, ensuring the society’s preservation for another
generation.
Neither Janie in Their Eyes Were Watching God nor Grace in Smith’s Saving
Grace embrace this duty, although Grace expresses more ambivalence about her inability
to do so than Janie does. As the daughter of a preacher as well as a preacher’s wife and
mother of his children, Grace goes to greater lengths than Janie does in an effort to
conform to the retrogressive gender norms of her religious communities in eastern
Tennessee and western North Carolina. Even more so than Janie, Grace radically changes
her physical appearance after leaving her life as a wife and mother with Travis Word for
a life of sin with the musician/housepainter Randy Newhouse. In rejecting the markers of
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her old life as a conservative preacher’s wife, Grace’s new choices underscore her
ambivalence about her new life as a cocktail waitress, living in sin with Randy:
The fact is, I was not real good at modern life. I didn’t even look good anymore
after five years with Randy Newhouse. I had circles under my eyes and a double
chin. I had gained thirty pounds. I had cut my hair and gotten a permanent so it
would be easier to take care of, and it was easier, but I don’t think Randy liked me
as much after that. He liked me back when I looked country, when I looked like a
preacher’s wife. This is what turned him on. Now that I was thirty-eight years old
and had cellulite on my thighs and looked like everybody else in Knoxville, he
was losing interest. (239)
To a certain extent, Grace’s changed appearance reflects the changes she has undergone
in her life, especially in the weight she gains, her cellulite, and the circles under her eyes.
However, she makes other choices—cutting her hair and leading the kind of lifestyle
which leads to weight gain and dark circles under the eyes—which make her less
attractive to Randy. Ambivalent about both possible lives (that represented by Travis
Word, the conservative preacher, and Randy Newhouse, the permissive and promiscuous
swinging seventies musician) Grace makes changes to her appearance which result in
alienating her from both realms.
Tara Powell categorizes Lee Smith as one of the “current, commercially popular
group of authors” writing in the ‘just folks’ and ‘hardscrabble South’ style.” Including
Smith in her analysis of the role of the intellectual in southern fiction, Powell
characterizes Smith’s works as “featur[ing] the academic stamp of educators and
educated people whose intellectual lives and rational decisions are spiritually and socially
unsatisfying—people who, in the tradition of O’Connor’s intellectual heathen, find
themselves looking outside intellectualism, seeking enlightenment elsewhere for
alienated, often dysfunctional lives” (105).
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Though Powell does not look at any of Smith’s work individually, her
characterization of Smith’s work as “just folks intellectuals” is notable with regard to
Smith’s 2002 novel The Last Girls. Among the reunited group of college roommates in
the novel, intellectualism is understood to be incompatible with marriage, as Harriet
realizes when considering why she never married: “Harriet always thought she’d get her
Ph.D. and publish papers in learned journals while writing brilliant novels on the side”
(8). In Harriet’s world, intellectualism would not only be a distraction from the duties that
marriage and motherhood requires, but the dissatisfaction with the limited activities of
these roles might lead to rebellion against these strictures.
As Powell notes, Smith is following in the tradition of Flannery O’Connor’s
characters, whom Powell characterizes as O’Connor’s “intellectual heathens.” In
O’Connor’s work, women who choose to make themselves ugly often do so in pursuit of
the life of the intellect. Characters such as Joy-Hulga in “Good Country People” and
Mary Grace in “Revelation” look, dress, and carry themselves in such a way as to reject
southern femininity and the expectations associated with their gender. Even in
O’Connor’s very early work, the connections between failure at romance and the life of
the mind were apparent. In his biography of O’Connor, Brad Gooch recounts an
unsuccessful date to a college dance that O’Connor went on—she claimed to be such a
bad dancer that she had a “tin leg.” Gooch suggests that this experience “may have
contributed to her April 1943 cartoon on the opening of a college gym for dances,
portraying a ‘wallflower’ of a girl in a long striped skirt, with glasses, sitting alone,
watching other couples dance. The caption, later echoed in Lee Smith’s work: ‘Oh, well,
I can always be a Ph.D.’” (Gooch 100).
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I see a direct link between the identity of the beautiful and that of the intellectual,
a link made clear by Powell’s definition of the term intellectual. After explaining a
number of different ways of understanding the term, Powell notes, “I have found it more
useful . . . to proceed with my paternal grandfather’s definition: anyone who has, in the
broadest possible sense, been up to the dubious project of beautifying his or her mind”
(19, emphasis added). Certainly, the ideal southern woman needs a certain amount of
education in order to handle the responsibilities of running a household. However, as
with a woman’s physical appearance, excess is unacceptable. Joy-Hulga’s Ph.D. in
philosophy exemplifies such excess. While her mother “thought it was nice for girls to go
to school” (A Good Man Is Hard to Find 267-8), her daughter’s degree baffles her.
According to Mrs. Hopewell, “You could not say, ‘My daughter is a philosopher.’ That
was something that had ended with the Greeks and Romans” (268). Joy-Hulga’s
doctorate is analogous to Molly’s unflattering makeup in The Old Order: in both cases, a
woman’s attempt to supplement their natural assets (whether physical or intellectual)
exceeds the boundaries of the appropriate and marks them as ineligible for marriage.
The difference between Molly and Joy-Hulga, of course, is that Molly’s failure is
unintended, while Joy-Hulga’s is quite intentional. Further, Joy-Hulga’s rebellion is, like
many of O’Connor’s characters who choose ugliness, directed at her mother. In the work
of many southern women, mothers bear the brunt of their daughters’ rebellion as they
attempt to fulfill their maternal roles by turning out reproductions of themselves: young
women eligible for the marriage market, poised to take their place in perpetuating the
dominant, white society. Certainly, the stakes are high for mothers of daughters: their
own success as a woman depends on their daughter’s success in the marriage market.
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Referencing Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, Susan Bordo identifies the body as
“not only a text of culture . . . [but also] a practical, direct locus of social control.
Banally, through table manners and toilet habits, through seemingly trivial routines, rules,
and practices, culture is ‘made body’” (165, emphasis in original). Though Bordo’s focus
is on the construction of the “made body,” she also calls attention to the mother’s central
role in this construction, as all of the subjects she names, such as table manners and toilet
habits, along with other banal and trivial practices, fall under the rubric of domestic and
maternal responsibilities. Bordo’s insight elucidates why producing marriageable
daughters is so crucial for women: as a “practical, direct locus of social control,” the
bodies of their daughters provide white mothers of a certain social class with one of the
few sanctioned avenues of power available to them within the strictly gendered realms of
southern society.
Mothers in these texts, then, see their daughters not only as their responsibility to
transform into the next generation of properly feminine marriage material, but also as one
of their few opportunities to escape the submissiveness which is expected of them in most
other realms. Daughters in these texts who choose to be ugly do so often in large part to
reject being the objects of their mothers’ creation, insisting on their own subjecthood and
self-fashioning.48 Certainly, there are many accounts (including those by O’Connor
herself) of O’Connor’s contentious relationship with her own mother, which include
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In her article “Southern Women” on the website for the southern lifestyle magazine Garden and Gun,
Allison Glock ties the importance of a southern woman’s appearance to her maternal qualities: “Southern
women do not capitalize on their looks to snag men, though that often results. The reason we Southern
women take care of ourselves is because, simply, Southern women are caretakers.” This connection
between an attractive appearance and caretaking responsibilities means that when women choose to be ugly
in part as a way against rebelling against their mothers, their ugliness is not only a rejection of traditional
gender roles, but is also itself a refusal to adopt a maternal role towards themselves, a stand against
assuming a caretaker role, even for themselves.
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stories of her mother’s disdain for her daughter’s intellectualness and frustration with her
failure to meet the expectations of southern ladyhood. In a letter to a friend, O’Connor
admits to sharing a disposition with Joy-Hulga (Letter to A., 5 August 1955, 954). She
even gave her character an unattractive sweatshirt, a source of real-life contention
between O’Connor and her mother: “The only embossed [sweatshirt] I ever had had a
fierce-looking bulldog on it with the word GEORGIA over him. I wore it all the time, it
being my policy at that point in life to create an unfavorable impression. My urge for
such has to be repressed as my mother does not approve of making a spectacle of oneself
when over thirty” (Letter to A., 5 August 1955, 946).
In her analysis of “Good Country People,” Powell observes that, “Important to the
success of this story is that O’Connor manages to critique the young woman’s intellectual
hubris while at the same time loving her strangeness and her courage” (33). In my
consideration, it is the coexistence of these three elements—Joy-Hulga’s intellectualness,
her strangeness, as well as her courage—which makes her the compelling character that
she is. She exemplifies how the choice to be ugly can be an attempt to choose the
intellectual life over the domestic one. Certainly, the connection between intellectualism
and ugliness is not without precedent.In American literature in general, one genealogy of
the ugly woman is that of the fairy tale character of the wise, helpful crone.49 While
O’Connor’s ugly women could not be described as helpful, I do see them as following a
tradition of the ugly woman as educated or wise, the type that W. J. Cash identified as the
“Yankee schoolma’am”:
Generally horsefaced, bespectacled, and spare of frame, she was, of course, no
proper intellectual but at best a comic character, at worst a dangerous fool,
49
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playing with explosive forces which she did not understand . . . . [The South] saw
her, indeed, as a living epitome of the Yankee mind, identified her essentially
with Northern universities, read in the evils springing abundantly from her
meddlesome stupidity categorical proof that Northern ‘theory’ was in toto
altogether mad. (137)
An alliance with educated “Yankee schoolma’ams” certainly sets southern women who
choose to be ugly at odds with their prettier sisters whose marriage and motherhood work
to preserve southern culture.
By emulating these ugly northern women, O’Connor’s ugly characters choose
ugliness as a rebellion against the expectations which have been placed on them because
of their identity as southern women. Ugliness is a deliberate choice for Joy-Hulga and
Mary Grace—both academics who reject the limitations southern ladyhood—which they
flaunt in the face of their mothers’ embarrassment. Even Joy-Hulga’s accomplishment of
earning a Ph.D. is unacceptable, as her mother would have preferred that she had made an
effort to meet boys at school, not spend all of her time studying (267-8). Similarly, Mary
Grace’s mother explains that “‘Mary Grace goes to Wellesley College . . . . In
Massachusetts,’ she said with a grimace. ‘And in the summer she just keeps right on
studying. Just reads all the time, a real bookworm.’” Her mother disapproves of her
constant study, and thinks “she ought to get out and have fun” (Everything that Rises
Must Converge 643). As a Wellesley student, Mary Grace exemplifies the kind of
unacceptable northern influence which Cash describes. Intellectual accomplishments are
simply a barrier to the more important accomplishments of attracting men, marrying, and
settling into the expected roles of wife and mother.
For both Joy-Hulga and Mary Grace, ugliness not only reflects their conscious
rejection of gender norms, but it is also a physical manifestation of the anger they feel at
such restrictions. In “Good Country People,” the “hulking” Joy-Hulga’s “constant
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outrage had obliterated every expression from her face.” She “would stare just a little to
the side of her, her eyes icy blue, with the look of someone who has achieved blindness
by an act of will and means to keep it” (264-265). Here, her ugly appearance is the result
of an act of will. Her mother’s exasperation with her results from realizing that JoyHulga’s ugliness is a chosen one. Mrs. Hopewell, looking at Joy-Hulga, “would think that
if she would only keep herself up a little, she wouldn’t be so bad looking. There was
nothing wrong with her face that a pleasant expression wouldn’t help” (267). By
changing her name to the ugliest name she can think of and consciously choosing to be
ugly through her clothes, facial expressions, and even the way that she walks, Joy-Hulga
disqualifies herself from the kind of marriage-based southern ladyhood expected of her.
In “Revelation,” O’Connor repeats the themes of “Good Country People,” as the
stylish lady in the waiting room at the doctor’s office assures Mrs. Turpin that “I don’t
think it makes a bit of difference what size you are. You just can’t beat a good
disposition” (Everything that Rises Must Converge 634). She’s accompanied by a “fat
girl of eighteen or nineteen, scowling into a thick blue book which Mrs. Turpin saw was
entitled Human Development . . . . She appeared annoyed that anyone should speak while
she tried to read. The poor girls’ face was blue with acne” (635). This mother and
daughter could be Mrs. Hopewell and Joy-Hulga, twenty years earlier. Both Mary Grace
and Joy-Hulga consciously struggle against the strictures of southern ladyhood,
expectations that their behavior be fitting of women named “Joy” and “Grace.” However,
O’Connor certainly does not privilege such rebellion, as neither Joy-Hulga nor Mary
Grace come to happy endings. Joy-Hulga’s hubris in feeling herself superior to the “good
country” Bible salesman leaves her stranded in a hayloft minus her prosthetic leg, while
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Mary Grace, after being overwhelmed by her anger at proper southern ladies, ends up
tranquilized and institutionalized.
By the twenty-first century, these mother-daughter battles take a disturbingly
darker turn. Helen Ellis’s 2000 novel Eating the Cheshire Cat shows the lengths to which
southern mothers are willing to go in order to make their daughters literally fit the mold.
The novel opens on the night before Sarina Summers’ sixteenth birthday, with the young
woman in the emergency room suffering from alcohol poisoning and smashed fingers.
Despite the stories that Sarina and her mother tell about adolescent indulgence and
drunken clumsiness with car doors, the reader soon learns that Sarina’s condition is all
her mother’s doing: after feeding her spiked punch and shots of whiskey,
Sarina saw her arms outstretched, her wrists duct-taped to a cinder block. Except
for her pinkies, her fingers were curled into fists and taped. Her pinkies laid out
and taped. The cinder block taped to the table. Her mother standing before it all.
“Oh,” cried Sarina. She was too drunk to speak.
“Be a good girl,” Mrs. Summers said as she picked up the ax. She lifted it, blade
backwards, over her shoulder. “Keep your eyes closed.”
Sarina did as she was told. (21).
As Sarina’s broken fingers will require re-setting after her mother’s terrifying attack, the
end result will conveniently be that Sarina’s crooked pinky fingers—the top joints of her
fingers bent in, looking as though “those pinkies were trying to do a U-turn,” according
to her father—will be straightened. When Mrs. Summers had previously tried to have
Sarina’s imperfect fingers fixed, her pediatrician had refused and claimed, “There’s no
doctor who’ll do it. What your daughter’s got is a recessive trait. Like widow’s peaks and
attached earlobes” (20). Mrs. Summers’s violent attack on her daughter is revealed to be
a twisted sweet sixteen present.
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Opening with this harrowing account of Sarina’s mother’s attack, the novel
subsequently follows Sarina’s friendship with Nicole, whose mother is even more intent
than Mrs. Summers is on her daughter’s physical and social perfection, along with the
experiences of Bitty Jack, the daughter of the summer camp caretakers whose life
frequently intersects with those of Sarina and Nicole. One thing this novel emphasizes is
that women who make the choice to be ugly do so from a position of privilege. Bitty
Jack’s ugly physical appearance is linked to her lower socioeconomic status; she would
certainly not choose it, if she could. When faced with the physically attractive (crooked
pinkies aside) bunkmate, Bitty Jack feels her own deficiencies in comparison: “She
wondered if she would ever outgrow what her mama called her awkward stage. Could
she ever afford new glasses? Could she dress better? Wear makeup so it looked right?
Would her acne ever clear? Would her hair lose the oil, gain body, gain bounce?” (26)
Unlike Bitty Jack, those for whom ugliness is a choice occupy a position of
privilege; they can choose ugliness as a form of rebellion, usually against insistent (or in
this novel, draconian) mothers who are adamant about ensuring that their daughters will
fit properly into the marriage economy. A woman must occupy a place of privilege
within society in order to have the choice to opt out of their expected position. For
Nicole, making herself ugly is an attempt to connect to her friend Sarina. Nicole's
obsession with Sarina is both a way of rebelling against her mother (who does not
approve of the friendship) as well as an expression of lesbian desire, which is strictly
forbidden in this community:
With Sarina, Nicole made an effort to play down her beauty. She didn’t powder
her nose. A zit was like a door prize that she’d never try to hide. Who cared what
her date thought? Not Nicole—one single bit. Her unfinished face put Sarina at
ease. When Sarina was at ease, she was more attentive to Nicole. She
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accompanied her to the rest room, to get popcorn, refill their drinks. Anytime
Nicole could steal Sarina from her date [sic]. (66)
Here, Nicole’s actions to make herself less attractive to her date have several goals. First,
by “putting Sarina at ease,” Nicole hopes both that Sarina will feel comfortable enough to
spend more time with her as well as relay the message that Sarina should not see her as
competition for the attention of young men. She also is signaling her lack of interest in
courtship to her date: in this way, Nicole is overtly communicating her intention to opt
out of the marriage market through her lack of interest in interacting with potential mates
through dating. Finally, by focusing her attention on wooing Sarina away from her date,
Nicole is not only encouraging Sarina to join her in opting out of the marriage market,
but also rebelling against the heteronormativity of the market. Further, Nicole’s selfsabotage is also an act of defiance against the imperatives of both of their mothers, that
they behave in ways which will best position them to claim a high-status marriage.
In contrast to Sarina’s and Nicole’s mothers, whose insistence on their daughters’
beauty and conventional behavior provokes rebellion, Bitty Jack’s mother sees beauty
even in the people who perform in the freak show with her daughter. Upon witnessing
“Little Miss Horse and Pony,” she whispers, “She has such a pretty face” (89). Though
she does not consciously make herself ugly like Nicole does, Bitty Jack's appearance is,
to a certain extent, also mutable, especially once she learns how context-dependent value
judgments about appearances are. When she gets a job in a freak show hosing off Johnny
Iguana, the “Freak Boss” assures her that “You’ll get along fine with him. I can tell. You
wouldn’t be here unless you was an ugly duckling once yourself,” to which Bitty Jack
replies, “I’m no swan” (81). At the freak show, however, the Freak Boss tells Bitty,
“You’re not chicken shit . . . around here, you’ll be the belle of the ball . . . . What you
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got? Glasses? Skin that’ll clear up sooner or later. Freckles. You’re skinny, but you’re
nothing to turn your nose up at” (81).
The Freak Boss has a clear understanding of the benefits of ugliness. Regaling
Bitty Jack with the story of the 300 pound woman who fell into the Pick a Duck pool,
who “was flailing around like a pig in shit . . . . Poor ducks were stuck in every crevice of
her body,” he goes on to say that “Someone got the whole ugly incident on camera. Won
ten grand on that goddamned embarrassing video show.” Despite the immediate
embarrassment it caused the fat woman, the Freak Boss ultimately wonders whether she
staged the entire incident with the prize money in mind (92-3). He understands that the
failure implied by ugliness is not necessarily a dead end: context is key.
At the fair, for example, the ugliness which held Bitty Jack back at camp now
allows her access (and training) that lead to her social success. Not only does she attract
the performer Johnny Iguana as a boyfriend, but she also is able to enact some revenge
over Sarina, whom she holds responsible for a great deal of her own unhappiness.
Working the games, she not only learns how they are fixed, but she also runs the games
herself, which ultimately enables her not only to win the big pig prize, but to prevent
Sarina’s boyfriend Stewart from winning the same prize, a failure which upsets Sarina.
When we first see Stewart and Sarina at the fair, we are tempted to believe them that the
games are fixed, although Sarina’s response to the Pick a Duck game—“The ugly bitch
behind the counter kept giving Stewart small prizes” (54)—seems excessive in response
to a carnival game. When we later learn that the “ugly bitch” is, in fact, Bitty Jack (and
that she is, in fact, cheating Stewart out of the prizes he has legitimately won), it
illuminates the unique power which ugliness grants Bitty Jack.
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Bitty Jack’s account of Stewart’s quest for the big pig includes her own candid
self-appraisal: “Bitty knew she was no swan. Her beauty wasn’t storybookish: no dragon
returns to find Bitty’s face morphed into a pot of gold. She still had to wear glasses. The
shower was a war zone against combination skin. But she wasn’t the same girl she was at
thirteen. Bitty knew she had bettered” (95). Though it is ultimately a trifling power, Bitty
does momentarily exercise power over Sarina and Stewart. Sarina has her heart set on
Stewart winning her a plush pig at the game—or, failing that, a purple snake. Regardless
of what Stewart picks in the carnival game Bitty Jack runs, however, Bitty Jack uses her
position to only award him the small prize—the plush snake—and never in Sarina’s
preferred purple. As Stewart’s frustration mounts with each additional consolation prize
snake, “[w]ithin minutes, Sarina stood like Medusa’s maid of honor. A wilted bouquet of
bold-colored snakes drooped from her grasp” (96). It is significant that Sarina in this
description is Medusa’s maid of honor, and not Medusa herself. Here, Bitty does not
grant Sarina the full power of Medusa. Instead, Bitty Jack retains her power, and it is
Bitty’s silent stare which drives Sarina mad, making enough of a commotion that Sarina
is asked to leave the fair (96-97). By retaining the full power of Medusa herself, Bitty
Jack demonstrates the power available to ugly women.
This power, however, does not come without a cost. While Eating the Cheshire
Cat ultimately emphasizes that ugliness in the South is synonymous with rebellion and
dissent, it emphasizes that such rebellion is not equally available to all who would seek it
through choosing to be ugly. Women such as Joy-Hulga in “Good Country People” and
Nicole in Eating the Cheshire Cat are able to adopt an unattractive appearance because
they are assured of a certain amount of security: they both have homes with mothers who
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are willing to provide them with food and shelter despite their daughters’ open contempt
for their preferred ambitions which would see their daughters married and procreating,
ensuring the reproduction of the system which they, as mothers, have embraced. They
can choose not to marry, as they still have access to food, shelter, and—at least in the
case of Nicole—opportunities to interact with society through her mother’s connections.
Despite Nicole’s repeated, outrageous public appearances, from attacking her mother at
the Tri Delt alumnae card party to her apparent murder/suicide during the Alabama
homecoming game, Nicole’s inherited wealth and societal status mean that she always
has some material security, even when she has run away from home and been kicked out
of her sorority.
Characters such as Bitty Jack in Eating the Cheshire Cat or Mrs. Freeman’s
daughters in “Good Country People” act as a foil for characters such as Joy-Hulga and
Nicole, as their lack of privilege prevents them from being able to make such choices.
Bitty Jack’s ugliness, for example, is to some extent a reflection of her class status, as her
acne and lifeless hair are examples of physical characteristics which greater wealth might
allow her to alleviate through access to the services of a dermatologist or a beauty salon.
Nicole, in contrast, is given cosmetics and attractive clothes, and thus has the opportunity
to decide whether to use them or not. Glynese and Carramae Freeman, similarly, as the
daughters of the lower class Mrs. Freeman in “Good Country People,” are presented as
pursuing marriage and motherhood at early ages without any possible alternatives
possible for them. Ugliness as a choice in these texts points to the material requirements
of being able to imagine alternatives to expectations of gender.
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When women consciously alter their appearance to make themselves
unattractive—whether through their choice of masculine clothing, their failure to wear
cosmetics, or their carriage and facial expressions—they not only signal their own
rejection of the expectations of their gender but also continue on a path of “being ugly” in
the southern sense of the term of being rude and making a spectacle of themselves. These
stories of women who choose ugliness highlight the ways in which the imperative for
southern women to fit into such narrow parameters of beauty results in a desire and drive
to “be ugly”—both in appearance and in behavior. In all of these texts, the rigid
requirements of femininity, marriage, and motherhood are openly rejected and rebelled
against by women who make themselves ugly through their clothes, carriage, and
behavior. Emphasizing the link between the southern idea of ugliness as unacceptable
behavior and the more general idea of ugliness as an unacceptable appearance, these
women embody the rebellion at the heart of “being ugly.”
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CONCLUSION
I’m writing this in the wake of twenty-two-year-old Elliot Rodger’s shooting spree

near the University of California Santa Barbara, during which he killed six people before
committing suicide. This tragedy has stirred a national conversation regarding male
privilege and the dehumanization of women, the result of objectification based on
appearance. After the discovery of Rodger’s misogynistic rants on YouTube as well as in
a137-page “manifesto” in which he blames women’s rejection of him for his homicidal
rage, the Twitter hashtag #YesAllWomen emerged as a way for women to bear witness to
their own everyday experiences of misogyny and gender-based harassment. In response
to the #NotAllMen hashtag, deployed by men who felt they were being unfairly
implicated or included in accusations of culturally-entrenched misogyny and sexism, the
#YesAllWomen Twitter campaign was a strategy deployed by (primarily American)
women in order to speak back to the misogynist culture, as a way to refuse suffering in
silence.50
Many twenty-first century women have found the co-opting of such media to be a
useful strategy for a variety of modes of feminist activism, running the gamut from
facetious Amazon.com product reviews of sexist products to Pussy Riot’s criminalized
anti-Putin YouTube videos and performance art.51 Though these acts of rebellion manifest
in a variety of registers (whose stakes are often not equivalent), they all illustrate ways in
which women have found ways to use media to convey their dissent against sexism. In
this way, throughout the twentieth century, southern women writers utilized the media of
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the written word and fiction in order to strike out against the limits imposed on them
because of their gender. In a world where women’s value is so often based on their
appearance, choosing to be ugly is a significant activity. The important strategies of
“being ugly” deployed by the authors in my study demonstrate a significant category of
methods of resistance, refusal, and rebellion which southern women have discovered to
employ against such gendered systems of privilege. Whether re-focusing the emphasis in
the Medusa/Perseus paradigm to the Medusa herself, as in Welty’s work, utilizing the
narrative form of the ugly plot (in contrast to the more traditional marriage and courtship
plots), or writing stories in which female characters choose to be ugly (both in their
physical appearance as well as in their behavior), southern women writers have created a
spectrum of ugly women who defy expectations of beautiful, demure women. In doing
so, they point to possible ways of living outside of the nuclear family, to alternatives to of
traditional femininity and feminine gender roles.
Such strategies have a wider significance as well. For example, as American
culture often relies upon regionalism in order to bolster national identity, viewing the
southern novel through the lens of the ugly plot reveals that texts written by southern
women not only speak back to gyneolatrous southern ideologies, but call into question
more general, national paradigms of femininity. Given the specifically southern nature of
the idea of “being ugly” as rude or rebellious behavior, the ubiquity of these characters
represents a real undercurrent of resistance throughout twentieth and twentieth century
fiction written by southern women, regardless of whether this resistance represents
conscious, active rebellion or a more subtle, passive stance. As the protection of white
women has been used as the reason for so much race-based violence (as well as for
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maintaining retrogressive gender roles) in the American South, I believe that the
deployment of these characters represents a refusal of this scapegoat role. And while
many of these characters, such as Joy-Hulga, are consciously acting to resist these roles,
even those characters who are not actively engaged in rebellion represent a refusal on the
part of their authors to sanction not only the expectations of gender in the South but also
the validity of the tradition of giving the safety and purity of southern women as the
reason for its violence.
In fact, looking at a wider swath of twentieth- and twenty-first-century southern
culture reveals that this strategy holds true. From the comedian Minnie Pearl to the
variety of women in Ross Campbell’s contemporary Wet Moon graphic novel series, ugly
women are everywhere in southern culture, defying our stereotypes of the beautiful
southern belle. Despite (or at times even because of) their frequent depiction for comic
effect, there is a common element of dissent to their frequent appearance. And within the
larger context of American literature, the appearance of male American authors will
never be subject to the same scrutiny that female American authors endure: critical
studies of both Eudora Welty and Edith Wharton (to only name two) have claimed that
their works were profoundly affected by their authors’ ugliness. That so many southern
women writers have laid claim to ugliness in their writing demonstrates not only an
awareness of the onus of physical appearance felt by women, but more importantly a way
out of this responsibility through literally being ugly.
As recent works such as Jon Smith’s Finding Purple America: The South and the
Future of American Cultural Studies, Jason Arthur’s Violet America: Regional
Cosmopolitanism in U.S. Fiction since the Great Depression, and William Hardwig’s
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Upon Provincialism: The South and the Future of American Cultural Studies
demonstrate, the relationship between Southern Studies and American Studies continues
to evolve, as changes in each field raise new questions in the other. I believe this trend
echoes Rodrigo Lazo’s discussion in the March 2014 issue of American Studies, in which
he asks whether “a local framework does not have to emphasize national belonging.”
Though his review essay considers an even larger field of “Hemispheric American
Studies,” the questions he raises about the changing significance of place is relevant to
southern studies. Like Lazo, I, too, am interested in what happens “a local context is
deployed in order to establish connections on a more global scale” (173). In other words,
as Lazo considers how individual, regional literature from the Americas can inform and
expand our understanding of the larger region, so, too, do I believe that focusing on the
figure of the ugly woman throughout the work of southern women writers complicates
our understanding not only the role of women in the larger American culture, but also on
the relationship between the South and nation.
Has the South, like Scarlett O’Hara, tried to charm its way out of its ugly history?
Or might characters such as Joy-Hulga and Minnie Pearl be ways of the South speaking
back to a larger American culture which has simultaneously cast it as both the nation’s
feminine other as well as its racist underside? Reconsidering the relationship between the
South and the nation in terms of the regional meaning of “being ugly” reveals previously
ignored undercurrents of subversion in southern society performed by its women writers
as well as opens up new possibilities of understanding its relationship to the nation.

159

WORKS CITED
Abbandonato, Linda. “‘A View from ‘Elsewhere’’: Subversive Sexuality and the
Rewriting of the Heroine’s Story in The Color Purple.” PMLA 106.5 (October
1991): 1106-1115.
Allison, Dorothy. Bastard Out of Carolina Manuscript. Dorothy Allison Papers, 19652010. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University.
---. Trash. 1988. New York: Plume, 2002.
---. Bastard out of Carolina. New York: Penguin Books, 1993.
---. Two or Three Things I Know for Sure. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.
Baker, Houston and Dana D. Nelson. “Preface: Violence, the Body, and ‘The South.’”
American Literature 73.2 (June 2001): 231-244.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. 1965. Trans. Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1984.
Bartky, Sandra Lee. “Narcissism, Femininity and Alienation.” Social Theory and
Practice 8 (Sum 1982): 127-143.
---. “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power.” Feminist Social
Thought: A Reader. Ed. Diana Tietjens Meyers. New York: Routledge, 1997. 93111.
Bauer, Dale. “‘In the Blood’: Sentiment, Sex, and the Ugly Girl.” differences: A Journal
of Feminist Cultural Studies 11.3 (Fall 1999): 57-75.
Berlant, Lauren. “Re-Writing the Medusa: Welty’s ‘The Petrified Man.’” Studies in Short
Fiction 26 (Winter 1989): 59-70.
Berlant, Lauren and Lee Edelman. Sex, or the Unbearable. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2014.
Benjamin, Jessica. Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual
Difference. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
Betts, Doris. Beasts of the Southern Wild and Other Stories. New York: Harper & Row,
1973.
Bibler, Michael. Cotton's Queer Relations: Same-Sex Intimacy and the Literature of the
Southern Plantation, 1936-1968. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2009
Blackall, Jean Frantz. “Edith Wharton’s Art of Ellipsis.” The Journal of Narrative
Technique 17.2 (Spring 1987): 145-162.

160

Boone, Joseph Allen. Tradition Counter Tradition: Love and the Form of Fiction.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Bordo, Susan. “The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity.” Conboy, Medina, and
Stanbury 90-110.
---. Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body. 1993. Tenth
Anniversary Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
Burton, Oville Vernon. “Family, Modernization of.” Encyclopedia of Southern Culture.
Ed. Charles Reagan Wilson and William Ferris. Vol. 4. New York: Anchor books,
1989. 459-462.
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York:
Routledge, 1993.
---. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Carter, Christine Jacobson. Southern Single Blessedness: Unmarried Women in the
Urban South 1800-1865. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006.
Cash, W. J. The Mind of the South. 1941. New York: Vintage, 1991.
"The Circus." Charlotte Observer (October 14, 1894): np.
Clinton, Catherine. “Maiden Aunt.” Encyclopedia of Southern Culture. Ed. Charles
Reagan Wilson and William Ferris. Vol. 4. New York: Anchor Books, 1989. 482485.
Conboy, Katie, Nadia Medina, and Sarah Stanbury, eds. Writing on the Body: Female
Embodiment and Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Despentes, Virginie. King Kong Theory. 2006. Trans. Stéphanie Benson. New York: The
Feminist Press, 2009.
Dillman, Caroline Matheny, ed. Southern Women. New York: Hemisphere Publishing
Corporation, 1988.
Douglas, Ellen. Witnessing. Oxford: University of Mississippi Press, 2004.
Edelman, Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2004.
Ellis, Helen. Eating the Cheshire Cat. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
Entzminger, Bettina. The Belle Gone Bad: White Southern Women Writers and the Dark
Seductress. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002.
Etcoff, Nancy. Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty. New York: Doubleday,
1999.

161

Faulkner, William. Absalom, Absalom! : The Corrected Text. 1936. Vintage International
ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1990.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 1975. Trans. Alan
Sheridan. 1977. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.
---. “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.” Trans. Phillis Aranov
and Dan McGrawth. Foucault Live (Interviews, 1961-1984). Ed. Sylvère
Lotringer. New York: Semiotext(e), 1996. 432-449.
Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth. "Scarlett O'Hara: The Southern Lady as New Woman."
American Quarterly 33.4 (Autumn, 1981): 391-411.
Freeman, Elizabeth. The Wedding Complex: Forms of Belonging in Modern American
Culture. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. Staring: How We Look. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
Gimlin, Debra L. Body Work: Beauty and Self-Image in American Culture. Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 2002
Glasgow, Ellen. “Heroes and Monsters.” The Saturday Review of Literature XII.1 (May
4, 1935): 3-4.
Gleeson-White, Sarah. “A Peculiarly Southern Form of Southern Ugliness: Eudora
Welty, Carson McCullers, and Flannery O’Connor.” The Southern Literary
Journal 36.1 (Fall 2003): 46-57.
Glock, Allison. “Southern Women.” Garden and Gun. August/September 2011. Web. 11
April 11, 2014.
Goffman, Erving. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York:
Simon & Schuster Inc., 1963.
Gooch, Brad. Flannery: A Life of Flannery O’Connor. New York: Little, Brown and
Company. 2009.
Greeson, Jennifer Rae. Our South: Geographic Fantasy and the Rise of National
Literature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994.
Guralnick, Peter. “The Storyteller’s Tale.” Conversations with Lee Smith. Ed. Linda Tate.
Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, 2001. 140-152.
Halberstam, Judith. The Queer Art of Failure. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
Higgins, Geraldine. “Tara, the O’Haras, and the Irish Gone With the Wind.” Southern
Cultures (Spring 2011): 30-49.

162

Hurston, Zora Neale. Their Eyes Were Watching God. 1937. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2006.
Irigaray, Luce. This Sex Which Is Not One. Trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke.
New York: Cornell University Press, 1985.
Jones, Anne Goodwyn. “Engendered in the South: Blood and Irony in Douglass and
Jacobs.” Jones and Donaldson 201-219.
---. Tomorrow is Another Day: The Woman Writer in the South 1859-1936. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1981.
Jones, Anne Goodwyn and Susan V. Donaldson. “Haunted Bodies: Rethinking the South
through Gender.” Jones and Donaldson 1-19.
Jones, Anne Goodwyn and Susan V. Donaldson, eds. Haunted Bodies: Gender and
Southern Texts. Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1997.
Jones, William M. “Eudora Welty’s Use of Myth in ‘Death of a Traveling Salesman.’”
Journal of American Folklore 73 (January-March 1960): 18-19.
---. “Name and Symbol in the Prose of Eudora Welty.” Southern Folklore Quarterly 22
(December 1958): 173-174.
Jordan, Jennifer. “Feminist Fantasies: Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching
God.” Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature 7.1 (Spring 1988): 105-117.
Judkis, Maura. "Big 'Lady' Pens Unleash Amazon Snarkfest." The Washington Post
(8/29/12): np.
Kennedy, John Pendleton. Swallow Barn. Originally published 1832; revised 1851. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986.
King, Florence. Confessions of a Failed Southern Lady. 1985. London: Virago Press,
2006.
Kreyling, Michael. Understanding Eudora Welty. Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1999.
Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
Lazo, Rodrigo. “The Place of Hemispheric American Studies.” American Literature 86.1
(March 2014): 171-181.
Leslie, Virginia Kent Anderson. “A Myth of the Southern Lady: Antebellum Proslavery
Rhetoric and the Proper Place of Woman.” Dillman 19-32.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Elementary Structures of Kinship (Les Structures élémentaires
de la Parenté). 1949. Rev. ed. Trans. James Harle Bell, John Richard von
Sturmer, and Rodney Needham, eds. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

163

Lienard-Yeterian, Marie. “Opening Up/Mapping Out a New Space in the Southern
Imagination” L’espace du Sud au Féminin (2011): 29-41.
Lindberg-Seyersted, Brita. “Who Is Nettie? and What Is She Doing in Alice Walker's The
Color Purple?” American Studies in Scandinavia 24 (1992): 83-96.
Lynxwiler, John and Michele Wilson. “The Code of the New Southern Belle: Generating
Typifications to Structure Social Interaction.” Dillman 113-124.
Marrs, Suzanne. Eudora Welty: A Biography. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2005.
---. “Eudora Welty: Panel Discussion and Gallery Walk-Through.” Ogden Museum, New
Orleans, Louisiana. 13 July 2013.
McGraw, Eliza Russi Lowen . "A 'Southern Belle with Her Irish Up': Scarlett O'Hara and
Ethnic Identity." South Atlantic Review 65.1 (Winter 2000): 123-131.
McPherson, Tara. Reconstructing Dixie: Race, Gender, and Nostalgia in the Imagined
South. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
Meisenhelder, Susan Edwards. Hitting a Straight Lick with a Crooked Stick: Race and
Gender in the Work of Zora Neale Hurston. Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press, 1999.
Miller, D. A. Jane Austen, or The Secret of Style. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003.
Mitchell, Margaret. Gone with the Wind. 1936. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1964.
Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007.
“nuclear, adj. (and adv.) and n.” OED Online. September 2013. Oxford University Press.
29 September 2013.
O’Connor, Flannery. A Good Man is Hard to Find. 1955. Stories and Occasional Prose.
New York: Library of America, 1988.
---. Letter to A. 5 August 1955. Essays and Letters. New York: Library of America,
1988.
---. “Some Aspects of the Grotesque in Southern Fiction.” 1960. Stories and Occasional
Prose. New York: Library of America, 1988.
---. Everything That Rises Must Converge. 1965. Stories and Occasional Prose. New
York: Library of America, 1988.
Penny, Laurie. Meat Market: Female Flesh Under Capitalism. Hampshire, UK: OBooks, 2010.

164

Phillips, Robert L., Jr. “A Structural Approach to Myth in the Fiction of Eudora Welty.”
Prenshaw 56-67.
Pitavy-Souques, Danielle. “Technique as Myth: The Structure of The Golden Apples.”
Prenshaw 258-268.
Porter, Katherine Anne. The Old Order: Stories of the South. 1944. New York: Harvest /
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
Powell, Tara. The Intellectual in Twentieth-Century Southern Literature. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State Press, 2012.
Prenshaw, Peggy, ed. Eudora Welty: Critical Essays. Jackson: University of Mississippi
Press, 1979.
Pussy Riot. "Pussy Riot Band Members in Orthodox Church." Youtube. 24 February
2012.
Rawlings, Marjorie Kinnan. “Gal Young Un.” Short Stories by Marjorie Kinnan
Rawlings.Ed. Rodger L. Tarr. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1994. 148183.
Rich, Adrienne. “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.” 1980. Blood,
Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986.
23-75.
Roberts, Blaine. Pageants, Parlors, and Pretty Women: Race and Beauty in the
Twentieth-Century South. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
2014.
Roberts, Diane. The Myth of Aunt Jemima: Representations of Race and Region. New
York: Routledge, 1994.
Ross, Daniel W. “Celie in the Looking Glass: The Desire for Selfhood in The Color
Purple.” Modern Fiction Studies 34.1 (Spring 1988): 69-84.
Rudman, Laurie A. and Jessica B. Heppen. “Implicit Romantic Fantasies and Women’s
Interest in Personal Power: A Glass Slipper Effect?” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 1357-1370.
Russo, Mary. The Female Grotesque: Risk, Excess, and Modernity. New York:
Routledge, 1994.
Scarry, Elaine, ed. Literature and the Body: Essays on Population and Persons (Selected
Papers from the English Institute). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1990.
Scarry, Elaine. On Beauty and Being Just. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1999.

165

Scott, Anne Firor. The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics 1830-1930. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial
Desire. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
Segrest, Mab. My Mama’s Dead Squirrel: Lesbian Essays on Southern Culture. Ithaca,
NY: Firebrand Books, 1985.
Seidel, Kathryn Lee. The Southern Belle in the American Novel. Gainesville, Florida:
University Presses of Florida, 1985.
Smith, Lee. Oral History. New York: Ballantine Books, 1983.
---. Family Linen. New York: Ballantine Books, 1985.
---. Saving Grace. New York: Random House, 1995.
---. The Last Girls. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 2002.
“southern belle, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2014. Web. 12 April
2014.
Stallybrass, Peter and Allon White. The Politic and Poetics of Transgression. London:
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1986.
Stockton, Kathryn Bond. The Queer Child, or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth
Century. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
Tayler, Jeffrey. "What Pussy Riot's 'Punk Prayer' Really Said." The Atlantic. 8 November
2012.
“ugly.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 5th ed. 2011.
Waldron, Anne. Eudora: A Writer’s Life. New York: Doubleday, 1998.
Walker, Alice. The Color Purple. New York: Harvest, 1982.
Watson, Jay. Reading for the Body: The Recalcitrant Materiality of Southern Fiction,
1893-1985. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012.
Weiss, Sasha. "The Power of #YesAllWomen." The New Yorker (May 26, 2014): np.
Wells, Rebecca. The Divine Secrets of the Ya-Ya Sisterhood. New York: HarperCollins,
1996.
Welter, Barbara. “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820–1860.” American Quarterly 18:2
(Summer 1966): 151–174.
Welty, Eudora. “Asphodel.” n.d. T S Eudora Welty Collection. Mississippi Department
of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.

166

---. “Clytie.” n.d. T S Eudora Welty Collection. Mississippi Department of Archives and
History, Jackson, Mississippi.
---. “The Key.” n.d. T S Eudora Welty Collection. Mississippi Department of Archives
and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
---. “A Memory.” n.d. T S Eudora Welty Collection. Mississippi Department of Archives
and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
---. “Why I Live at the P.O.” n.d. T S Eudora Welty Collection. Mississippi Department
of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
---. The Bride of the Innisfallen, and Other Stories. 1940. New York: Library of America,
1998.
---. A Curtain of Green and Other Stories. 1941. New York: Library of America, 1998.
---. “Letter to John F. Robinson, n.d. “Friday” [27 June 1941].” Mississippi Department
of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
---. The Wide Net and Other Stories. 1943. New York: Library of America, 1998.
---. The Golden Apples. 1949. New York: Library of America, 1998.
---. Losing Battles. 1970. New York: Library of America, 1998.
---. “Eudora Welty, The Art of Fiction No. 47.” Interview with Linda Kuehl. The Paris
Review 55 (Fall 1972): n.p.
---. Moon Lake and Other Stories. 1980. New York: Library of America, 1998.
---. On Writing. New York: Modern Library, 2002.
White, Evelyn C. Alice Walker: A Life. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.
Wiese, Holger, Carolin S.Altmann, and StefanR.Schweinberger. “Effects of
attractiveness on face memory separated from distinctiveness: Evidence from
event-related brain potentials.” Neuropsychologia 56 (2014): 26-36.
Wright, Charlotte M. Plain and Ugly Janes: The Rise of the Ugly Woman in
Contemporary American Fiction. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2006.
Yaeger, Patricia. Dirt and Desire: Reconstructing Southern Women’s Writing, 19301990. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
---. “Beyond the Hummingbird: Southern Women Writers and the Southern Gargantua.”
Haunted Bodies: Gender and Southern Texts. Jones and Donaldson 287-318.
---. "Genre." 128th Modern Language Association Annual Convention. Modern Language
Association. Boston. 4 January 2013.

167

VITA
Monica C. Miller received her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in English at the
University of Tennessee-Knoxville in 2008 and 2010, respectively. She expects to
receive her Ph.D. in English with a minor in Women’s and Gender Studies from
Louisiana State University in August 2014 and will begin a Brittain Postdoctoral
Fellowship at Georgia Institute of Technology in August 2014.

168

